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INTRODUCTION
The vindication of Galileo Galilei came, at long last, on October
80, 1992.' The Roman Catholic Church finally cleared Galileo's
name after condemning him in 1633 as the original "junk scientist"
for his heresy in attempting to prove, and teach, his fervent and
long-held view that the Earth travels around the Sun.2 More than
350 years had elapsed, but after a thirteen-year study of the case, a
special commission of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences "brought
the pope a 'not guilty' finding for Galileo who . . . at age 69, was
forced to repent by the Roman Inquisition and spent the last eight
years of his life under house arrest."3
If Galileo had somehow been able to see his name cleared by the
Church-say, if in his declining years he had devoted his creative
energies to research in cryogenic engineering and had chosen him-
self as the first experimental subject, leaving instructions to be awak-
ened upon his vindication-how shocked he would have been to
learn that, despite his vindication by the Church, he remained con-
troversial among certain secular figures. Indeed, Galileo would be
surprised to learn that he played a starring role in Peter W. Huber's
influential recent book about the American legal system. For on
awakening, our Renaissance Rip Van Winkle would learn that he
had already achieved something beyond simple vindication-re-
venge. What is "Galileo's Revenge"? Huber, widely regarded as
the nation's preeminent "guru" of tort reform,4 explains in the sub-
title of his book that Galileo's Revenge is "Junk Science in the
Courtroom." 5
In the introduction to his book, Huber declares that, "[j]unk sci-
ence is the mirror image of real science. ' 6 Huber lays out his thesis
in a few sentences:
Junk science cuts across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine
1. See William D. Montalbano, Vatican Finds Galileo 'Not Guilty, Pope Admits Error in Re-
jecting Theory, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1992, at A40 (reporting that Roman Catholic church admit-
ted that Galileo's condemnation was mistake).
2. See 19 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 640-41 (Philip N. Goetz ed., 15th ed. 1988)
("Galileo became convinced early in life of the truth of the Copernican theory (i.e., that the
planets revolve about the Sun)"). In 1609, Galileo, with the aid of the telescope, attempted to
support his scientific beliefs. Id. at 640. He first ran into trouble with the Church for three
letters venturing that the movement of sunspots across the face of the Sun proved that Coper-
nicus was right. Id His authorship in 1632 of Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems-
Ptolemaic and Copernican led to his formal condemnation under the Inquisition. Id. at 641.
3. Montalbano, supra note 1, at A40.
4. Saundra Torry, Walter Cronkite Video Helps Stir Up Debate over Tort Reform, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 1992, (Washington Business) at 5.
5. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991)
[hereinafter HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE].
6. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 2.
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and engineering .... It is a catalog of every conceivable kind of
error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and,
now and again, outright fraud.
On the legal side, junk science is matched by what might be
called liability science, a speculative theory that expects lawyers,
judges, and juries to search for causes at the far fringes of science
and beyond. The legal establishment has adjusted rules of evi-
dence accordingly, so that almost any self-styled scientist, no mat-
ter how strange or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify
in court. The same scientific questions are litigated again and
again, in one courtroom after the next, so that error is almost
inevitable.
Junk science is impelled through our courts by a mix of oppor-
tunity and incentive. "Let-it-all-in" legal theory creates the op-
portunity. The incentive is money: the prospect that the Midas-
like touch of a credulous jury will now and again transform scien-
tific dust into gold.7
Huber pulls no punches in voicing the level of his concern. Hu-
ber's first major book, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Conse-
quences, written in 1988, cataloged a long list of what Huber regards
as the most outstanding flaws of the American tort liability system.,
But Huber insists that one defect is paramount: "[A]mong all the
many refractory problems of our modern liability system, junk sci-
ence is the most insidious and the least noted."
Huber claims to have uncovered an ongoing scheme against cor-
porations, the public good, and science itself, carried out by seven
co-conspirators: (1) liberal, ivory-tower law professors and social
engineers, led by the dean of the Yale Law School, Guido Cala-
bresi,10 who care more about fairness than about legitimate science
and economic efficiency and have propagated the idea that legal lia-
bility should be imposed on "deep pocket" corporations, regardless
of traditional notions of causation and fault;"1 (2) injured consumers
and workers looking for a quick buck, who bring suit on exaggerated
grievances at the drop of a hat;12 (3) rapacious attorneys who file
7. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 3.
8. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)
[hereinafter HUBER, LIABILITY].
9. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4.
10. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 11, 13 (citing Guido Calabresi's book
The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis as summary of "liability science" school of
thought and referring to followers of theory as "Calabresians").
11. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 11-13 (explaining that "liability sci-
ence" developed as attempt to control costs of accidents by allocating them to "cheapest cost
avoider," or party who was best suited to prevent accident).
12. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 41.
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such baseless claims;' 3 (4) out-of-the-mainstream scientists who
prostitute themselves by proffering novel and ridiculous conjectures
as if they were well-demonstrated scientific facts and well-accepted
theories; 14 (5) trial judges who ought to act as vigilant gatekeepers,
but who instead abdicate their duties and "let in all the evidence,"
that is, the patent nonsense offered by plaintiffs' paid expert wit-
nesses;15 (6) ignorant jurors who believe such alchemical drivel;16
and (7) appellate judges who ignore the truth to uphold undeserved
victories and unjustifiably generous awards won by plaintiffs.1 7 In
his first book on the American tort system, Huber advanced a simi-
lar thesis about the machinations of "the Founders" of this destruc-
tive system.' 8 The point of Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the
Courtroom is to highlight the "most insidious" aspect of this
scheme-the use of "junk science."' 19
Why does "junk science," this insidious instrument of injustice,
constitute "Galileo's Revenge"? Why would Galileo endorse the
view of courtroom scientific testimony sketched out in chapter one
of Galileo's Revenge, in which the plaintiffs' trial bar breeds "en-
trepreneurial experts" who-through a bizarre process of "unnatu-
ral selection"- develop "exorbitant plumage and distinctive songs"
and ultimately present themselves as "Mr. Professional Witness,
U.S.A."? 20 Why would Galileo be so happy with this state of affairs?
According to Huber, Galileo is enjoying a last laugh at the ex-
pense of millions of American citizens because his example of
steadfast scientific dissent in the face of overwhelming orthodoxy
serves as both inspiration to, and justification for, an army of "junk
scientists." 2' Thus, Galileo may have suffered unjustly by being
branded a heretic, but at least Galileo can enjoy sweet revenge,
knowing that American corporations and consumers alike are suffer-
13. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4.
14. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 19 (citing sources that refer to scien-
tific experts as "hired guns" who "are like a bunch of hookers in June").
15. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 209-10.
16. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4.
17. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 46-47.
18. See HUBER, LIABILITY, supra note 8, at 7 ("In a remarkably short time, the Founders
[Huber's term for law professors like Dean William Prosser and Dean Guido Calabresi who
advocated proconsumer legal reforms] completely recast a centuries-old body of law in an
entirely new mold of their own design.").
19. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4-5 (claiming that one urgent ques-
tion facing society is "how to stop legions of case-hardened lawyers from attacking false
causes, on behalf of false victims, on the basis of what nobody but a lawyer and his pocket
expert call science").
20. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 19.
21. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 194 (asserting that plaintiffs' lawyers
use figure of"mini-Galileos" to plead that novel scientists should not be ostracized because,
like Galileo, they are at "frontiers of medicine or science").
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ing at the hands of many junk scientists, each of whom claims to be
"a new Galileo, a lonely, misunderstood genius who can see won-
ders that others neither discern or understand." 22 Ostracism by so-
called mainstream scientists supposedly "inspires rather than dis-
courages the new-age Galileos." 23 Thus, Huber describes Galileo as
"the patron saint of all heretics." 24
According to Huber, the reason that Galileo's example is so per-
nicious, and why his revenge is so destructive, is that the lesson of
Galileo's life's work not only is no longer relevant for the modern
world, but it actually offers a romantic but destructive model of indi-
vidual genius laboring against convention. It is true that Galileo sin-
glehandedly made astounding discoveries, was correct in many of
his conclusions, and was wrongly denounced. Huber suggests, how-
ever, that it is highly unlikely for a single scientist working now to
produce an original work that proves the prevailing consensus
wrong.25 As a result, Galileo is not only an artifact of a bygone age,
but he is also a malignant model for present-day scientists. In his
day, "Galileo had limited opportunity to belong to a larger commu-
nity of scientists .... -26 Since 1660, however, "all science in the
West has been built up through collegiality and consensus-and a
concomitant decline in the role of the hermit scientist" who oper-
ated in the style of Galileo. 27 In this day and age, "[t]he vindication
of good science in court" requires that we give "much less attention
to the, self-proclaimed new Galileos, and far more to the reticent
stalwarts of the mainstream scientific community." 28
Forced adherence to "mainstream" science is the ultimate theme
and policy prescription of Galileo's Revenge. As Huber notes on his
closing page, "The best test of certainty we have is good science...
the science of consensus and peer review."'29 For these reasons, Hu-
ber believes that the example of Galileo should be banned from the
courtroom, and until it is banned, that Galileo's Revenge will
continue.
This synopsis of Huber's thesis, along with samples of the sarcas-
tic and bombastic rhetoric contained in Galileo's Revenge, does not on
22. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 16.
23. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 93.
24. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 194.
25. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 196 (stating that modern science no
longer progresses according to single theory but is "process of replication and verification, a
search for consensus").
26. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 196.
27. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 196.
28. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 210.
29. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 228.
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the surface reveal a serious work of legal research or thought. Ordi-
narily, such a book would not deserve extended analysis in a law
review article. Indeed, even those closest to Huber do not appear to
view him, on the issues of "tort reform" and "junk science," as a
serious scholar. For example, Kenneth R. Foster, a University of
Pennsylvania bioengineering professor who is Huber's co-editor for
his forthcoming book, Phantom Risks: Scientific Inference and the Law,30
recently noted that Huber is "'not an academic scholar .... He
writes a good jeremiad. He's a polemicist.' ,,1
However, because both Galileo's Revenge and its author have re-
ceived heavy publicity and have been treated by lawyers as well as
laypeople as if they were part of legitimate scholarship on these is-
sues, the book demands extended critical review. As explained in
Part I of this Article, in recent years Huber has attained remarkable
influence in policy debates over tort law in America. Galileo's Revenge
and Huber's other writings have been widely cited by lawyers, lob-
byists, and even former Vice President Dan Quayle,32 and have been
glowingly reviewed by lay writers. Even as a mere "polemicist" who
writes nothing more than a "good jeremiad," Huber is clearly a fig-
ure to be reckoned with. Indeed, Huber's definition of "good sci-
ence" as "the science of consensus and peer review" was the main
explication of the scientific method relied on by Judge Alex Kozinski
in his opinion for'the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,3 a case which served as
the vehicle for the U.S. Supreme Court's first analysis of the expert
testimony rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 34
Parts II and III examine some of the more serious factual and
legal flaws in Galileo's Revenge. The analysis of Huber's treatment of
facts in Part II reveals a work that relies almost exclusively on anec-
dotal information and inflated rhetoric, misrepresents numerous as-
30. KENNETH R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW
(1993).
31. Milo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge: Star of Legal Refonn Kindles Controversy but Collects Crit-
iCS, WALL ST.J., Oct. 16, 1992, at Al, A6 (quoting Kenneth R. Foster).
32. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (noting that former Vice President
Quayle relied on Huber's research and tort reform ideas).
33. 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). Judge Kozinski
quoted Huber's definition of good science--the science of publication, replication, and ver-
ification, the science of consensus and peer review"-in support of his decision to disallow
the plaintiffs' expert testimony. Id. at 1131. The author was counsel of record in the U.S.
Supreme Court for the plaintiffs in Daubert.
34. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve three issues: (1) whether the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence dispense with the "general acceptance" test regarding expert testi-
mony; (2) whether the lower courts can create their own exclusionary rules to replace or
supplement those enacted by Congress; and (3) whether the lower courts may delegate au-
thority for determining acceptability of scientific evidence to editors of peer-review journals.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
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pects of its subject matter, and presents no considered, objective, or
empirically based measure of the extent of the "junk science" prob-
lem. The legal analysis in Part III focuses on Huber's fictional ren-
dering of the history of the "Frye rule" mandating "general
acceptance" of novel scientific techniques used in some types of
cases,3 5 and on Huber's failure to take into account the constitution-
ally mandated and traditional role of the jury in resolving factual
issues in American lawsuits. Collectively, Parts II and III support
the conclusion that Galileo's Revenge is perfectly described with Hu-
ber's own words as "a catalog of every conceivable kind of error:
data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now and
again, outright fraud."'3 6
Finally, Part IV explores how a book with such deplorable factual
and legal analysis could come to be so widely cited and widely
praised in both the legal and lay press. The answer is perhaps the
most interesting and surprising aspect of this Article. The success
of Galileo's Revenge, and the prominence of Peter Huber on tort re-
form issues generally, are largely the product of an expensive, sus-
tained, and well-coordinated public relations effort by the
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, the conservative "think
tank" that employs Huber. The Institute is assisted in this task by a
phalanx of corporations and insurance companies that support the
work of Huber and other similar advocates in a quite understanda-
ble attempt to reduce their tort liability to individuals. Although
there is certainly nothing illegitimate about such an effort, knowl-
edge of the financial self-interest of those who support Huber and
promote his work plainly demonstrates the need for close scrutiny
of the content of, and motives for, Huber's writing. Unlike Galileo,
Huber is not a scholar who has achieved prominence in this field by
the sheer intellectual force of his ideas. Moreover, the story of Peter
Huber's rise as a corporate "guru" on the twin issues of "civil jus-
tice reform" in general, and "junk science" in particular, provides
an interesting window into the role of corporate-funded public rela-
tions campaigns in the ongoing policy debate over whether the
American legal system needs radical reform.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that Galileo is not the villain de-
picted by Huber. If awakened from cryogenic sleep today, Galileo
would not exult at the "revenge" Huber believes Galileo is wreaking
through the power of his gripping, but supposedly irrelevant, exam-
35. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (articulating rule that
scientific technique must have acquired "general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs" before it may serve as the basis of evidence).
36. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 3.
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ple of scientific fortitude. Rather, Galileo would again resort to the
scientific method, this time in the library rather than in the astro-
nomical observatory, and would quickly become exasperated at the
unsupported thesis of Huber's book, its numerous material misrep-
resentations and omissions, and its manipulative and evasive
method of argument. Galileo would find Huber's criticism of pur-
ported errors of scholarship by others to be hypocritical, as Huber
himself repeatedly violates the standards he holds out for the world
at large. After full review, Galileo would not ratify the message of
Galileo's Revenge. Finding little factual or legal support for Huber's
junk science theory and little to fear from the "new-age Galileos"
that figure as the subsidiary villains in Huber's book, Galileo would
instead issue a strong retort to Huber-an analysis of Huber's book,
one might imagine, much like the remainder of this Article.
I. THE PROMINENCE OF PETER HUBER
Between Peter Huber's 1988 publication of his first book criticiz-
ing the American system of tort liability, Liability: The Legal Revolu-
tion and Its Consequences, and the beginning of the Clinton
administration, Huber attained remarkable prominence in the tort
reform debate. In particular, Huber proved to be quite influential
in the Bush-Quayle administration,37 more so than any other profes-
sional critic of the civil justice system. Indeed, Huber's employer,
the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 38 boasted:
The Bush Administration's recent initiatives (witness Dan
Quayle's [August, 1991] speech to the ABA [Convention] or Pres-
ident Bush's recent Executive Order on civil justice reform) arise
directly out of the work of Senior Fellows Walter K. Olson and
Peter W. Huber; both gentlemen have met extensively with the
President's domestic policy staff.39
37. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (noting former Vice President Quayle's
reliance on Huber's figures and research).
38. See infra part IV (discussing power of Manhattan Institute and Huber's relationship
with and reliance on it). Huber acknowledges that Galileo's Revenge "was written under the
auspices of the Civil Justice Project of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research," where
Huber is a senior fellow. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 261. Those "auspices"
are not merely honorific; they pay well. As a senior fellow, Huber is one of three professional
employees of the Judicial Studies Program. Huber and the other two scholars, Walter Olson,
another senior fellow, and Michael Horowitz, former general counsel of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget in the Reagan administration and former head of the Reagan administra.
tion's Tort Policy Working Group, are slated to split $500,000 this year in salaries and
benefits. MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, JUDICIAL STUDIES PROGRAM: MISSION
STATEMENT AND OVERVIEW; ANNUAL BUDGET AND LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 5-6, 8 (Nov. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter MISSION STATEMENT] (on file with The American University Law Review); Letter from
Lawrence Mone, vice president, Research, The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, to
Supporters (Feb. 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review).
39. Fundraising Letter from William M.H. Hammett, President, Manhattan Institute for
[Vol. 42:1637
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Likewise, Huber himself noted that when former Vice President
Dan Quayle excoriated lawyers for allegedly burdening the Ameri-
can economy with $80 billion a year in "direct costs" and more than
$300 billion a year in "indirect" costs, 40 the Vice President derived
his estimates from a single source: Huber's 1988 book, Liability.4'
Independent observers and the White House staff subsequently
confirmed that Huber's analysis was of unmatched influence.42
Despite a brief spate of attention at the beginning of President
Clinton's term in office accorded by the withdrawn nomination of
Zoe E. Baird,43 the new administration appears to provide less fer-
tile ground for Huber's ideas.44 Nonetheless, Huber's well-estab-
lished position of influence in the policy debates of the day remains
for the most part untouched. Indeed, it is fair to say that Huber's
fame and influence in this area are unequaled. The Wall Street Jour-
nal described Huber as the "superstar" of the movement for "civil
justice reform."'45 The Washington Post echoed that Huber and his
Manhattan Institute colleague Walter Olson are "the intellectual
gurus of the tort-reform movement." 46 One law professor's exami-
nation of Huber's theory of tort law described him as "the leading
tort politician-academic of these times."'47
Far from being limited to a single administration or to the execu-
Policy Research, to Corporate Executives 1 (Nov. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Fundraising Letter]
(on file with The American University Law Review).
40. See Dan Quayle, CivilJustice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 560 (1992) (summarizing
civil justice reform proposals as presented to American Bar Association and placing direct and
indirect costs of liability system at $80 and $300 billion, respectively).
41. See Peter W. Huber, Dan Quayle, the Lawyers, and the AIDS Babies, FORBES, Oct. 28,
1991, at 194, 194 (recognizing that Vice President Quayle relied on figures from Liability).
42. See Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al (stating that Vice President relied on Huber's re-
search to buttress his tort reform proposal);Joe Queenan, Birth of a Notion: How the Think Tank
Industry Came up with an Issue That Dan Quayle Could Call His Own, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at
Cl (reporting that Vice President Quayle's ideas on tort reform derived from Huber and
Walter Olson, both of Manhattan Institute); Uncommon Law, NAT'L REV., Sept. 9, 1991, at 14,
14 ("Vice President [Quayle] drew heavily upon the scholarship of Peter Huber, Walter O1-
son, and others in recommending sweeping changes in our civil-justice system.").
43. See Michael Isikoff, Baird Backed Quayle Plan, Panel Told, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 1993, at
A6 (reporting that Baird had, as part of her corporate general counsel employment, previ-
ously endorsed Quayle's proposals for national tort reform). As general counsel and senior
vice president of the Aetna Life Insurance & Casualty Co., Zoe Baird proposed the creation of
the Office ofJudicial Impact Assessment to instigate tort reform legislation. Id. At that time,
she not only praised Quayle's proposals, but served briefly on a Council on Competitiveness
working group chaired by former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr that helped develop the
proposals. Id.
44. See Milo Geyelin, Product-Liability Groups Take Up Arms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at
BI (suggesting that tort reform proposals will not receive high priority in Clinton
administration).
45. Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al.
46. Torry, supra note 4, at 5.
47. Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L. REv.
1177, 1187 (1990). According to Professor Bell, in the last half of the 1980s, "a major new
kind of analysis of the proper role of torts has come to the fore, an analysis catapulted to new
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tive branch of the Federal Government, Huber's fame and influence
have reached many arenas, ranging from the federal judiciary48 to
law schools49 and the popular press. 50 As for Congress, according
to Victor E. Schwartz, the nation's most prominent tort-reform lob-
byist, 51 Huber's first book has had an unparalleled "'influence on
heights of prominence, and perhaps popularity, within the last year through the writing and
peregrinations of Peter Huber." Id. at 1178. Professor Bell further noted:
Huber has traveled far and wide since the publication of [Liability], engaging in de-
bates and explaining his theses. Memoranda from the Manhattan Institute discuss
his extensive speaking tours, provide glowing reviews of his writings and even offer
for sale audio tapes of Huber's performances on radio talk shows. At recent schol-
arly meetings, law professors from Yale, Stanford and the University of Houston
have spoken of the sensation created by recent Huber visits. An entire panel at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association ... in September, 1989
was devoted to [Liability], with the author there to confront his "critics." Huber has
been featured in front-page New York Times discussions of risk and public policy. He
regularly writes a column in Forbes magazine. In short, to a much greater degree than
any other writer about tort-related issues, Huber is a visible public figure.
Id. at 1178 n.7. Another law review writer has noted that "Peter Huber has emerged as one of
the leading critics of the tort system in general, and of the handling of scientific issues in court
in particular." Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Along the Litigation/Science Interface, 57 BRooK. L.
REv. 381, 381 n.2 (1991).
48. Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described
Huber as "a man of clear vision and extraordinary talent" who is "destined to become a major
player" in the movement to restore right thinking to the law of torts. Alex Kozinski, Torts Are
No Piece of Cake, WALL ST.J., Oct. 6, 1988, at A16. Judge Kozinski has called Liability required
reading "for anyone who wears a judicial robe." Id. In one judicial opinion, Kozinski cited
Liability in support of the proposition that "commercial enterprises [cannot] be expected to
flourish in a legal atmosphere where every move, every innovation, every business decision
must be hedged against the risk of exotic new causes of action and incalculable damages."
Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski,J., concur-
ring). As noted earlier, Galileo's Revenge played the central role in the theory of "good sci-
ence" adopted by Kozinski in his opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (relying on Huber's definition that good science is "the
science of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and peer re-
view"), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for whom Huber served as a law clerk,
has cited him in two opinions: Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Liability in
support of fact that designers of airplanes and motor vehicles cease work on projects out of
fear of punitive damages), and Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1059
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Liability as charging that "open-ended" punitive
damages instructions "stroke ... the vindictive or sympathetic passions ofjuries").
49. See MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, TEN YEAR REVIEw: 1980-1989, at 14
(1990) [hereinafter TEN YEAR REVIEW] (stating that since its publication in 1988, Liability has
become "assigned reading at many law schools" and "Huber has visited over three dozen law
schools to lecture and debate"); MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, SUMMER UPDATE 1
(1991) (noting that "the final exam from the first-year torts class at Yale [Law School]...
asked students to comment on a passage from [that] book").
50. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing press treatment of Huber's
work).
51. Victor E. Schwartz, long regarded as the tort reform movement's chief lobbyist and
spokesperson on Capitol Hill, "single-handedly engineered an entire subculture of the lobby-
ing industry," serving as founder of the Product Liability Alliance and "midwife for the Prod-
uct Liability Information Bureau, the Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Laws, and the
Product Liability Coordinating Committee." Sheila Kaplan, These Perennials Are Lobbyists' Cash
Cows, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at S3, S3-4.
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how people think .... Go in any policymaker's office-Democratic
or Republican-and they had his book.' "52 Huber has appeared
often before the Senate Commerce Committee during the past two
years, promoting federal limits on manufacturers' liability.53 In May
1992, Huber, using excerpts from Galileo's Revenge as support, testi-
fied before top Republicans as they considered legal-reform cam-
paign planks. 54
The lay press, for the most part, has seen Huber as an unalloyed
precious metal.55 Much of the praise for Huber has been wholly
without qualification or even hesitation, and, as will be demon-
strated below, remarkably without any effort to check the accuracy
of Huber's factual assertions.5 6 Huber is routinely referred to as an
estimable authority in scores of editorials, op-ed pieces, news sto-
ries, and business publications. 57 Although some lay reviewers have
criticized, or at least acknowledged, Huber's Manichean, all-black/
all-white vision of expert witnesses and their testimony, almost
every critic has apparently taken for granted that Huber's factual as-
52. See Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages on Torts, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1, 35 (quot-
ing pro-tort reform lobbyist Victor E. Schwartz).
53. Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al.
54. Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al.
55. For example, Galileo's Revenge is described as a "rare" book that is uniquely "fair,
important and original," Michael Fomento, Greedy Lawyers and "Expert" Witnesses, WALL ST.J.,
Oct. 9, 1992, at A13; as a "witty and readable.., book [that] should be read by every lawyer-
regardless of his [or her) position on the controversy-seeking a better understanding of the
tort system's abuses and the need for reform," Norman L. Greene, The Lawyer's Bookshelf, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 2; as a book that probes issues of science and the law "with a delightful
blend of humour and logic," Barry Kay, With Everything To Gain, INDEPENDENT, May 16, 1992,
at 28, 28; and as a book that "brilliantly ... piles case upon case, fact upon fact, to show that
junk science has become a plague on our legal system," Robert L. Spaeth, 'Junk Science" Has
Become a Plague in the System, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., May 3, 1992, at 12F; see also Charlotte
Allen, 'Junk Science" Prosecuted for Malicious Wounding ofJustice System, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1991, at B8 (stating that Galileo 's Revenge should be required reading for every jurist); Eliza-
beth Rosenthal, Tarnished Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 7, at 23 (opining that Galileo's
Revenge is perceptive combination of legal history, psychology, and sociology).
56. For an analysis of Huber's use of factual data, see infra, part II.
57. See, e.g., And justice for Some, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at F2; Doug Bandow, Legal
Alchemy in America, FORTUNE, Oct. 7, 1991, at 184, 184; Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The
Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 197, 197; L. Gordon Crovitz &
Stephen Bates, How Law Destroys Order, NAT'L REv., Feb. 11, 1991, at 28, 28; Henry Fairlie, Fear
of Living: America's Morbid Aversion to Risk, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1989, at 14, 14; Kenneth
Jost, Weird Science, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 104, 104; Tex Lezar, Texans Are Stuck with Huge,
Hidden Legal Costs, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1992, at 55; W.John Moore, Costly Justice, NAT'LJ.,
July 22, 1989, at 1898, 1898; Peter Passell, Economic Watch; Making a Risky Life Bearable: Better
Data, Clearer Choices, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1989, at Al; Joe Queenan, Birth of a Notion: How the
Think Industry Came Up with an Issue That Dan Quayle Could Call His Own, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
1992, at Cl; Paul C. Roberts, It's Time To Scrap America's Postwar Game Plan, Bus. WK., Apr. 9,
1990, at 14, 14; Ed Rubenstein, Killer Regulations: Economic Costs of Consumer Protection Regula-
tions, NAT'L REV., Nov. 24, 1989, at 20, 20; David Warsh, Economic Principals; No-Fault: We
Hardly Knew You, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 1988, at Al; Pat Widder, Smoke Signals: Baby Boomers
Are Growing Less Tolerant of Risks, CHI. TRiB., June 28, 1992, at Cl.
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sertions are accurate. 58
The lay criticisms of Huber's work that do exist tend to focus far
more on Huber's hyperbolic style of advocacy than on the quality of
his research and the level of factual support for his conclusions. 59
Only on rare occasions has any reviewer noted the one-sided nature
of Huber's critique of the civil justice system.60
With hardly an exception, legal scholars also have given Huber a
free ride, evidently regarding him as so established a scholar that his
credentials entitle his works to be routinely cited in the vein of
58. Thus, a recent review opined:
Huber is very convincing when he describes the histories and techniques of law-
yers who exploited these cases [i.e., injuries caused by sudden acceleration of Audi
5000 automobiles and birth defects caused by the prescription anti-nausea drug
Bendectin]. Their "experts" scrupulously avoid using all scientific evidence such as
quantifiable data, controlled tests or publication in peer-reviewed journals. [Huber]
is less convincing when he discusses other products, for instance, the Dalkon Shield,
an intrauterine birth control device that turned out to be an incubator for bacte-
ria.... It is too bad that Huber does not dwell on instances where products-like
asbestos, like the Dalkon Shield-have been truly injurious, and the courts a venue
for justice. All issues are not black and white.
Bettyann Kevles, DrivingJunk Sdencefrom the Courts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at E1O. The
reviewer conducted no independent scrutiny of Huber's presentation of the "facts" surround-
ing the Audi 5000 and Bendectin litigation. Id.
59. One commentator observed that Huber's "clever, rather high-toned expose [of
"junk science"] ... succumbs to repetitive rhetoric. Huber's hubris betrays him. He refuses
to talk straight." Ann G. Sjoerdsma, The Pseudoscience Bamboozlers, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 1991,
(Sunday Review) at 9. Another reviewer opined that although Galileo's Revenge is a "ferocious
and highly readable book ... Huber... weakens his case by slipping into easy sarcasm-a
temptation that's understandable, given the chicanery of his villains, but nonetheless distract-
ing." Louise Kennedy, Throwing 'Junk Science"out of Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1991, at
30. Still another commentator, this time with respect to Liability, although "impressed by
Huber's attention to the real workings of the tort system and his willingness to explain and
explore some of the more complex and elusive legal concepts that play such a crucial role in
the courts," nonetheless complained that "Huber is a missionary, not a scholar" and that his
"overheated rhetoric is so full of sarcasm and outright rancor that 'Liability' has the tone of a
propaganda tract rather than a considered attempt to persuade." Jonathan Kirsch, Who's To
Blame for High Liability Cost?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1988, § 5, at 4.
60. For example, one commentator observed:
Huber has written an angry, informed, entertaining tirade against pseudoscientific
experts-for-hire and the credulous judges, greedy attorneys, and know-nothing juries
who allow them to ply their trade .... Huber documents junk science ;s practiced
by experts for plaintiffs but never questions the science ginned up by defendants. He
attacks plaintiffs' attorneys as flamboyant, money-grubbing shysters who care little
for their clients. But he fails to note that once upon a time, many consumers had
little recourse in the courts. They were beaten down by big corporations that could
hire armies of experts to swear that their chemicals and their products were not dan-
gerous .... [Huber's] anti-Nader sentiments seem to blind him to the fact that re-
form must apply equally to large corporations, which still have the resources to
outexpert the most affluent of public-interest groups.
William Booth, Book Review-Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, WASH. MoNTiLy,
Sept. 1991, at 57, 57-59; see also Kennedy, supra note 59, at 30 (noting that "there are mo-
ments when [Huber's] faith in science seems as risky as the superstitions and pseudo-scientific
fads he so effectively debunks"); Kirsch, supra note 59, at 4 (asserting that "Huber undermines
his own credibility when he blames virtually all of the profound institutional changes in tort
law on a sinister conspiracy of lawyers and judges").
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Corbin on Contracts or Wigmore on Evidence, rather than carefully ex-
amined.61 Those few academics who have taken their obligations as
reviewers seriously have a decidedly different assessment of Huber's
scholarship. 62 Huber's views have been particularly influential in
the debate on "junk science," a topic, as well as a phrase, that Huber
almost singlehandedly popularized.63
As to the merit underlying this broad acceptance of Huber's work,
notwithstanding the seventeenth-century Roman Catholic Church's
misplaced confidence in the Ptolemaic view of the universe, the con-
61. See, e.g., Peter W. Sperlich, The Liability of Junk and the Junk of Liability: Evidentiary
Misdeeds in the Courts, 75JuDICArURE 273, 281 (1992) (noting that Galileo's Revenge "contributes
significantly to liability jurisprudence and the law/science interaction debate," that "[i]ts data
and arguments are germane to the work of judges, legal scholars, lawmakers, and forensic
scientists," and that Huber's "graceful" writing "should be read by all who have an interest in
our courts."); John F. Baughman, 1992 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 90 MIcH. L. REV.
1614, 1617 (1992) (reviewing Galileo's Revenge) ("Huber mercilessly and effectively describes
the pernicious effect ofjunk science on the courtroom"); Book Note, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 247,
248 (1992) (reviewing Galileo's Revenge) ("[Huber's) anecdotal, provocative style is engrossing,
and his revelations are astonishing."); Book Note, Rebel Without a Cause, 105 HARV. L. REV.
935, 936, 940 (1992) (reviewing Galileo's Revenge) ("Chapter by chapter, Huber documents
how ... permissiveness has obfuscated the issue of causation in tort cases.... Regardless of
whether he overstates the present danger or whether his Fye solution risks undercompensat-
ing valid claims, [Huber] credibly advances the debate on regulating expert testimony.").
Many law review articles treat Huber's works as essential, landmark works in the area of ap-
propriate tort liability policy. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJury
or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125 n.4, 1127 nn.8-9 (1992);
William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal To Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
639, 642 n.8 (1991); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned
Hand Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323, 344 n.101 (1991); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?
Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293,
297 n.10 (1988); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 669-70
nn.125-26 (1992); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 134 n.26 (1990); Jason S.
Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 340, 344 n.8 (1991).
62. For a discussion of negative academic appraisals of Huber's books, see infra part II.
Even the most conscientious of critics are seemingly overwhelmed by the sheer amount of
misrepresentation and distortion contained in Galileo's Revenge. Thus, Professor Lewin, in a
recent review of Galileo's Revenge, notes that "Huber fails to prove his contentions about the
extent and origins of the problem ofjunk science because his own methodology is little better
than that of the charlatans he criticizes." Jeff L. Lewin, Book Review: Calabresi's Revenge? Junk
Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 183, 186 (1993). But Lewin nonetheless
falls victim to the superficial plausibility of a number of Huber's case studies. Thus, Lewin
notes that Huber "is probably correct" in his scathing attack on the "junk science" suppos-
edly involved in litigation involving spermicides, Bendectin, and cerebral palsy, see id. at 202;
however, exhaustive scrutiny of each factual assertion made by Huber on these subjects (but
not undertaken by Lewin) reveals that Huber's critiques are unfounded.
63. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (recounting immense positive reception
of Huber's work). Huber's employer, the Manhattan Institute, boasted in a recent memoran-
dum to supporters that Huber has "played a key role in giving junk science testimony the
public attention it deserves, . . . and the Supreme Court review that is now pending" in
Daubert. "Indeed," the memorandum noted, "the very term 'junk science' has been popular-
ized largely through Peter Huber's book, Galileo's Revenge." Memorandum from Michael J.
Horowitz, Director, Judicial Studies Program, Manhattan Institute, to Colleagues and Associ-
ates (Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review).
1650 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1637
sensus views of things is often right. But as Galileo and countless
others have demonstrated, consensus views are occasionally or even
frequently wrong. We need not look to the legion of examples
drawn from the history of science to demonstrate this point;64 we
need only do what the many peers of Huber who have reviewed his
books have evidently not done: critically analyze his factual and
legal prescriptions. The next two parts of this Article reveal that,
based on such critical review, the popular acclaim enjoyed by
Galileo's Revenge does not arise from thorough research and accurate
analysis, for neither is evident in Huber's book.
II. HUBER'S DUBIOUS USE OF "FACTS" IN Galileo's Revenge
Unless we are all raging hypocrites, facts should be paramount
in a process that repeatedly swears fealty to the truth and nothing
but the truth.... The rule of law depends on both lucid rules and
accurate facts. 65
For Peter Huber, "[t]he 'rule of law' is a completely empty prom-
ise if key facts are infinitely plastic, if there is no external and immu-
table reality."66 "The rule of law is indeed a grand thing, but not
half so grand as the rule of fact."6 7 The question naturally arises:
How well does Galileo's Revenge measure up by Huber's own stan-
dards? One who demands that others meet high standards for pre-
cision and probity in their research and writing has a duty to abide
by those same standards, as Huber himself insists.6 8 And a writer of
64. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs 6 (2d ed.
1970) (enumerating scientific revolutions brought about by Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier,
and Einstein as examples of situations in which time-honored theories were rejected in favor
of new theories).
65. HUBER, GALtLEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 226.
66. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 219.
67. HUBER, GALiLEo's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 225. Huber is quite, and properly, unre-
lenting on this overriding theme of factual accuracy. Indeed, there is no message in Galileo's
Revenge about which he is more insistent, going so far as to entitle Part III of the book's three
parts: "The Rule of Fact." Id. at 169. For example, Huber states:
We want cases to be tried on their own facts, but we do not want facts themselves
reduced to transitory, manipulable sound bites with no objective reality. The indi-
vidual trial must somehow fit into a larger coherence, or all we have is despotism sold
by the drink.
... But anyone who believes in the possibility of neutral law ... must at the same
time believe in the existence of objective fact, which ultimately means positive sci-
ence.
... Shaggy edges notwithstanding, we need similar distinctions-with straightfor-
ward terminology to match-between fact and fantasy. Claims dressed up in the
form of serious science but lacking serious empirical and conceptual credentials will
continue to be junk science.
... In the end, getting facts right is a fundamental requirement of morality.
Id at 218-19, 223, 227.
68. See HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 200-01 (excoriating lawyers and ex-
pert witnesses who are unwilling to follow the standards they impose on others by noting:
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Huber's abilities is certainly capable of meeting these high
standards.
Huber is a brilliant engineering Ph.D who served as an instructor
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), graduated
summa cum laude from Harvard Law School, and clerked on the
U.S. Supreme Court.69 Among other professional endeavors unre-
lated to tort reform, in the mid-1980s Huber worked as a technical
consultant to the Department ofJustice, compiling the voluminous,
heavily documented "Huber Report" that the Department and the
federal courts relied on in significantly deregulating the nation's
telecommunications infrastructure. 70 Huber is surely able to meet
high standards of accuracy and thoroughness in scholarship when
he chooses to do so.
In order to test the validity of Huber's contention that junk sci-
ence is running an epidemic course in the nation's courts, and that it
poses "the most insidious" of "the many refractory problems of our
modem liability system,"'7 1 it would appear appropriate to judge
Huber's scholarship by the same standards he lays down for the con-
duct of science. Huber says that "real science" can be distinguished
from "junk science" by asking the following questions. First, does a
putative scientist base her conclusions on demonstrable facts or
does she just repeat her theory by way of endless illustration? Put
differently, does the scientist place fact upon fact, like brick upon
brick, to erect a solid wall of argument, or does she merely raise
castles of conjecture in the air?72 Second, how accurate and relia-
"[I]f people who really design cars or deliver babies are to be judged by professional stan-
dards in court, those who accuse them must be held to similar account. If the law is capable of
holding defendants to professional standards, it is capable of holding witnesses to the
same.").
69. See Geyelin, supra note 31, at A6 (stating that Huber earned both master's and doc-
toral degrees at MIT, received invitation to remain and teach, simultaneously attended
Harvard Law School, and eventually clerked forJustice O'Connor).
70. See PETER W. HUBER, THE GEODEsIc NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1987); see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283,
291 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that Department ofJustice relied on Huber Report as basis for recom-
mending deregulation of telecommunications industry), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). In-
deed, Huber's abilities in the fields of engineering and law have made him a leading figure
within the telecommunications area. In 1992, Huber co-authored the first full treatise on
federal telecommunications law. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE & PETER HUBER, FED-
ERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw (1992).
71. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4.
72. Huber posits:
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same form but
none of the same substance.... Take the serious sciences of allergy [sic] and immu-
nology, brush away the detail and rigor, and you have the junk science of clinical
ecology.... Junk science cuts across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and
engineering. It is a hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference, and logical leg-
erdemain, patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and diag-
nosis far outstrips their skill.
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ble-or how distorted-are the facts that she uses? 73 And third,
how willing is the scientist to present all sides of a controversy and
to acknowledge inconvenient facts that tend to disprove his hypoth-
eses, i.e., to tell the complete story-"the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth"74 -rather than including just those facts that
confirm his theories?75 As the remainder of Part II demonstrates,
the core of Huber's book, which presents his empirical evidence of
the junk science problem, fails these three tests.
A. The Endless Repetition of Anecdotal Horror Stories
and Conclusory Assertions, Without Empirical Substantiation
Galileo's Revenge fails Huber's first test, which is citation to, and
reliance on, verifiable, falsifiable factual data. The conclusion Hu-
ber seeks to prove is that junk science is the "most insidious" prob-
lem facing our tort system today. Thus, central to Huber's entire
argument is the factual assertion that "[']unk science verdicts, once rare,
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 2-3.
73. Huber asserts that "junk scientists" are willing to stretch whatever facts they discover
to fit the theories they espouse. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 27-29. Thus:
Pathological science often needs to assert claims of great accuracy as well, to con-
vert random noise into an apparently meaningful pattern. Observed effects rise and
fall as the intensity of the field (or the alpha rays, or the ambient traces of dioxin, or
whatever) are steadily increased. The skeptic concludes: there is no effect here at
all. Oh no, says the believer. Oh no. There are "windows" of sensitivity and re-
sponse here. Resonances. The effects are highly sensitive to the prece frequency
of the electric field, or dosage, or what have you. To the well-calibrated eye, there is
order here. The wide variations in response just reveal exquisite sensitivity to the
stimulus.
However gathered, bad data serve as a springboard for spurious inferences.
Id at 28-29.
74. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 2 ("The pursuit of truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth has given way to reams of meaningless data, fearful specula-
tion, and fantastic conjecture.").
Huber is right to hold out this standard for scientists and scholars, and indeed himself. But
he is either confused or misleading in his suggestion that the adversarial civil justice system
(or the adversarial criminal justice system, for that matter) has as its aim the pursuit of "truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." As Huber surely knows, the justice system pur-
sues relative justice, not absolute truth. If discovering absolute truth, not pursuing relative
justice, was the purpose of the justice system, many things would change. We would have
inquiries, not trials. The rules governing discovery would be greatly loosened, if not entirely
eliminated, and the discovery process would know no limits. Statutes of limitation and stat-
utes of repose would be repealed. And such niceties as the work-product doctrine, the attor-
ney-client privilege (and all other testimonial privileges), protective orders, confidentiality
decrees, sealed stipulations of settlement, gag orders, and such constitutionally mandated
doctrines as the exclusionary rule and the Miranda doctrine would have to go the way of the
wind, as each substantially interferes with the pursuit of absolute truth.
75. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 27 (claiming that "wishful research-
ers unconsciously discard 'bad' data to make remaining 'good' points look more important").
Huber quotes Nobel laureate Richard Feynman to good effect about why good scholarship
"demands 'utter honesty,' a 'leaning over backwards' to be open and frank. '[T]he idea is to
try to give all of the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not
just information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.'" Id. at 207
(quoting RICHARD FEYNMAN, SURELY YOU'RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMANI 34 (1985)).
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are now common. Never before have so many lawyers grown so
wealthy peddling such ambitious reports of the science of things
that aren't S0."'76 The Churchillian send-up is a nice touch, if a bit
overused. But Churchill had a way with facts, not just words.77
Where are Huber's facts, statistics, hard evidence, and authorities?
Huber cites none, and he does not attempt to build an empirical
case of his own to demonstrate the significance of the problem on
which he dwells. Not only are there no studies that support Huber's
view, but a recent report by the authoritative Carnegie Commission
on Science, Technology, and Government concluded that, as for the
"alleg[ations] that 'junk science' is flooding the courtroom," "many
of the concerns are greatly exaggerated" and "it does not appear
that the federal courts are being inundated with fringe science."'78
The first hint of the factual inadequacy in Huber's book lies in its
organization. Part I of Galileo's Revenge takes the form of a rambling
opening statement, defining the terms "liability science" and "junk
science" and introducing central villains from both law and science
who are integral to the insidious problem Huber has detected.79
The book ends, in Part III, with an even more discursive closing
argument, repeating these themes and urging judges to reject all
scientific testimony not endorsed by so-called mainstream scien-
tists.80 Less than sixty percent of Galileo's Revenge's pages are de-
voted to presenting factual support for Huber's thesis.8 1 And in this
middle section of the book, entitled "Law and Pseudoscience, ' 8 2
Huber proceeds only by way of illustrative anecdotes that, while in-
dividually dramatic, are never quantified. Although Huber often re-
fers to the persecution of witches, and in fact quantifies the scope of
that long-gone junk science epidemic,83 Huber's modern-day junk
76. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis added).
77. For example, Churchill knew-and noted-just how few Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots
fought off the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. It was those real facts, and not just
Churchill's words, that made his speech so compelling. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, BLOOD,
SWEAT & TEARS 341-51 (1941) (presenting Churchill's famous speech to British House of
Commons on August 20, 1940, in which Churchill recounted how Britain's RAF defeated
Germany's Luftwaffe despite overwhelming numerical odds and stated, "Never in the field of
conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.").
78. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 13 (Mar. 1993). The Commission did note, however, that the
reported cases "represent only the tip of the iceberg." Id.
79. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 9-35.
80. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 171-228.
81. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 39-168.
82. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 37.
83. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 10 (explaining how witch hunts ex-
panded as number of witch hunters increased, and stating that "[b]etween the Renaissance
and the Reformation, half a million witches were burned at the stake, for crimes committed
only in other people's dreams").
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science anecdotes never seem to make it into a table or chart and are
never cited as anything but individual examples of a supposed
whole. Huber's portrait of bad science running riot over good is at
best illustrative and impressionistic.
It may seem odd that an author who so revels in the hard sciences
of numerical, mathematically measurable, and provable (or falsifi-
able) facts, and who so chastises expert witnesses whom he terms
"liability scientists" for their putative failure to use empirical, quan-
tifiable data, is so chary of using them himself. But the absence in
Galileo's Revenge of empirically verifiable indicia of the "junk science"
problem hardly seems an inadvertence. More likely, it is a strategem
designed to avoid the sort of intense criticism that Huber faced
when he did set forth a key, bottom-line statistic in his 1988 book,
Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences-for which Huber
received intense criticism on the ground that he had simply con-
cocted the number as a means of dramatizing a supposedly en-
gulfing tide of frivolous lawsuits, absurd verdicts, outrageous
damage awards, and ridiculous rulings. 84
As noted in Part I, former Vice President Dan Quayle based his
charge that lawsuits were costing the American economy $300 bil-
lion a year entirely on the "facts" that Huber cited in Liability.85 The
trouble with the $300 billion figure is that it does not bear up under
even cursory scrutiny. As the venerable British journal 7he Economist
has summarized, the "$300 billion figure has no discernible connec-
tion to reality,"' 6 and "is impossible tojustify.' 8 7 "[T]here is scant
evidence of the catastrophic damage described by Mr. Quayle and
other critics," and, in fact, "much of the conventional wisdom about
product liability that lies behind the alarmist talk is plain wrong." 88
This view has been echoed by Judge Roger J. Miner of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a prominent judicial con-
servative who was appointed to the bench in 1985 by President Rea-
gan. Speaking before the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York in October, 1992, Miner advised that " 'it seems almost certain
that all of [Quayle's] figures were wrong.' "89 In particular, Miner
continued, " 'It]he $300 billion figure has been demonstrated to be
84. See HUBER, LIABILITY, supra note 8, at 4 (citing $80 billion figure as direct cost of
liability system and $300 billion as indirect cost).
85. See supra notes 39-42 (discussing former Vice President's reliance on Huber's
figures).
86. Order in the Tort, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, (Survey) at 8, 13.
87. Not Guilty, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1993, at 63, 63.
88. Id.
89. Henry J. Reske, In Defense of Lawyers: Conservative Judge Challenges Quayle Statistics,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 33, 33 (quotingJudge Roger J. Miner).
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a product of casual speculation and not derived in any sense from
investigative or statistical analysis.' "90
As University of Wisconsin law professor Marc Galanter has re-
ported, Quayle took his numbers from "liability guru Peter Huber,
who, it is fair to say, made [them] up." 91 Galanter went to some
effort to try to track down the sources and reasoning behind Hu-
ber's $300 billion number. His exegesis deserves to be quoted at
length:
Those who beat the antilawyer drum tell us, to take a statement
made by the vice-president to a group of business leaders last Oc-
tober, that "the legal system . . .now costs Americans an esti-
mated $300 billion a year." Three hundred billion? Where does
that come from? The vice-president has it from the Council on
Competitiveness (which he chairs), whose "Agenda for Civil Jus-
tice Reform," released August 13, 1991, borrows it from an article
in Forbes, which in turn took it from liability guru Peter Huber,
who, it is fair to say, made it up.
From a single sentence spoken by corporate executive Robert
Malott in a 1986 roundtable discussion of product liability, Hu-
ber, in his 1988 book Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Conse-
quences, adopted an unsubstantiated estimate that the direct costs
of the U.S. tort system are at least $80 billion a year-a number
far higher than the estimates in careful and systematic studies of
these costs. Huber then multiplied Malott's surmise by 3.5 and
rounded it up to $300 billion-and called that the indirect cost of
the tort system. The 3.5 multiplier came from a reference in a
medical journal editorial concerning the effects on doctors' prac-
tices of increases in their malpractice insurance premiums. Hu-
ber's book contained no discussion of the applicability of this
multiplier. It would appear that Huber, who has recently taken to lectur-
ing on the dangers of 'junk science, " certainly knows whereof he speaks.
So the vice-president's [and Huber's $300 billion] cost estimate
is not the product of any investigation or analysis by the competi-
tiveness council, or by Forbes, or by Huber, but is a product of
casual speculation. 92
Other scholars have agreed with Galanter's criticisms of Huber's
"utterly cavalier treatment of facts" and "use of sources that would
90. Id.
91. Marc Galanter, Pick a Number Any Number, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 82, 84 [hereinafter
Galanter, Pick a Number].
92. Id at 84 (emphasis added); see also Carolyn Colwell, A Defense Lawyer for Lawyers; State
Bar Head Says Bush-Quayle Attacks on Attorneys Are "Nonsense", NEWSDAY, Nov. 2, 1992, at B36
(citing Harvard professor Paul Weiler's objections to Huber's estimate that yearly cost of liti-
gation is $300 billion); Marc Galanter, Bumbling on Billions, AM. LAw., Apr. 1992, at 86, 86
(discussing Huber's lack of scholarly research and analysis).
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shame any first-year law student." 93 Thus, Professor Nicholas A.
Ashford, who taught Huber when he studied engineering at MIT,
characterized Huber's manipulation of the facts from which the
$300 billion estimate was derived as nothing less than a " 'slick
sleight of hand.'"94 Peter L. Kahn, an economist at Catholic Uni-
versity's Columbus School of Law, called Huber's "numbers totally
misleading. They immensely overstate the cost of the tort system to
society."9 5 Deborah R. Hensler, senior social scientist at the RAND
Institute for CivilJustice, a highly regarded research center, accused
Quayle of presenting " 'shaky' " statistics that are " 'at best incom-
plete and at worst misleading.' "96 Mark Hager, a professor at The
American University's Washington College of Law who analyzed the
provenance and accuracy of the $300 billion figure in exceedingly
fine detail in six pages of his superb Stanford Law Review article on
Liability, castigated that figure as a "huge exaggeration. ' 97
Huber's use of the $300 billion "factoid" appears symptomatic of
Huber's writings overall. Thus, Harvard law professor and top Rea-
93. Galanter, Pick a Number, supra note 91, at 82, 84.
94. Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al (quoting Nicholas Ashford).
95. Peter L. Kahn, Pricing the U.S. Legal System, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1992,
at 19.
96. Milo Geyelin, Quayle's Data in Proposed Reform of Legal System Called Misleading, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 4, 1992, at B7 (quoting Deborah Hensler).
97. Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 539, 547 (1990). For example, Hager traces the origin of one key element of the $300
billion "liability tax," the supposed $80 billion a year in direct liability costs that burden the
U.S. economy:
The source of this figure is mysterious and its accuracy doubtful.
Huber gives only one cite for the figure: "Chief Executive, Summer 1986, p. 32."
Ever hear of Chief Executive? Neither had I, but it turns out to be a kind of coffee table
magazine for high executives: lots of color photos and gossipy tidbits about business
luminaries. Its statement of editorial policy explains:
Chief Executive is ajournal of opinion by and for CEOs .... Our aim is to
... raise issues and offer solutions... without the editorial filter of the news
media.... Chief Executive is not a newsgathering magazine .... It serves
as a forum through which .. . [CEOs] can exchange opinions and get to
know one another.
Huber's endnote refers us to a [Chief Executive] combination feature on "The Liability
Crisis," part of it done in that familiar journalistic forum style: reprinting an inter-
viewer's questions and the oral remarks of several assembled pundits. The specific
source for Huber's figure is a remark by Robert Malott, chair of the Business Round-
table's product liability task force, that "insurance liability costs industry about $80
billion a year." Malott gives no documentation for his remark, so it is difficult to
know on what it is based or what types of costs the figure is meant to include. It is
striking, to say the least, that Huber should rely on such a casual source for so crucial
a point in his argument.
Huber characterizes this $80 billion annual figure as the sum of what tort liability
costs America "directly." Malott does not use the term "directly," and Huber does
not explain why he inserts the adjective or what it denotes. Hence, the meaning and
significance of the figure, already vague as posited by Malott, becomes even more
slippery in Huber's hands.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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gan Justice Department official Richard Stewart criticized Liability
for Huber's "'embrace of large conclusions on the basis of partial
or inadequate evidence.' "98 Joseph A. Page, a professor at the Ge-
orgetown University Law Center, faulted Huber for the "many inac-
curacies and distortions sprinkled throughout [Liability].'" 99 Even
conservative scholars fault Huber for his reckless disregard of fac-
tual accuracy. Thus, Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Virginia
Law School, who generally agrees with a number of Huber's pro-
posals, "finds fault with some of his methodology and data. 'I think
he does extrapolate from some pretty marginal data some-
times.' "100 Professor Hager goes a bit further: he finds Liability to
be "a book riddled with flaws and errors-factual, historical, logical,
philosophical, and moral-so serious as to make its destined status
as 'authoritative' a disturbing prospect."' 0 1 Hager concludes:
"Sloppy scholarship and flimsy argumentation make the book too
flawed to be taken seriously. Huber's statistics and anecdotes about
the liability crisis are so misleading that they amount to little more
than scare tactics."' 02
Sadly, the only lesson that Huber seems to have gleaned from
these criticisms of his first book is not that providing accurate facts
and reliable numbers is indispensable, but that in the polemical
98. Geyelin, supra note 31, at A6 (quoting Richard Stewart).
99. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. LJ. 649, 659 (1990). Page concludes
that Liability is generally flawed by a "cavalier regard for accuracy." Id. at 697; see also Vincent
R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1026, 1031 n.35 (1989) ("While the accuracy of Huber's argument is often a matter of
interpretation and emphasis, at some junctures, certain factual assertions appear to be simply
incorrect or plainly misleading."); Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1153, 1157 (1989) (noting that "[u]nfortunately, Huber's method of proof as to the existence
of error and its consequences is sometimes bald assertion").
100. Geyelin, supra note 31, at A6 (quoting Jeffrey O'Connell).
101. Hager, supra note 97, at 540.
102. Hager, supra note 97, at 579. Despite the strong criticisms contained in Geyelin's
Wall Street Journal expose of Oct. 16, 1992, Geyelin, supra note 31, at Al, A6, including nega-
tive comments by a co-author of his next book and two of his former professors, id., three
months transpired before Huber publicly commented, in the form of a letter to the editor of
the Journal. Peter W. Huber, "Slight of Hand?" Look Closer, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 15, 1993, at Al1.
Despite Huber's ample time for reflection on the range of criticisms in the article, Huber
elected to respond to only one criticism, that of his $80 billion/S300 billion annual "tort tax"
figure. Huber complained that Geyelin's article "focused on a single paragraph from my 1988
book 'Liability.' You dismissed my $80 billion estimate of the direct costs of liability insur-
ance as conjecture.... There followed a quote accusing me of'slick sleight of hand.' " Id. Of
course, Geyelin's article highlighted the $300 billion figure as but one (albeit the most glaring)
example of Huber's decidedly unscholarly reliance on unsubstantiated facts and rhetorical
excesses, as to the rest of which Huber had nothing to say. Even as to the $300 billion figure,
Huber's defense was to quote a 1992 clip from the RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil
Justice, summarizing the origins of Huber's $300 billion figure, noting that it "raises some
questions" about the validity of the analysis, offering an alternative estimate of the cost of the
tort system, and opining that "[rlight now, the answer to these questions must be that we
really don't know." Id
1658 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
writing of a "good jeremiad" it is necessary to dispense with con-
crete facts and numbers in their entirety so as to avoid giving critics a
clear target. Accordingly, in Galileo's Revenge Huber has totally es-
chewed hard numbers and solid statistics, opting instead for soft
anecdotes that are a good bit more difficult to appraise, much less
challenge. Thus, Huber nowhere documents his specific, central
charge that "Uj]unk science verdicts, once rare, are now com-
mon."10 Galileo's Revenge fails Huber's first test for good analysis.
Huber does not even attempt to establish verifiable or falsifiable fac-
tual data, but instead relies on endless repetition of the same theory,
based on isolated anecdotal information.
B. The Factual Distortions in Case Studies
Huber's second test for distinguishing "good science" from "junk
science"-or, for our purposes, good scholarship from "junk schol-
arship"-involves analyzing the accuracy and reliability of the indi-
vidual facts used by the scientist or the author. Galileo's Revenge fails
this test as well.
Unable to cite any statistical measures to prove that junk science
verdicts are "common," Huber devotes the middle seven chapters
of Galileo's Revenge to loose case studies of supposed junk science.
The first five chapters present anecdotal information in five kinds of
cases, cases put forth by Huber as proof of junk science run wild:
trauma-induced cancer, Audi 5000 "sudden acceleration," cerebral
palsy as a result of birth malpractice, clinical ecology, and Bendec-
tin. Two chapters then stress thematic concerns about tort law's al-
lowability of recovery for fear of future injury and tort law's
ignorance of environmental and lifestyle factors contributing to per-
sonal injuries.
The use of illustrative examples and anecdotes is not a wholly ille-
gitimate method of argument, but it has its dangers.' 04 Even assum-
ing that the portraits accurately depict the problem or tendency they
purport to describe, there always remains the question whether the
examples delineated as prototypes are really representative of other
cases. For example, readers of reports prepared by statisticians and
103. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 4.
104. As Professor Saks has persuasively pointed out, "anecdotal evidenc:e is heavily dis-
counted in most fields" because it "permits only the loosest and weakest ofinferences about
matters a field is trying to understand." MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1159 (1992). "[I]f we want
to know how the [tort litigation] system is really performing... then we must do more than
fling anecdotes back and forth," partly because "[s]ome litigation system anecdotes are simply
fabricated," and partly because "[a]necdotes have the power to mislead us into thinking we
know things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us." Id. at 1160-61.
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political pollsters are typically cautioned to inquire whether the
sample studied was a truly representative segment of the whole.
Huber provides no basis for establishing whether the examples he
gives of junk science are typical or instead aberrant. He simply as-
serts that the specific examples he cites are characteristic of overall
trends and entreats the good reader to trust him.
Beyond the lack of any basis for extrapolating from a few case
studies to a broader conclusion, the key case studies offered by Hu-
ber are themselves plagued by heavy misstatements of fact, as the
remainder of this Part demonstrates. 10 5
105. Given time and space constraints, the author has not attempted to analyze every fac-
tual charge made by Huber. Nevertheless, all is not well even in the portions of Galileo's
Revenge that are not critiqued at length in the ensuing pages. As just one example, chapter 6
of Galileo's Revenge, entitled "No Immunity: Chemicals Cause Everything," purports to de-
bunk the theory that the human immune system can be compromised by environmental tox-
ins, a theory sometimes referred to as "chemical AIDS." See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE,
supra note 5, at 92-110 (attacking Dr. Bertram Carnow and his school of "chemical AIDS"
enthusiasts and declaring that clinical ecology syndrome is belief, not disease). Huber reports
that maverick scientists' theories that industrial poisons can significantly damage the body's
autoimmune system are "medical fantasy, not fact." ldE at 104. He adamantly insists that the
theory that chemicals could so weaken a body's immune system as to facilitate the develop-
ment of diseases otherwise warded off by the natural immunities
finds no confirmation in studies of people who have been exposed to chemicals at
levels millions of times higher than those encountered through environmental pollu-
tion.... Good science has quite firmly established that, though scads of toxins might
theoretically harm immune system cells and proteins, only a very few, usually deliv-
ered intimately, knock out immune response while leaving no visible marks on other
body systems.
Id. at 104-05. Earlier in his book, Huber mocks these clinical ecologists as a mongrel "mix of
general practitioners, psychiatrists, urologists, and pediatricians," few of whom had scientific
training in laboratory or clinical research. Id. at 94.
This appears to be somewhat of an overreaction. In fact, real scientists, including those
"with diverse backgrounds in and knowledge of immunology, toxicology, immunotoxicology,
risk analysis, and other disciplines," and hailing from distinguished Federal Government re-
search labs like the Centers for Disease Control, the National Cancer Institute, the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, as well as theJohns Hopkins University, Case Western Reserve University,
the University of Colorado, and Oregon State University, disagree with Huber. SUBCOMM. ON
IMMUNOTOXICOLOGY, NATURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOLOGIC MARKERS IN IMMUNOTOX-
ICOLOGY 1 (1992). Their research, which was sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the U.S. Public Health Service, the National Institute for Environmental Health
Sciences, and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and published by the
National Academy of Sciences Press, reached conclusions quite different from Huber's. The
Subcommittee on Immunotoxicology of the Committee on Biologic Markers of the National
Research Council reported:
There is increasing awareness and concern within the scientific and public communities that
chemicalpollutants can suppress immune processes and thus cause increased development of
neoplastic and infectious diseases. Adverse effects on humans treated with immu-
nosuppressive drugs, numerous studies employing experimental animals, and, to a
lesser extent, isolated cases of altered immune function in humans inadvertently or
occupationally exposed to xenobiotic [a chemical from a nonbiologic source] sub-
stances support these concerns. There is no definitive evidence, as yet, that persons
who live near contaminated sites or chemical-manufacturing plants have been immu-
nologically compromised to the extent that they are at increased risk of disease.
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that chemical-induced damage to the [human body's]
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1. "Cancer-by-pothole"
In chapter three of Galileo's Revenge, "The Midas Touch: How
Money Causes Disease,"10 6 Huber assails what he felicitously calls
the "cancer-by-pothole" theory of causation, the notion that cancer
can be caused by some sort of physical trauma, such as a blow on the
arm, the sudden tug of a seatbelt across the groin during an auto
accident, or the bumping of a person's chest against the steering
wheel of a vehicle as the vehicle runs into a pothole.10 7 Huber high-
lights forty cases as examples of cancer-by-pothole, surely an im-
pressive number for a seventeen-page chapter, and a number
suggesting that a problem of "junk science" has existed in this area
of tort law.
Curiously, however, in ten of these forty cases, juries and judges
did exactly what Huber thinks they ought to do in every case: they
rejected the plaintiffs' junk science claims.108 That leaves Huber
with thirty cases to ridicule. One difficulty with the remaining thirty
cases, however, is their timeworn status. With the exception of
three cases,10 9 every case that Huber mocks as an exemplar of pseu-
doscience running riot in our modem age, despite the best knowl-
edge made available by modem science, predates a 1974 Mayo Clinic
study 10 that Huber himself cites as the definitive analysis of the the-
immune system might be associated with pathologic conditions, some of which might
be detectable only after a long latency.
One should not use such a term as "chemical AIDS" in reference to chemical-
induced immune dysfunction .... AIDS and the effect of commonly used immu-
nomodulating drugs can be useful, however, as examples of the damage that can
result from a compromised immune system in animals and humans.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Huber's authoritative pronouncements to the
contrary, it appears that real scientists find that there are real problems in this area-illustrat-
ing that no factual proposition advanced by Huber, regardless of how plausible and how con-
fidentially asserted, can reliably be counted on as accurately reflecting the whole picture.
106. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 39-56.
107. See HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 53-54 (citing "cancer-by-pothole"
decisions in Louisiana and New York).
108. Slack v. C.L. Percival Co., 199 N.W. 323, 326-27 (Iowa 1924); Stordahl v. Rush Im-
plement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 99 (Mont. 1966); Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., 119 N.E.2d 601,
601 (N.Y. 1954); Dennison v. Wing, 110 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952);
Frankenheim v. B. Altman & Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (N.Y. App. Term. 1958); Lopresti v.
Community Traction Co., 117 N.E.2d 2, 7 (Ohio 1954); Glover v. Rhett Jackson Co., 267
S.E.2d 77, 78 (S.C. 1980); Gambrell v. Burleson, 165 S.E.2d 622, 626 (S.C. 1969); Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 710 (Tex. 1966); Tonkovich v. Department of Labor
& Indus., 195 P.2d 638, 638 (Wash. 1948).
109. See Hammond v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 419 So. 2d 829, 833 (La. 1982) (permitting
plaintiff to recover for cancer aggravated by traumatic injury); Pezzolanti v. Green Bus Lines,
494 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (upholding cancer-by-pothole award where
trauma aggravated preexisting cancer); Glover v. Jackson Bush Co., 267 S.E.2d 77, 78 (S.C.
1980) (rejecting claim that trauma aggravated precancerous condition).
110. See generally George R. Monkman et al., Trauma and Oncogenesis, 49 MAO CLINIC PROC.
157 (1974) (reporting that thorough review of literature relating cancer to trauma revealed
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ories that cancer can be induced, spread, or accelerated by
trauma. I 1
To be sure, as Huber rightly notes, some scientists long ago
doubted that a single physical blow, by itself, could cause cancer
where none had existed before."12 And, as Huber also observes, the
number of such skeptics grew over the years. But, as evidenced by
the pains taken by the Mayo Clinic experts in a 1974 review of previ-
ous studies of traumatic cancer, reputable accounts of cancer being
caused by a single blow were still being published by well-respected
scientists in leading scientific journals into the 1960s. 113 Accord-
ingly, what is particularly noteworthy about the Mayo Clinic report
is not that its authors concluded that "there is no evidence to sug-
gest that single uncomplicated trauma can cause cancer,"' 14 but that
such a conclusion was the stuff of serious scholarly inquiry as late as
1974.
that although no evidence existed to suggest origin of cancer in single uncomplicated trauma,
adequate evidence does exist to suggest that spread of malignant tumors can be affected by
trauma). The study is cited in HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 51, 56.
111. One of the cases that predate the 1974 Mayo Clinic study dates from the 1800s:
Jewell v. Ground Truck Ry., 55 N.H. 84, 89 (1874).
Three of the cases date from the 1910s: Santa Ana Sugar Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 170 P.
630, 630 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); Louisville Ry. v. Steubing's Adm'r, 136 S.W. 634, 634
(Ky. Ct. App. 1911); Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 83 So. 19, 20 (La. 1919).
Four cases date from the 1920s: Canon Reliance Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 P.
868, 869 (Colo. 1922); Austin v. Red Wing Sewer Pipe Co., 204 N.W. 323, 323-24 (Minn.
1925); Gaetz v. City of Melrose, 193 N.W. 691, 692 (Minn. 1923); Winchester Milling Corp. v.
Sencindiver, 138 S.E. 479, 480 (Va. 1927).
Two cases date from the 1930s: Hertz v. Watab Pulp & Paper Co., 237 N.W. 610, 611
(Minn. 1931); Vitale v. Duerbeck, 92 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo. 1935).
Four cases date from the 1940s: Mooney v. Copper Range R.R. Co., 27 N.W.2d 603, 604
(Mich. 1947); Emma v. A.D.Julliard & Co., 63 A.2d 786, 787-88 (R.I. 1949); Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Turner, 149 S.W.2d 593, 597-98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Ellis v. Commonwealth
Dep't of Highways, 28 S.E.2d 730, 731-32 (Va. 1944).
Seven cases date from the 1950s: Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Div. of Nat'l Lead Co., 91
N.W.2d 538, 539-40 (Mich. 1958); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., 48 N.W.2d 735, 736
(Minn. 1951); White v. Valley Land Co., 322 P.2d 707, 708 (N.M. 1958); Glenn v. National
Supply, 129 N.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
103 A.2d 681, 683 (Pa. 1954); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 75 A.2d 191, 193 (R.I. 1950); Boyd v.
Young, 246 S.W.2d 10, 10 (Tenn. 1951).
Four cases date from the 1960s: National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Durham, 154 S.E.2d 752,
753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Minn. 1964); Mattfield
v. Ward Baking Co., 221 N.Y.S.2d 224, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961); Baker v. De Rosa, 196
A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1964).
Finally, three cases date from the early 1970s: Reed v. Mullin Wood Co., 274 So. 2d 845,
846-47 (La. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 275 So. 2d 729, 791 (La. 1973); Hanna v. Aetna Ins.,
259 N.E.2d 177, 177-79 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Dayton 1970); Koehring-Southern & Am. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Burnette, 464 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tenn. 1970).
112. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 50-51 (recounting work of Dr. James
Ewing, who remained skeptical of single blow cancer causation theory throughout his re-
search beginning in mid-1920s).
113. See Monkman et al., supra note 110, at 159, 161 (reporting 1960s studies of trauma-
induced or -affected malignancies by various scientists).
114. Monkman et al., supra note 110, at 167.
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It is as important to pay attention to what the Mayo clinicians did
not say as it is to what they did say. They did not declare that trauma
cannot aggravate or accelerate existing malignancies. Rather, the
Mayo Clinic experts confirmed earlier reports, which some industry-
funded "mainstream" experts had previously denounced as fraudu-
lent science, that "trauma, in combination with other factors, may
act as a cocarcinogen, particularly in the production of skin
cancers." 1
15
They conceded a point that Huber disingenuously chooses to
omit: the fact that "[t]here is adequate evidence suggesting that
metastatic spread of malignant tumors can be affected by
trauma."' 1 6 Significantly, eighteen of these twenty-seven cases ridi-
culed by Huber that predate the 1974 Mayo Clinic report-fully
two-thirds of the cases discussed by Huber-involved these wholly
tenable claims that a trauma aggravated, accelerated, or spread ex-
isting malignancies. 1 7 Huber studiously conceals this fact from
readers who lack the time, or the distrust of authors, to check each
source relied on by Huber. Instead, Huber leads the reader to as-
sume that the cases he discusses involve only the claim that a blow
was the sole cause of a cancer." 8
Huber then states that after courts started questioning single-
115. Monkman et al., supra note 110. at 167.
116. Monkman et al., supra note 110, at 167.
117. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Durham, 154 S.E.2d 752, 754 (Ga. 1967) (alleging
that collision aggravated and accelerated plaintiff's cancer); Reed v. Mullin Wood Co., 274
So. 2d 845, 846 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (awarding worker's compensation claim to plaintiff who
alleged that blow in leg caused or aggravated cancer), cerl. denied, 275 So. 2d 791, 792 (La.
1973); Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis, 91 N.W.2d 538, 539 (Mich. 1958) (claiming trauma caused or
precipitated cancer); Mooney v. Copper Range R.R. Co., 27 N.W.2d 603, 606-07 (Mich. 1947)
(alleging that fall from train aggravated or accelerated cancer); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour
Mills, Inc., 48 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn. 1951) (alleging that blow to chest from drill caused or
aggravated breast cancer); Hertz v. Watab Pulp & Paper Co., 237 N.W. 610, 611 (Minn. 1931)
(finding trauma originated or exaggerated and excited cancer); Gaetz v. City of Melrose, 193
N.W. 691, 691 (Minn. 1923) (alleging that assault by criminals aggravated preexisting cancer);
Jewell v. Grand Trunk Ry., 55 N.H. 84, 95 (1874) (claiming accident caused or accelerated
cancer); White v. Valley Land Co., 322 P.2d 707, 711 (N.M. 1958) (alleging that blow to leg
aggravated or caused cancer); Mattfield v. Ward Baking Co., 221 N.Y.S.2d 224, 224 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1961) (claiming blow aggravated cancer); Glenn v. National Supply, 129 N.E.2d
189, 192-93 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (claiming blow from mold aggravated cancer); Baker v. De
Rosa, 196 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1964) (sustaining claim that car accident caused or aggravated
lung cancer); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 75 A.2d 191, 194 (R.I. 1950) (claiming blow from bob-
bin caused or aggravated cancer); Koehring-Southern & Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burnette, 464
S.W.2d 820, 821-22 (Tenn. 1970) (claiming that traumatic injury to foot activated or acceler-
ated cancer); Boyd v. Young, 246 S.W.2d 10, 12-14 (Tenn. 1951) (claiming that injury from
heavy lifting caused or aggravated cancer); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 149 S.W.2d
593, 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (providing relief for claimant who suffered two blows to testi-
cles that aggravated and accelerated cancer); Ellis v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 28
S.E.2d 730, 732-36 (Va. 1944) (claiming that loose rocks hitting knee aggravated cancer);
Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, 138 S.E. 479, 480 (Va. 1927) (alleging fall causing
injury to ribcage caused and aggravated rib cancer).
118. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 43-45.
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blow causation in the 1950s and 1960s, "well-advised litigants kept
their claims alive by a change of emphasis" with "the new line" that
trauma did not cause cancer, but "did aggravate or accelerate the can-
cer." 119 Buried more than 150 pages later, in the sole textual
endnote to this chapter, Huber adds, "The 'aggravation' theory had
been around for much longer, of course, and appears frequently
enough in the earlier decisions too. E.g., Traders and General In-
surance Co. v. Turner, 149 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App., Ft. Worth
1941). In the later years, however, it displaces all others." 120
A reader who has not bothered to go to the library and examine
each case cited by Huber, and who for some reason happens to no-
tice this buried endnote, will doubtless assume that the "earlier de-
cisions" in which the aggravation theory appears "frequently
enough" are decisions that Huber does not discuss, and that this
endnote is an academic sidelight not worth putting in text. For in
his earlier discussion of supposed cancer-by-pothole cases involving
claims of cancer being caused by traumatic blows far faster than
medically imaginable, Huber does not provide information that
would allow a reader to discern that, "of course," two-thirds of the
cases he does discuss actually involve perfectly understandable
claims of aggravated cancer. Indeed, in his earlier discussion Huber
misrepresents the Traders v. Turner case (correctly described in Hu-
ber's buried endnote as an aggravated cancer case), as a case in which
"[t]wo severe blows to a man's testicles caused malignant cancer
seven days later."' 121 Reports of such bizarre cases are the mainstay
of Huber's book, but they are entirely at odds with reality and re-
quire affirmative deception by Huber to have any rhetorical
effectiveness.
Moreover, setting aside the Mayo Clinic's own recognition that
tumors can be affected by trauma, the fact that some plaintiffs
claimed that their cancer was caused, in whole or in part, by trauma
is not a convincing demonstration of their greed or their willful dis-
regard of "good science." Instead, it may merely be a reflection
that at the time these claims were made, even the best of scientists
were not certain what could or could not cause cancer.' 22 In ridicul-
ing yesterday's courts for having permitted yesterday's scientists to
119. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 52-53 (emphasis added).
120. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 234 n.68.
121. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 43 (emphasis added).
122. Huber's own selection of cases reveals a pattern that as the science of oncology ma-
tured and developed, scientists could be more definitive about the causes of cancer. Simply
put, the more experience scientists gained, the more they understood that although trauma
could aggravate, accelerate, and spread cancer, it could not, by itself, cause a tumor to de-
velop where none had existed before. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 42-45
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testify about a theory that today's scientists regard as false, Huber
proves himself to be the classic Monday-morning quarterback, heap-
ing scorn on yesterday's scientists (and lawyers and judges) for not
knowing then what everyone knows now. 123
The question remains: What about the three out of forty cases
criticized by Huber that do postdate the 1974 Mayo Clinic study?
Unfortunately for Huber, none of the three cases involved the now-
widely discredited proposition that cancer can be caused by a single
blow. Rather, each case concerned the unassailable view that preex-
isting cancerous conditions can be activated, precipitated, or spread
as a result of a physical injury.124 And one of those claims was re-
jected by the appellate court. 125 If there is any nonsense regarding
Huber's "cancer-by-pothole" cases, it lies in Huber's distorted de-
scriptions of them, not in the underlying claims of the litigants.
2. Cerebral palsy
The same holds true for chapter five of Galileo's Revenge, "Gadgets
and Knives: Cashing in on Magical Cures." Huber argues in this
chapter that obstetric malpractice accounts for a negligible number
of cerebral palsy (CP) cases and, consequently, that: (1) most suits
brought by plaintiffs that allege medical malpractice as the cause of
infant CP are frivolous,' 26 and (2) efforts to reduce CP by improving
obstetrical care (such as through the use of electronic fetal monitor-
ing devices) are nothing more than a cruel and expensive hoax.' 27
Huber asserts that most CP babies "are doomed long before an ob-
stetrician comes near them."' 28 This contention relies most heavily
(describing early cancer litigation). In other words, as scientists learned more about the
causes of cancer, plaintiffs ceased making claims that lacked a scientific basis.
123. Huber's showcasing of the work of pathologist James Ewing, Huber's hero of Ameri-
can science, who almost singlehandedly revealed the cancer-by-pothole theory to be a fraud,
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 50-51, is puzzling. Surely, that Ewing ultimately
turned out to be right does not establish that it was "heresy" or "junk science" to disagree
with Ewing when he first wrote in the mid-1920s. Many other scientists have turned out to be
wrong in their attempts to debunk perceived dangers-for example, the scientists who in the
early days of controversy over asbestos, cigarettes, silicone, and IUDs stated the belief that
these products were not harmful.
124. See Hammond v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 419 So. 2d 829, 832 (La. 1982) (holding
that doctor's testimony that tumor existed prior to injury but that injury precipitated disability
supported compensation for disability claim); Pezzolanti v. Green Bus Lines, 494 N.Y.S.2d
168, 169 (1985) (holding that evidence supported claim that trauma contributed to disabling
pain from tumor); Glover v. RhettJackson Bush Co., 267 S.E.2d 77, 79 (S.C. 1980) (rejecting
claim that one blow to arm had aggravated tumor).
125. Glover, 267 S.E.2d at 80.
126. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 76-82.
127. See HUBER, GAULLEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 78-85 (criticizing rush in medical and
legal communities to view use of electronic fetal monitoring as preventative "cure" for cere-
bral palsy).
128. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 82.
GALILEO'S RETORT
on a study appearing in 1986 in The New England Journal of
Medicine,129 which Huber cites six times in his seventeen-page chap-
ter, far more than any other source.13 0
This important study by Drs. Karin Nelson and Jonas Ellenberg is
praised by Huber as "the largest ever of its kind."' 31 Huber further
asserts that "[tihe results of a study of this size are about as solid
and certain as medical science can supply."' 32 Huber cites Nelson
and Ellenberg for their finding that "no factor related to labor and
delivery is associated with more than 2 percent of the risk."' 33 Hu-
ber proclaims that this study brings a definitive end to the century-
long debate over the causes of CP.134 To do this, however, Huber
resorts to the type of egregious selective citation that might trigger
sanctions for a college term paper.
First, Huber fails to inform the reader that the editors of The New
England Jounal of Medicine, in the very issue that published the Nel-
son and Ellenberg article, noted significant analytical flaws in the
article. In a rather unusual step, the editors paired the publication
of the Nelson and Ellenberg study, which they obviously regarded as
provocative, with their own critique of the article's underlying ana-
lytical premise. The author of the editorial, Dr. Nigel Paneth of Co-
lumbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons, entitled a
section of his essay: "Could the methods used by Nelson and Ellen-
berg have obscured the causal role of birth asphyxia?"' 3 5 Paneth's
answer to this question disclaimed the methodology employed in
the Nelson and Ellenberg study.'3 6
The causal role of birth asphyxia is obscured in the Nelson and
Ellenberg article, Paneth said, because "the predictive power of a
variable and its correct role in a causal sequence are not necessarily
interchangeable."'' 3 7 Nelson's and Ellenberg's error was to ascribe
nearly all CP causation to factors that occur before labor and deliv-
ery because those prelabor factors predict CP.138 In other words, Dr.
Paneth criticized Nelson's and Ellenberg's study for confounding
129. Karin B. Nelson &Jonas H. Ellenberg, Antecedents of Cerebral Palsy: Multivariate Analysis
of Risk, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 81 (1986).
130. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 240-43 nn.25, 28, 30, 35, 52, 54.
131. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 82.
132. HER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 83.
133. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 83.
134. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 82-83.
135. Nigel Paneth, Birth and the Origins of Cerebral Palsy, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 124, 125
(1986).
136. See id. (cautioning that "[i]f a variable present earlier is strongly associated with a true
cause of disease, it may well substitute for-that cause if entered first in a multivariate model").
137. Id-
138. Id.
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prediction with cause: the fact that certain prebirth conditions unre-
lated to delivery may predict CP does not mean that physicians can-
not overcome these problems through state-of-the-art birth
procedures that can ensure a healthy baby. Thus, failure to use
these procedures may constitute a proximate cause of CP. Dr.
Paneth used the colorful analogy of a pirate walking the plank to
illustrate his point: just because "walking the plank" predicts the
death of a pirate, it does not follow that water is not a proximate
cause of the pirate's drowning.'3 9 Similarly, just because prelabor
factors are associated with CP does not mean that intrapartum ob-
stetric practice is not the chief cause of (or a contributing factor in)
some or even many cases of CP. Nelson and Ellenberg's conclusion
that the "results suggest a relatively small role for factors of labor
and delivery in accounting for CP in this population"'140 muddles
prediction with cause.
Second, despite his extensive research into, and citation to, con-
temporary articles on CP, Huber fails to acknowledge that one of
the co-authors of the Nelson and Ellenberg study essentially re-
canted her conclusion two years later. 141 The article ignored by Hu-
ber is a 1988 analysis by Nelson, published in the editor's column of
Journal of Pediatrics, that conflicts with her 1986 article on the etiol-
ogy of CP. She began her editorial by stating unequivocally, "[W]e
know, on the basis of experimental and clinical evidence, that birth
asphyxia can cause CP."' 142 Nelson's 1988 assertion sharply con-
trasted with her minimization of labor and delivery factors in her
1986 study.143 In the 1988 article, she explained that "[d]epending
on the criteria employed, then, the estimate of the proportion of CP
associated with intrapartum asphyxia in births in the NCPP [the
same data pool used in the Nelson and Ellenberg study of 1986] was
in the range of 3% to 13% and did not exceed 21%."144 These
statistics are miles apart from those cited in the article she co-au-
thored just two years earlier. In 1986, Nelson and Ellenberg pro-
fessed that "[t]he risk of cerebral palsy associated with each factor
related to labor and delivery alone was under 2 percent in all
139. Id.
140. Nelson & Ellenberg, supra note 129, at 86.
141. See Karin B. Nelson, What Proportion of Cerebral Palsy Is Related to Birth Asphyxia?, 112J.
PEDIATRICS 572, 573 (1988).
142. Id. at 572.
143. See Nelson & Ellenberg, supra note 129, at 86 (concluding that there is "relatively
small role for factors of labor and delivery in accounting for cerebral palsy in [the population
studied]").
144. Nelson, supra note 141, at 573.
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cases."'145 Nelson's honorable recantation of her earlier claim is in
keeping with the highest traditions of scholarship, both in the natu-
ral sciences and elsewhere.
Huber's failure to apprise the reader of either Paneth's editorial
in The New England Journal of Medicine or Nelson's disavowal of her
earlier study is anything but honorable. Huber can hardly claim in-
advertence; he was well aware of both the editorial criticisms and
Nelson's recantation because he cited both sources earlier in his
chapter as background on the problem of CP.146
Huber's failure to convey significant information contrary to his
conclusions is hardly limited to his discussion of CP. An even more
egregious example of this practice is found later in the book in a
discussion of the $5.1 million award for spermicide-caused birth de-
fects in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 1 47 Huber packages the case
as a dramatic example of junk science at work, where a credulous
jury is persuaded to render a "spectacular verdict" based on a sin-
gle, tentative medical study, after which the authors of that study
react in horror, confessing that the study was unsupported, inade-
quate, and should have been left unpublished.
On this subject, in marked contrast to his discussion of the evi-
dence on cerebral palsy, Huber displays a keen interest in focusing
the reader's attention on retractions. He states that in Wells,
lawyers won a spectacular $5.1 million verdict against the Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corporation, largely on the strength of a single
study that had very tentatively suggested that spermicides might
cause birth defects. A year after the verdict, however, the several
authors of that study spoke out again. One acknowledged that
their work "was not corroborated by subsequent studies," and
that their "study's definition of exposure to spermicide near the
time of conception was grossly inaccurate." Another frankly con-
ceded: "I believe our article should never have been published.
In our present litigious environment, the reservations and qualifi-
145. Nelson & Ellenberg, supra note 129, at 83.
146. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 238 nn.2, 4. Although citing these
sources, Huber resolutely and disdainfully ignores their content. Though Huber cites Nel-
son's 1988 article for the number of children born with CP, he cloaks the fact that Nelson had
restated her views in a way that undermined rather than supported Huber's thesis that obstet-
ric malpractice accounts for a negligible number of CP cases. Id. at 76, 238 n.2. Similarly,
Huber conveniently chooses to ignore The New EnglandJournal of Medicine's editorial doubts
about the Nelson and Ellenberg study. Instead, Huber merely cites the Paneth editorial as a
source for the history of theories of the etiology of CP. Id. at 238 n.4. Worse, in this latter
footnote Huber disingenuously presents the dated authority, William Little, M.D., to repre-
sent the medical opinion that CP is related to intrapartum events. Id. Little, in 1861, theo-
rized that CP was caused by "trauma and other stresses during labor and delivery." Id. at 76.
147. 615 F. Supp. 262, 266 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aft'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 950 (1986).
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cations written into a published report are often ignored, and the
article is used as 'proof' of a causal relationship."1 48
A close examination of Wells, and of the retractions cited by Hu-
ber, reveals three flagrant errors. First, contrary to Huber's effort to
imply that Wells illustrates the work of a bamboozled, runaway jury,
resulting in a "spectacular ... $5.1 million verdict,"'149 the parties in
fact waived the right to ajury. Wells was decided by a federal district
judge who issued a twenty-eight page opinion analyzing all the evi-
dence and specifically concluding that the plaintiffs "presented com-
petent and credible medical and scientific evidence" showing that
the defendant's spermicide had caused the precise birth defects in
question and that the plaintiffs had presented "the most reasonable
and believable" testimony, given that much of the defendant's evi-
dence "lacked credibility because it reflected bias or inconsis-
tency."' 50 This decision was unanimously upheld by three federal
appellate judges, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied review.
Second, Huber suggests, without citation, that the award was
handed out "largely on the strength of a single study."' 15 Yet
twenty-one studies were submitted into evidence, ten by the plain-
tiffs and eleven by the defendant.15 2 Only one of the four experts
called by plaintiffs even mentioned the study seized on by Huber
(the "Jick study"), and this expert discussed a total of six studies
tending to support causation.' 53 Far from the intense focus on the
Jick study that Huber claims animated the Wells case, the district
judge indicated that he was favorably impressed by four of the stud-
ies cited by the plaintiffs' experts, including the Jick study, but that
he "did not need to consider as substantive evidence" any of the
studies offered on either side because he was basing his decision on
the overall testimony of the experts on both sides. 54
Third, Huber suggests that all of "the several authors" of the.Jick
study later repudiated their conclusions, expressing their detached
148. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 174 (footnotes omitted).
149. The term "verdict" obviously refers to the product of a jury trial. See, e.g., BLACK'S
LAW DIC'IONARY 1398 (6th ed. 1990) ("The formal decision or finding made by ajury, impan-
eled and sworn for the trial of a cause, and reported to the court .... ); THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1983 (3d ed. 1992) ("The finding of ajury in a trial."); THE COMPACT
EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3610 (1971) ("The decision of a jury in a civil
or criminal cause upon a decision which has been submitted to their judgment.").
150. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 292-94 (N.D. Ga. 1985),
aff'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
151. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 174.
152. See Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 269-91.
153. Id at 269-73 (summarizing testimony of Dr. Bruce Buehler); id. at 272 & n.12 (noting
that "Dr. Buehler also discussed the 1981 Jick article") (citing Hershel Jick et al., Vaginal
Spermicides and Congenital Disorders, 245 JAMA 1329 (1981)).
154. Id. at 292 & n.38.
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professional horror at the outcome of Wells. He offers, as examples
of this repudiation, the comments of "one" of the authors, and then
"another" of the authors, printed in letters to the journal that origi-
nally published the study.' 5 5 But contrary to Huber's image of a
unanimous retraction published by "the several authors," the Jick
study in fact had nine authors, and only the two authors cited by
Huber expressed any misgivings about their study. Worse still, in a
joint letter, three other authors of the Jick study sharply criticized
the "one" author (who had testified as a paid expert witness for the
defendant in Wells) for being an advocate rather than a scientist, and
strongly defended their original study.156
Most damning, Huber can hardly claim that he inadvertently over-
looked the rejoinder written by these three authors. Thejoint letter
not only appears on the same page of the same medical journal as
the criticisms quoted by Huber; it is actually sandwiched in between
the letters of "one" and "another" author. 57
In sum, Huber displays remarkable powers of selective perception
and recitation. In discussing cerebral palsy, Huber fails even to
mention the repudiation by one of two authors of the key study he
himself relies on in his analysis. But in discussing the Wells case Hu-
ber obsesses about a study's repudiation by two of nine authors and
ignores a defense of the original study and a rebuttal to the criticism
by three other authors of that study, even though this was only one
of many studies cited by the plaintiffs, and even though the Wells
case was decided by a district judge who ultimately chose not to con-
sider any of the studies as evidence.
According to Huber, junk scientists "discard enough 'bad' data to
make the remaining 'good' points look important.... Professional
statisticians call this 'data dredging.' "1158 Huber's scholarship falls
155. HUBER, GALILEo's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 174.
156. The district court in Wells found that Huber's "one" author, Dr. Richard N. Watkins,
was simply "not credible," finding it "perplexing that a physician would risk his professional
reputation by signing his name to a study about which he had serious reservations," as Wat-
kins claimed he did at the time of the study, and finding it suspicious that Watkins had waited
four years, until he was a paid expert witness in court, to express these misgivings. Wells, 615
F. Supp. at 282. Similarly, the three authors who rebutted Watkins stated, in a joint letter,
that, "Dr. Watkins has selectively reclassified the exposure status of exposed cases without
engaging in a similar effort for exposed noncases. The technique is one used in advocacy, but
it is not good science." HershelJick et al., In Reply, 256 JAMA 3095, 3095-96 (1986).
In defense of their original study, these three authors stated that since the study "[a]
number of authors have found associations between spermicide use and both chromosomal
anomalies and limb anomalies very close to those reported by us," and that "[i]n hindsight,
we still believe that our report did address plausible hypotheses, was valid in its conception
and conduct, was circumspectly reported, and is consonant with much material published
both before and since." Id.
157. Id.
158. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 27.
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short of the standards he sets for everyone else.
3. Bendectin
Huber frequently invokes the National Enquirer in his chapter on
Bendectin. 159 Given Huber's enormous distortions of the scientific
record on traumatically induced or aggravated cancer, on cerebral
palsy, and on the Wells spermicide case, truly enquiring minds will
be on the lookout for similar distortions in Huber's review of the
Bendectin litigation. 160
According to Huber, "[a] large volume of published epidemiolog-
ical data has previously revealed no statistically significant associa-
tion between Bendectin and birth defects."' 61 Junk scientists,
however, used a chilling off-the-cuff assessment that Bendectin is
"like [T]halidomide," the terrible drug that caused babies to be
born "with dolphinlike flippers,"' 162 as well as "some scattered labo-
ratory tests" and other tangential data, to come up with a theory
that Bendectin also causes birth defects. As the subtitle to Huber's
chapter relates, what followed was a "Massed Legal Attack"' 63 in
which Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (Men-ell), the manufacturer of
Bendectin, was subjected to ruinous litigation by greedy plaintiffs
and their "villainous" lawyers.' l 4 These compatriots employed junk
science to force a blameless company to pull a valuable antinausea
product from the market.' 6 5 Litigation continued for several more
years before the company was finally vindicated by "wise" judges
who ultimately concluded that such nonsense must end.' 66
Huber's tale is gripping, but has at least three major faults that
prevent this chapter from being taken seriously as an analysis tend-
ing to establish Huber's thesis that "junk science" is common and
represents the "most insidious" of all problems within our liability
system. First is a pervasive flaw that by now is easily spotted in the
book: Huber's hyperbolic, sarcastic, selective, anecdotal, ad hoc and
at times ad hominem argument style, which makes for entertaining
reading but leaves the reader wondering whether both sides of the
159. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at II1-13, 129.
160. The author was counsel of record in one Bendectin case that reached the Supreme
Court, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). The author has also assisted plaintiffs' attorneys (including
Barry J. Nace, see infra note 167) in several other Bendectin cases, on petitions for certiorari
and on briefs in federal courts of appeals.
161. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 113.
162. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 112.
163. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 111.
164. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 113-22.
165. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 127.
166. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 122-27.
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story are being told. Huber's rhetorical technique is to string to-
gether news reports and court decisions so as to chronicle the his-
tory of the litigation in a manner that makes the scientific evidence
proffered by plaintiffs look ridiculous, and the ethics of selected at-
torneys and experts involved on the plaintiffs' side appear reprehen-
sible. Notably, there is no indication that Huber interviewed any of
the plaintiffs' attorneys he goes out of his way to castigate, and in at
least one instance Huber has declined to defend himself against de-
tailed charges that his account of the Bendectin litigation is filled
with "many misstatements" and that his understanding of the sub-
ject in general is "ridiculously immature."' 167 A recent extensive re-
view of the history of the Bendectin litigation written by Professor
Joseph Sanders, who did take care to consult with main participants
on both sides, covers many of the same events documented by Hu-
ber in an evenhanded manner that amply demonstrates the one-
sided and partisan nature of Huber's analysis. 168
Second, Huber erroneously invites the reader to conclude that, if
it can be shown that plaintiffs' evidence on causation in Bendectin
cases ultimately turned out by the late 1980s to be disproved by an
overwhelming array of epidemiological studies, then the Bendectin
claims must have been baseless, and pure "junk science," from the
beginning. But there is no support for this view. Despite Huber's
extended efforts to lampoon the early proof put forward by plain-
tiffs, as Professor Sanders has noted, "[w]e should expect that the
science will be relatively poorly developed in the early stages of liti-
gation," and that only later will litigation spur the production of "a
richer body of scientific evidence."' 169 As Professor Michael D.
Green notes in a recent review of Bendectin evidence, "It is impor-
tant to emphasize that . . . in 1977 when Bendectin litigation first
began ... there was a paucity of decent epidemiologic studies and
unsettling animal studies regarding possible toxicity." 170 Professor
167. Letter from BarryJ. Nace, Esq., to Peter W. Huber, Esq. 1, 3 (Feb. 19, 1992) (on file
with The American University Law Review). Mr. Nace, a respected trial lawyer serving as presi-
dent of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America for 1993-1994, is one of the "villainous"
lawyers portrayed throughout Huber's chapter in a most unflattering light. In his letter Nace
noted that Huber had never contacted him in any manner, and he listed a variety of serious
misrepresentations of the record. IdL at 1-4. In closing, Nace stated, "If you wish to debate
this subject somewhere, just let me know. I would be happy to debate it with you... [elither
from a scientific or legal standpoint-or both." Id. at 3. Fifteen months later, Nace had not
received any response. Telephone Interview with BarryJ. Nace, Esq. (May 19, 1993).
168. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts,
43 HASTINGS LJ. 301, 311-86 (1992). The acknowledgement footnote to Sanders' article
thanks W. Glenn Forrester, Merrell's lead in-house attorney, and Barry Nace, a prominent
plaintiffs' attorney in Bendectin cases, for their help. Id. at 301 n.*.
169. Id. at 331.
170. Green, supra note 61, at 677. Professor Green notes that these and other factors "led
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Green concludes, in direct answer to the thesis set forth by Huber:
"Bendectin did not begin, as some have said, as a case of avaricious
lawyers pursuing a drug whose safety was well established over a
long period of time by numerous solid scientific studies." 171
The reason this is so, these scholars explain, is that the early
Bendectin litigation must be placed in the context of both Merrell's
lack of adequate original testing and the company's poor track rec-
ord on the safety of its drugs and the integrity of its dealings with
the FDA. Remarkably, prior to Merrell's marketing of Bendectin in
1956, no substantial safety testing was done on whether Bendectin
might cause birth defects; the FDA required no testing, given that
each of the three prescription components of Bendectin had previ-
ously been approved for use in adults.' 72 Indeed, the prevailing sci-
entific belief at this stage was that the womb was a safehouse against
environmental dangers.1 73 Conventional scientific wisdom proved
to be wrong just a few years later, with "the appearance of an epi-
demic of limb-reduction malformations" in babies whose mothers
had taken the "presumably harmless sedative-hypnotic drug
[T]halidomide," which made clear the vulnerability of human em-
bryos "to certain environmental agents even though these have neg-
ligible or no toxic effects in postnatal individuals."' 174 The
Thalidomide tragedy spurred the rapid development of teratology,
the study of teratogens, or substances that produce malformations
in human fetuses.' 75
Merrell happened to be the American licensee of Thalidomide
and thus was implicated in the public concern surrounding that
tragedy.' 76 Even worse for Merrell's reputation, in the following
plaintiffs' lawyers in the late 1970s and early 1980s to believe that they had a genuine mass
toxic [tort case] staring them in the face," although based on the scientific record that
emerged a decade later, he opines, it either "appears they were wrong" or that "Bendectin, if
it has any teratogenic effect, has quite a weak one." Id. at 677 n.155.
171. Id.
172. Sanders, supra note 168, at 317, 321.
173. See James G. Wilson, Current Status of Teratology, in HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY 47, 47
(James G. Wilson & F. Clarke Fraser eds., 1977) (discussing 1940s view that womb was imper-
vious to harmful influences). Although the embryos of amphibians, fish, and chickens had
been shown "to be quite susceptible to unfavorable influences during development," these
tests "were not generally accepted as purporting similar vulnerability for higher animals." Id.
at 47. Instead, "[ilt was widely assumed in biology and in medicine that the mammalian em-
bryo developed within the virtually impervious shelter of the uterus and the maternal body
where it was protected from extrinsic factors." Id.
174. Wilson, supra note 173, at 48.
175. Wilson, supra note 173, at 48-49.
176. Merrell had attempted to convince the FDA that Thalidomide was safe to market in
the United States, but FDA suspicion and delay resulted in Merrell being giving only initial
limited authorization for investigational use, thus sparing the American public the large
number of deformed babies witnessed in other countries. Sanders, supra note 168, at 313-14.
Still, even while it awaited what it hoped would be final FDA approval, Merrell "engaged in
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year, 1962, the FDA discovered that Menell had misrepresented nu-
merous animal studies as demonstrating the complete safety of
MER/29, an anti-cholesterol drug, when in fact Merrell knew that
most animals exposed to the drug developed cataracts and other
side effects. 177 Merrell nevertheless continued to market the drug
for nearly two years while reports of identical injuries in humans
accumulated.' 78 As a result, Menell and three of its scientists were
indicted for lying to the FDA. The company subsequently received
the maximum possible fine and its scientists received suspended
sentences.' 79 Merrell also paid tens of millions of dollars in dam-
ages as a result of civil litigation (including a sizable punitive dam-
ages award), settling more than 95% of the cases against it, and the
widespread publicity understandably led to public condemnation of
Merrell.' 8 0
Despite Huber's failure to address this history, Merrell's check-
ered past was obviously pivotal to the initial development of the
Bendectin litigation. Once suspicion began growing during the
1970s among medical authorities that Bendectin might be a cause of
birth defects,' 81 and once it was learned that even after the MER/29
episode Merrell performed wholly inadequate testing of the safety
of Bendectin and arguably hid negative results from the FDA, just as
it did with MER/29, 8 2 it was hardly a stretch to "conclude[] that,
what might charitably be called extremely lax behavior" in distributing 2.5 million
Thalidomide pills to 20,000 persons, including 624 pregnant women, leading to at least ten
deformed Thalidomide babies. Id. at 314.
177. Sanders, supra note 168, at 315.
178. Sanders, supra note 168, at 315-16.
179. Sanders, supra note 168, at 315-16.
180. Sanders, supra note 168, at 315-16; see also Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 404-08 (Ct. App. 1967) (summarizing voluminous evidence of Merrell's egregious
actions); RALPH E. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DECEPTION: THE SHOCKING STORY OF MER/29 AND
THE FOLKS WHO GAVE You THALIDOMIDE 23, 151 (1972) (describing criminal proceedings
against Merrell for falsifying scientific data submitted to FDA); Richard A. Merrill, Compensa-
tionfor Prescription DrugInjuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 40-43 (1968) (providing brief synopsis of five
reported MER/29 cases); Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass
Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968) (containing general summary of Merrell
wrongdoing).
181. Sanders, supra note 168, at 317-18.
182. Merrell performed only limited and sporadic animal in vivo testing of Bendectin and
ignored a researcher's suggestion that more testing be done, despite its recent history of
problems with Thalidomide and MER/29. Sanders, supra note 168, at 333-36. These actions
helped to "fuel speculation by plaintiffs that if they only dug deep enough, they would find a
cover-up." Id. at 333 n.152. Moreover, "[t]he first epidemiologic study performed in 1963 by
a Merrell employee and relied on by Merrell for fifteen years was so shoddy in method and
interpretation that even Merrell has conceded its lack of validity; it has provided an inviting
target for plaintiffs' attorneys' attacks and claims for punitive damages." Green, supra note
61, at 677 n.155.
Merrell's initial animal testing was so inadequate in light of the low dosages administered to
the animals that one plaintiffs' expert in a recent trial termed the tests not only "useless," but
"irresponsible." Transcript of Record at 49-50, Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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with respect to this firm, where there was smoke there must be fire,"
and that there was strong ground to believe that Merrell was impli-
cated in yet a third harmful drug and was again covering up known,
serious risks. 183 Huber simply makes no effort to demonstrate that,
in light of what was known when the Bendectin litigation commenced, the
early cases can be condemned as "junk science."
Third and finally, beyond the inadequacy of Huber's discussion of
the early stage of the Bendectin litigation, Huber also fails to ad-
dress enough of the substance of the Bendectin litigation in its ma-
ture state so that the reader can adequately assess the nature of the
controversy and reach his or her own conclusion about whether le-
gitimate scientific issues exist. Such a project is well beyond the
scope of this Article, but the shallow and one-sided nature of Hu-
ber's analysis can readily be grasped by comparing his chapter with
the analysis of Professor Sanders 184 and with portions of the briefs
and Joint Appendix analyzing the nature of the four different types
of data in the Bendectin case recently considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court.' 85
Within the scope of this Article, it is important to note one central
flaw in Huber's framework of analysis. As to Merrell's central de-
fense in these cases, Huber is correct that a significant number of
epidemiological studies have been published on Bendectin, none of
which (in the view of the authors of those studies) individually estab-
lishes with "statistical significance" at the 95% certainty level that
Bendectin is linked to birth defects.' 8 6 Indeed, three separate fed-
eral courts of appeals have given this characterization of the epide-
miological record determinative weight in ruling against Bendectin
(Tex. 214th Dist. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991) (No. 88-3915-F). Evidence exists that even at these low
doses the tests indicated that Bendectin was a teratogen, id. at 51-52, and that in reaction to
those results Merrell researchers doctored the raw data and substituted a sanitized version to
the FDA that either understated or completely failed to report malformations in the fetuses of
several animals receiving doses of Bendectin, id. at 30-41, actions arguably typical of a com-
pany as to which the FDA stated in reaction to the MER/29 incident: "[W]e cannot consider
information submitted by this firm as reliable without thorough verification." Id. at 58. This
and similar evidence led in a recent case to the entry of a $15 million punitive damages award
against Merrell (on compensatory damages of $3.75 million), after full post-trial review. See
Final Judgment in Havner (No. 88-3915-F) (now on appeal).
183. Sanders, supra note 168, at 316.
184. Sanders, supra note 168, at 321-48.
185. See Brief for Petitioners at 2-12, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (U.S.
Dec. 2, 1992) (No. 92-102) (summarizing nature of evidence in Bendectin cases);Joint Appen-
dix at 53-207, Daubert (No. 92-102) (reprinting affidavits of plaintiffs' experts in Dauber); Brief
for Respondent at 2-9, 35-48, Daubert (No. 92-102) (rebutting opening brief);Joint Appendix
at 31-44, Daubert (No. 92-102) (reprinting affidavit of defendant's expert in Daubert); Reply
Brief of Petitioners at 2-5, Daubert (No. 92-102) (answering respondent's factual analysis).
186. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 113.
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plaintiffs. 18 7
But Huber rests too readily on these holdings for his analysis to
withstand scrutiny. Apart from a failure to give serious attention to
the testimony of a number of experts on plaintiffs' side who evaluate
the epidemiological data in light of other sources of information on
the drug,188 Huber ignores the elementary point that any failure of
epidemiology to establish the 95% certainty level in no way affirma-
tively demonstrates the safety of Bendectin. Far from there being a
consensus on the safety of Bendectin based on extant epidemiologi-
cal studies, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently
observed in a Bendectin case that Merrell "overstates the persuasive
power of these statistical studies," that these studies are "by no
means conclusive," and that "[a]n analysis of this evidence demon-
strates that it is possible that Bendectin causes birth defects even
though these studies do not detect a significant association." 18 9
Contrary to the impression left by Huber's chapter, the current sta-
tus of Bendectin litigation in the lower federal courts reveals a seri-
ous controversy within the scientific community and the courts on
causation, not a set of claims that plausibly may be termed "junk
science." 190
187. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313-15, modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 857 F.2d 823,829-32 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-
National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320
(1992), cited these cases approvingly but based its holding against the plaintiffs on the failure
of one of their experts to publish her epidemiological opinion, not on the absence of a "statis-
tically significant" epidemiological study standing alone. Id. at 1130.
188. See supra notes 184-85 (providing analyses of chemical structure and in vitro and in
vivo animal data).
189. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1357 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941, 945-49 (3d Cir. 1990) (expressing similar caution about overstating value of epidemio-
logical data); Brief of Professor Kenneth Rothman et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, Daubert (No. 92-102) (characterizing concept of statistical significance as
"misleading," "never descriptive," and imprecise when analyzing epidemiological data).
Although the Sixth Circuit found in Turpin, with respect to the animal data on Bendectin,
that "[a]nimal studies often comprise the backbone of evidence indicating biological hazards,
and their legal value has been recognized by federal courts and agencies," the court deter-
mined that on the basis of the specific expert affidavits proffered in that case, the evidence was
insufficient to go to the jury. Id. at 1360.
190. As the Sixth Circuit summarized the case law as of March, 1992, "Four federal cir-
cuits have held that plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to establish causation ... [but] other
courts have either denied or reversed on appeal grants of summary judgment for [Merrell] in
eight cases." Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1351-52 (citations omitted). The existence of two sides on
the issue is concretely illustrated by the results of the 1985 multidistrict common issues trial
that resolved more than 800 Bendectin cases, in which the Sixth Circuit observed that "the
jury verdict following trial here might have been for the plaintiffs instead of for the defend-
ant," In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 325 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989), and in which the district court had earlier observed, "Both sides presented testimony
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C. The Unwillingness To Acknowledge Inconvenient Facts Necessary
to "the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth"
Huber fails the third test of good science and good scholarship:
the willingness" 'to try to give all of the information to help others
to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that
leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.' "191 Will-
ful failure to take note of evidence in a given article that conflicts
with predetermined views is one kind of data dredging;1 92 obdurate
failure to even mention other articles or other examples that under-
mine one's hypothesis is another. "Sins of omission are less obvi-
ous, but no less common."' 9 3
Huber is intimate with this sin. He bends over backwards to high-
light supposed malfeasance by plaintiffs, their lawyers, and their ex-
perts, while failing to examine parallel examples of possible
corporate wrongdoing. 94 There is good reason to worry that cor-
porate scientists owe their allegiance to their employers first and to
truth second, and that whistleblowers who reverse this scheme of
priorities may be quickly shown the door.195
of eminently qualified and highly credible experts who differed in regard to the safety of
Bendectin." In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
Indeed, several years later ChiefJudge Rubin, the trial judge in the multidistrict case, re-
fused Merrell's request for summary judgment in other individual cases, stating that "the
Court is convinced that there are genuine issues of fact which preclude entry of summary
judgment." In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
Otherjudges have rejected out of hand the exclusive focus on epidemiology adopted by some
circuits to throw out plaintiffs' claims. See Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893
F.2d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that each side presented sufficient expert testi-
mony to create conflict and that jury alone has power to weigh evidence and determine which
witnesses are more credible); Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737 F. Supp.
1117, 1120 (D. Idaho 1990) (rejecting resort to supposedly "overwhelming" statistical data in
order "to bulldoze aside the plaintiffs' experts").
191. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 207 (quoting RICHARD FEYNMAN, SURELY
YOU'RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMAN! 311-12 (1986)).
192. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 27 (explaining that professional stat-
isticians call process of disregarding "bad" data to make "good" data appear more important
"data dredging").
193. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 207.
194. See generally HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 75-168 (discussing various
case studies focusing on failings of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys without mentioning fail-
ings of corporations).
195. See, e.g., JuDrrI SWAZEY & STEPHEN R. SCHER, WHISTLEBLOWING IN BIOMEDICAL RE-
SEARCH 110-40 (1982) (discussing policies and procedures used by corporations in response
to reports of misconduct in biomedical research).
If, as Huber insists, money is what drives junk science, it stands to reason that huge mul-
tinational corporations with ample resources and considerable liability exposure are more
likely to sponsor junk science than are individual plaintiffs' lawyers. To cite but one example,
the Journal of Occupational Medicine, a neutral-sounding journal, is published by the American
College of Occupational Medicine, also conveying an impression of neutrality. One issue of
that journal (Vol. 33, No. 12,Jan.-Dec. 1991) is devoted to "Managing the Conduct and Qual-
ity of Epidemiologic Studies," a neutral-sounding topic, and one of obvious interest to mem-
bers of both the plaintiffs' and defense bars. But a cursory review of the affiliations of the
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Huber hardly makes a stab at being evenhanded. He reserves
ninety-nine percent of his rhetorical ammunition and every one of
the seven chapters of Galileo's Revenge that are devoted to specific
examples of junk science to horror stories involving plaintifs' ex-
perts. 196 Huber does briefly acknowledge that "[e]ven asbestos and
the Dalkon Shield have become part of the junk science story." 197
Still, even these concessions, necessary to preserve even a patina of
objectivity, are made in the most perfunctory and misleading man-
ner. Huber writes:
From the beginning of World War II through the 1970s, about
ten million people were exposed to high levels of asbestos in the
workplace. Today, good science confirms that heavy exposure to
asbestos multiplies the lung-cancer risks you otherwise face by
roughly five to seven times. The Dalkon Shield plays in similar
leagues. Soon after worldwide marketing began in 1971, doctors
observed that its users were developing pelvic inflammatory dis-
ease (PID) six to ten times as often as other women. Both Robins,
manufacturer of the Shield, and Manville, a major supplier of as-
bestos, were driven into bankruptcy. As any knowledgeable scien-
tist will attest, both sold products that caused great harm. 198
Huber describes these subjects as "impossibly delicate, tragic,
and charged with emotion." 199 To be sure, the agonizing deaths of
hundreds of thousands of workers from asbestos 200 and the linger-
ing health problems of tens of thousands of women due to the
Dalkon Shield20 1 are "tragic, and charged with emotion." 20 2 But
Journal of Occupational Medicine's editorial board, and of the authors of each article in this issue,
reveals that this ostensibly academic, scientific, and thus objective periodical is something
other than it appears to be. Both the editor and associate editor of the Journal at the time of
this issue were employed by major chemical manufacturers or industrial companies. The
same is true of at least four of the other ten members of the editorial board. Similarly, with
few exceptions, the authors of each article in this issue, which aims to set the criteria for
undertaking and evaluating epidemiologic studies, are also employed by major chemical,
pharmaceutical, or industrial manufacturers.
196. For example, Huber concedes, as he inevitably must, that "[y]es, the scientists at the
drug and chemical companies may sometimes advance the interests of their employers by
shrugging off serious scientific evidence of real problems." HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra
note 5, at 188. He similarly concedes that, professional witnesses "work[] consistently for one
side (insurance companies) or the other (plaintiffs' lawyers)." Id. at 20.
197. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
198. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
199. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
200. See Failure To Regulate Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy? Hearings Before House Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983) (statement of William J. Nicholson,
Environmental Sciences Library) (noting that from 1980 onward there will be 350,000 prema-
ture deaths resulting from asbestos-related cancers that developed between 1940 and 1980).
201. See MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD 4 (1985) (noting that many of 800,000 to one million women implanted with Dalkon
Shield suffer from such health problems as spontaneous miscarriages, septic abortions, and
fatal abortions).
202. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
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these injuries, both individually and collectively, are more than
"tragic" accidents or lamentable mishaps. These injuries and
deaths are scandalous, not because "Robins .. .and Manville...
both sold products that caused great harm," but because these com-
panies sold those products for years (in the case of the Dalkon
Shield) or decades (in the case of asbestos) with full knowledge that
they "caused great harm. ' 203 That is the reason why Robins and
Manville "were driven into bankruptcy": juries awarded plaintiffs
huge sums in punitive damages not just because "both sold prod-
ucts that caused great harm" but because both companies knew that
they caused great harm and kept silent; knew that they caused great
harm and repeatedly denied the harm; knew that they caused great
harm but withheld evidence and instructed the scientists employed
by these companies to keep their mouths shut; and knew that they
caused great harm but continued selling the products anyway.20 4
203. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
204. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152. As early as 1933, a Manville scien-
tist informed his employer that workers who installed asbestos as insulation in buildings suf-
fered much higher rates of asbestosis. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCr: THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 111-14 (1985) (detailing actions taken byJohns-Manville to try
to suppress asbestosis findings). Manville took no action, other than ordering the information
to be suppressed. Id. During the course of decades-long litigation against Manville and other
asbestos manufacturers, processors, and distributors, plaintiffs' attorneys uncovered evidence
that, among other things: (1) animal tests begun in 1943 revealed that insulation products
containing low levels of asbestos could cause lung disease, id. at 143; (2) Manville knew in the
1950s that insulators and pipe coverers working with asbestos were at greatly increased risk of
developing asbestosis, id. at 99; and (3) in 1947, scientists had warned the Asbestos Textile
Institute (comprised of Manville and other asbestos suppliers and fabricators) that workers
who endured long exposure to asbestos at levels previously considered safe were at increased
risk ofasbestosis. Id. at 143. Perhaps most damning of all, Manville scientists were part of the
callous deception. Id. at 102-03. For example, in 1948, the medical director of a wholly
owned Manville subsidiary undertook an industrial hygiene survey that revealed that only less
than 1%o, or 4 of 708, of surveyed asbestos workers had healthy, normal lungs. Id. The medi-
cal director successfully urged a corporate coverup:
It must be remembered that although these men have the X-Ray evidence of asbesto-
sis, they are working today and definitely are not disabled from asbestos. They have
not been told of this diagnosis .... When he becomes disabled and sick, then the
diagnosis should be made and the claim submitted by the Company. The fibrosis of
this disease is irreversible and permanent so that eventually compensation will be paid to
each of these men. But as long as the man is not disabled it is felt that he should not
be told of his condition so that he can live and work in peace and the Company can
benefit from his many years of experience.
Id. Manville, and others, continued to market asbestos long after receiving these warnings,
while failing to warn purchasers and users of these known risks. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that plaintiff introduced
evidence tending to establish that defendant manufacturers were, or should have been, fully
aware of multitude of studies and articles on asbestos, and that evidence also indicated de-
fendants did not warn any workers of danger), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
Regarding the Dalkon Shield, plaintiffs' attorneys proved that by at least 1972, Robins
either knew or should have known that the medical data upon which it relied in promotional
literature to establish the effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield was patently wrong. Miz, supra
note 201, at 86. That same year, Robins began receiving reports from concerned physicians
from around the United States about deaths and life-threatening injuries being caused by the
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In his discussion of asbestos and the Dalkon Shield, rather than
focusing on such decades-long corporate malfeasance, Huber at-
tempts to neutralize these episodes by changing the subject. He
highlights the conduct of those whom he regards as the real villains:
plaintiffs' experts who ostensibly "minimize the role of other, even
more important and widespread causes of identical injuries, '20 5
such as cigarette smoking (which causes more cancer and lung dis-
ease than asbestos), and sexual promiscuity (which is the source of
more cases of pelvic inflammatory disease than IUDs). 206 Thus,
"there is ample room for junk science even when one is dealing with
real hazards and grave harms. '20 7
What is so striking about Huber's selection of case studies is that
he would not have needed to look long or hard to find possible ex-
amples of junk science practiced by corporate defendants, by the
lawyers hired by those defendants, or by the experts retained by
those corporations or those corporations' lawyers. In addition to
presenting a truthful account of the scandals involving asbestos and
the Dalkon Shield, Huber could easily have reported on strong evi-
dence of corporate fraud and criminality20 8 implicating corporate-
sponsored scientists. 20 9 These examples include, but are not lim-
Shield. Id at 149-72. Robins officials suppressed these reports and continued to market the
Shield. Id.
In upholding an award of $7.5 million in punitive damages to a single victim of the Dalkon
Shield, one state's highest court summarized Robins' systematic distortion of science and its
extreme indifference to anything other than its own bottom line as follows:
[N]ot only was there substantial evidence to conclude that Robins fully compre-
hended, by 1974 at the latest, the enormity of the dangers it had created, but that it
deliberately and intentionally concealed these dangers; that it put money into
'favorable"studies; that it tried to neutralize any critics of the Dalkon Shield; that Robins was
motivated by a desire to avoid litigation rather than a concern for the safety of the
users of the Dalkon Shield; that it consistently denied the dangers of the Dalkon
Shield for fifteen years after the original marketing of the Dalkon Shield; that it com-
missioned studies on the Dalkon Shield which it dropped or concealed when the results were unfa-
vorable; and, ultimately, that it consigned hundreds of documents to the furnace rather than
inform women that the Dalkon Shield carried inside their bodies was a bacterial time bomb which
could cause septic abortions, PID [pelvic inflammatory disease], and even death.
Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (emphasis added).
The most that Huber has to say about these outrages is that "Robins [the manufacturer of
the Dalkon Shield] and Manville [the largest asbestos processor] had obviously done serious
wrong in covering up the hazard, or so many juries concluded." HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE,
supra note 5, at 154. Huber, who does not hesitate to harshly reproach the testimony of any
plaintiffs' expert or to sternly scold any plaintiff for taking part in self-destructive behavior like
smoking, is unusually reticent about drawing any conclusions himself.
205. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
206. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152-55.
207. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 152.
208. To unearth such evidence, Huber would not have had to dig deep into history to find
examples of a wave ofjunk science verdicts, as was necessary in his chapter on "The Midas
Touch" (on "cancer-by-pothole"). Instead, all Huber needed to do was read his daily news-
paper, for the examples discussed below are truly the stuff of everyday headlines.
209. See generally ROBERT BELL, IMPURE SCIENCE: FRAUD, COMPROMISE, AND POLITICAL IN-
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ited to, the following.
(1) TOBACCO. The tobacco industry has continually insisted
(long after every scientist not in their employ had come to the oppo-
site conclusion) that smoking is risk free. The U.S. Surgeon Gen-
eral's 1986 report on the harmful effects of passive smoking,
however, found:
The data reviewed in 17 previous U.S. Public Health Service Re-
ports on the health consequences of smoking have conclusively
established cigarette smoking as the largest single preventable
cause of premature death and disability in the United States.
The question whether tobacco smoke is harmful to smokers was
answered more than twenty years ago.210
But the tobacco industry, backed by numerous research reports au-
thored by scores of scientists employed by the industry-funded To-
bacco Institute, disputed this answer. The industry insisted that the
question remains open. Thus, on March 12, 1982, EdwardJ. Harri-
gan, the chair of the Tobacco Institute's Executive Committee and
the chair and CEO of the RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., declared that
"[a]fter three decades of investigation and millions of dollars in-
vested, the smoking and health controversy remains unresolved.
The net result of all this effort has been that no causal link between
smoking and disease has been established." 211
Subsequent research has revealed that what Harrigan politely
called a "controversy" might be more aptly described as a conspir-
acy to hide, distort, and falsify evidence, a conspiracy against to-
bacco smokers, their families, and the public health. Indeed, one
federal judge described it as follows:
Evidence presented by the plaintiff, particularly that contained in
documents of the defendants themselves, indicates the develop-
ment of a public relations strategy aimed at combatting the
mounting adverse scientific reports regarding the dangers of
FLUENCE IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 105-82 (1992) (discussing moral and ethical aspects of wide-
spread fraud and corruption in U.S. corporate scientific research); WILLIAM BROAD &
NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF TRUTH: FRAUD AND DECEIT IN THE HALLS OF SCIENCE 140-63
(1983) (exposing corporate-sponsored fraud in scientific research). Examples of systematic
fakery and fraud by individual scientists in pursuit of personal fame and private profit also
abound. See, e.g., BELL, supra, at 106-10, 113-42 (highlighting examples of scientific fraud by
individual scientists); BROAD & WADE, supra, at 140-63 (noting instances of individual deceit by
some corporate scientists); David Goodstein, Scientific Fraud, 60 AM. SCHOLAR 505, 505-15
(1991) (examining ethical implications of scientific fraud by scientists corrupted by political
influence and personal greed).
210. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOK-
ING vii (1986).
211. Comprehensive Smoking Prevention Education Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 353 (1982)
(statement of Edward Harrigan, chair of the Tobacco Institute's Executive Committee).
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smoking. The evidence indicates further that the industry of
which these defendants were and are a part entered into a sophis-
ticated conspiracy. The conspiracy was organized to refute, un-
dermine, and neutralize information coming from the scientific
and medical community and, at the same time, to confuse and
mislead the consuming public in an effort to encourage existing
smokers to continue and new persons to commence smoking.2 12
Subsequent discovery by the plaintiffs in that same case further
revealed the depths of that conspiracy as well as the active, knowing
complicity of industry-paid scientists and corporate research depart-
ments in furtherance of that conspiracy. That discovery disclosed
that beginning in 1954,
[The tobacco industry] sought to discredit or neutralize the ad-
verse information [about the dangers of smoking] by proffering an
independent research organization ... which purportedly would
examine the risks of smoking and report its finding to the pub-
lic.... [T]he industry research which might indict smoking as a
cause of illness was diverted to secret research projects and ...
the publicized efforts were primarily directed at finding causes
other than smoking for the illnesses being attributed to it.
... [T]he industry's announcement of proposed independent
research into the dangers of smoking and its promise to disclose
its findings was nothing but a public relations ploy-a fraud-to
deflect the growing evidence against the industry ....
... Despite the industry's promise to engage independent re-
searchers to explore the dangers of cigarette smoking and to pub-
licize their findings, the evidence clearly suggests that the research
was not independent... [and] that the attorney-client privilege
was intentionally employed to guard against... unwanted disclo-
sure [of adverse research results] .... 213
212. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1990).
213. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683-84 (DN.J. 1992). It should be
noted that on a motion by the tobacco company defendants, the author of the Haines opinion,
DistrictJudge H. Lee Sarokin, was removed from the case on account of this strong language
and its compromise of the appearance of impartiality-although in taking this course the
Third Circuit stressed that it did not doubt Judge Sarokin's actual impartiality and fairness
and his outstanding abilities. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97-98 (3d Cir.
1992); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 466, 466 (D.NJ. 1992) (contain-
ingJudge Sarokin's recusal of himself from another case, and commentary on Third Circuit's
order in Haines).
A recent front-page story in the Wall Street Journal provided additional documentation of
what that newspaper termed "the longest-running misinformation campaign in U.S. business
history .... " a systematic campaign to enlist some scientists to discredit others, and so to
deceive consumers and government regulators, all in an effort to protect the safety of corpo-
rate profit-making. See Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, How Cigarette Makers Keep Health
Question 'Open' Year After Year, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at 1, 6. The Council for Tobacco
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(2) PFIZER HEART VALVES. Pfizer Pharmaceutical's anxiety about
profits and sales of Bjork-Shiley Convexo-Concave heart valves may
have overridden its concern about the lives of the patients involved.
Thus, the company continued to market the valves four years after
its inventor warned that such a course of action would be " 'tanta-
mount to murder.' "214 According to a December 1990 internal re-
port by an FDA task group that investigated the misconduct of Pfizer
and its Shiley subsidiary,
"During the c/c [Convexo-Concave] valve's history, Shiley en-
gaged in efforts to thwart FDA's intervention by untimely reports
of [valve] fractures, unreported changes in quality control and
manufacturing procedures, failure to correct known poor manu-
facturing procedures, and minimization of the overall problem
through misleading and confusing communications to FDA and
the medical community." 215
By the time Pfizer finally pulled the valves from the market in
1986, more than 82,000 valves had been implanted worldwide, leav-
ing those patients facing a terrible choice between dangerous re-
placement procedures and living with the knowledge of'a potential
defect.2 1 6 By 1992, the valve defects had caused over 500 deaths
and resulted in a class action settlement amounting to between $165
and $215 million, or $500,000 to $2 million per valve fracture.2 17
(3) HALCION. According to critics, Upjohn's own financial wor-
ries led it to withhold critical information from the FDA about dan-
gerous side effects of Halcion, a prescription sleeping pill it
manufactured and marketed. 218 The reported side effects ranged
Research (CTR) has been the primary advocate for the tobacco industry by producing studies
that cast doubt on whether smoking is a health hazard and by disregarding or cutting off
studies of its own that likely would have linked tobacco to health problems. Id. at 1. The CTR
not only engages in research, but also lobbies for the tobacco industry with the assistance of
public relations firms and cigarette manufacturers. Id. at 6.
214. See Greg Rushford, Pfizer's Tell-Tale Heart Valve, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 26, 1990, at 1, 11(noting that Swedish press reported in March 1982 that Bjork, product's inventor, was con-
cerned about valves and suggested discontinuance of product).
215. BELL, supra note 209, at 167 (quoting FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TASK GROUP REPORT ON
BjORK SHILEY HEART VALVE AND SHILEY CORP. (1990)). See generally Christine Gorman, Can
Drug Firms Be Trusted?, TIME, Feb. 10, 1992, at 42, 42 (discussing merit of fraud allegations
against medical supply and drug manufacturers); Greg Rushford, Pfizer's Smoking Gun?, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at 1 (referring to internal corporate report, generated in response to
FDA investigation, documenting that Pfizer "continued to produce and sell thousands of
mechanical heart valves even after it knew of the structural weaknesses and sloppy
manufacturing").
216. Barry Meier, Flawed Heart Valve Is Presenting Patients with Harrowing Choice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1992, § 1, at 1.
217. Milt Freudenheim, Settlement Approved on Pfizer Heart Valves, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20,
1992, at D4.
218. See Gina Kolata, Maker of Sleeping Pill Hid Data on Side Effects, Researchers Say, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 20, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Kolata, Maker of Sleeping Pill] (reporting critics' allega-
tions that Upjohn concealed report from FDA demonstrating that Halcion could cause serious
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from amnesia, paranoia, depression, and hallucinations to suicide
and murder.219 Although reports linking Halcion to adverse side
effects first appeared in the medical literature in 1979 and concerns
were confirmed by the medical community in the late 1980s,
Upjohn, in its own studies, subtly concealed adverse findings, later
claiming that any errors were merely "clerical" or "trivial." 220
(4) LEAD. For decades, the lead industry has obstructed efforts
undertaken by university researchers, consumer-, environmental-
and child-protection public interest groups, and government agen-
cies charged with public health and safety to learn about and pre-
vent lead poisoning.22 1 According to a recent report,
Responses of the lead-producing and lead-using industries and
their allies to the growing scientific case against lead constitute a
useful case study in how established economic interests react to
scientific evidence threatening their activities. Originally .... the
bearers of adverse information were seemingly intimidated on an
ad hoc, individual basis. When adverse information on lead expo-
sure and human intoxication could not be contained "one-on-
one" during the 1970s and 1980s, the industry abruptly took the
tack of seeming cooperation. It cultivated a simulacrum of con-
cerned, responsible "objectivity," expanded and established its
psychiatric side effects). Halcion is, or at least was, the "world's best selling sleeping pill,"
sold by Upjohn in the United States since 1983 and in markets in 89 other countries and
representing some 8%o of Upjohn's sales (approximately $200 million for the first three
quarters of 1991). Gina Kolata, F.D.A. Panel Recommends Keeping Sleeping Pill on Market, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1992, at C3; Kolata, Maker of Sleeping Pill, supra, at Al.
219. See William Styron, Prozac Days, Halion Nights: Profits and Pills, NATIoN, Jan. 4, 1993,
at 1, 1 (detailing author's personal experiences with Halcion); see also Stein, Our Man in Nir-
vana, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1992, at A21 (detailing similar negative experiences with Halcion).
By way of example, a Utah woman who shot her mother eight times and then placed a birth-
day card in her hand claimed that Halcion caused her behavior. The Price of a Good Night's Sleep,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, § 4, at 9. The woman not only avoided prosecution, but won an
out-of-court settlement against Upjohn. Id. In another case, a jury awarded a family $1.8
million (later reduced) in a suit against Upjohn alleging that Halcion had caused a family
member to turn violent and murder his best friend. Id.
220. Kolata, Maker of Sleeping Pill, supra note 218, at Al; see Joseph W. Moch, Halcion: The
Hotbed of Controversy Continues, 15 TRIAL DIPL.J. 101, 103-04 (1992) (describing various studies
of Halcion). A Washington Post editorial raised related questions:
[A]s a slice of regulatory history, the Halcion story, like the story of breast implants,
is a troubling one. How is it that some safety studies identified by the FDA as "piv-
otal" were conducted by a confessed fraud whom the agency had disqualified before
the drug's approval? ... How did Upjohn come to underreport adverse reactions?
(The FDA is investigating this.) And what is one to make of continuing allegations
that the manufacturer failed to give regulators complete information pertaining to
safety and that the FDA in turn failed to review adequately the data in its possession?
The Halcion File, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1992, at A24; see also Gorman, supra note 215, at 42
(discussing charge against Upjohn for falsifying evidence of Halcion's safety).
221. See Herbert L. Needleman, Childhood Lead Poisoning: Man-Made and Eradicable, 2 PSRQ. 130, 133 (1992) (noting that lead industry threatened researchers that claimed lead to be
hazardous by attempting to prevent publication of their studies, threatening them with law-
suits, and alleging that their studies violated ethical standards).
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own research programs and conferences, and heavily intruded
into the regulatory evaluation process itself.
Science evolves, but it evolves imperfectly; in its early jerky
thrusts at the truth of a matter, there is considerable uncertainty
about research results, their meaning, and their consequences.
The 1970s and early 1980s typified this period for lead as a scien-
tific research topic, and industry exploited this uncertainty ex-
haustively and effectively. The multidefense industry position
now seemed to say: Our experts don't agree that lead exposure
has occurred, but if it has our experts don't agree that the expo-
sure produces significant public health problems, but if it does
our experts say it is not extensive enough in the population to
worry about. Current industry strategy, having apparently given
up on a science that continued to indict lead as a major health
issue, apparently relies on economics and cost-effectiveness: Lead
is too important an economic commodity to regulate; what's
more, the costs of existing lead abatement are too high for the
benefits. 2 22
(5) AIR POLLUTION. The automobile industry attempted to sup-
press pioneering research on air pollution. In 1950, ArieJ. Haagen-
Smit, a professor of biochemistry at the California Institute of Tech-
nology, made what was then a novel discovery: air pollution from
cars and oil refineries causes smog. 223 The oil and auto industries
saw Haagen-Smit's research findings as a potential threat to their
economic well-being and proceeded to try to debunk Flaagen-Smit
222. Paul Mushak, The Landmark Needleman Study of Childhood Lead Poisoning: Scientific and
SocialAftermath, 2 PSR Q. 165, 169 (1992) (reporting on landmark 1979 study on neurotoxic
effects of low levels of lead on very young children). "Apparent" acceptance and "apparent"
cooperation are not the only tactics followed by the lead industry.
Given [the lead] industry's complex strategy, the [pioneering] Needleman study
posed special difficulties.... Not surprisingly, the industry launched persistent as-
saults on the Needleman study. In the early 1980s, these included misrepresenting,
via wide publicity, technical evaluation of the Needleman study by the EPA's advisory
consultants. More recently, the industry has supported efforts of others attacking the
Needleman results and Needleman personally. In this regard, suspicion of miscon-
duct charges were filed against him. After an extended investigation of the charges
by the University of Pittsburgh, Needleman was cleared on misconduct charges.
Id. (footnote omitted); see Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Per-
formance of Children with Elevated Denture Lead Levels, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 689, 689 (1979)
(reporting that children with high levels of exposure to lead did not score as well on intelli-
gence test as children with lower lead levels);JosephJ. Palca, Get-the-Lead-Out Guru Challenged,
253 SCIENCE 842, 842 (1991) (discussing alleged misconduct in scientific study of effects of
low-level lead on human development); Gary Putka, Professor's Data on Lead Levels Cleared by
Panel, WALL ST.J., May 27, 1992, at B5 (reporting claim by Needleman's attorney that Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh investigators found no evidence of fraud in scientists' lead poisoning stud-
ies); see also Joseph Palca, Panel Clears Needleman of Misconduct, 256 SCIENCE 1389, 1389 (1992)
(reporting that University of Pittsburgh panel cleared Needleman of charges of scientific
misconduct).
223. Mark Thompson, Fighting for Cleaner Air, A-LAsrc, Sept. 1988, at 20, 23.
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as a junk scientist.224 To that end,
The Stanford Research Institute, employed by one of the [oil] in-
dustry's trade associations, quickly claimed to have found funda-
mental flaws in Haagen-Smit's methods and conclusions. In 1953
the auto industry entered the arena, beginning its own research
program on the ground that the situation was too obscure to as-
sign blame.225
(6) CHOCOLATE. At times, corporate zeal to use captive "scien-
tific research organizations" to hoodwink both unaffiliated scientists
and the unassuming public takes on ludicrous dimensions. For ex-
ample, the Princeton Dental Resource Center suggested to dentists
that their patients eat chocolate as a way of fighting tooth decay. 226
Newsletters from this center reported that eating chocolate could
possibly inhibit cavities. 227 What the newsletters failed to mention,
however, was that the Princeton Dental Resource Center was fi-
nanced almost entirely by Mars Inc., manufacturer of M&Ms and
Snickers and Milky Way candy bars. 228 The newsletter also failed to
explain that only one ingredient found in chocolate-cocoa-had
been pegged by researchers as a possible cavity-fighting substance,
because beneficial tannins could be isolated from the cocoa. 229 Any
benefits in the case of chocolate candy, however, would be com-
pletely offset by ingredients like sugar.230
(7) THE MONEY LURE. More generally, for years both university
researchers and government regulators have worried that the often
cozy relationships between industries and industry-funded but os-
tensibly neutral research centers might be a bit too cozy, bordering
on (or crossing over into) systematic fraud, deceit, and corrup-
tion. 231 Huber seems to be one of the few who is not concerned
224. Id. at 22-23.
225. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 7 (1977).
226. Barry Meier, Report Touting Chocolate as Cavity-Fighter Derided, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 15,
1992, at Al; see Calvin Trillin, Exposing Chocolate Therapy, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Apr. 27, 1992,
at A13 (describing newsletter sent to dentists' offices extolling cavity-fighting properties of
chocolate).
227. Meier, supra note 226, at Al.
228. Meier, supra note 226, at Al.
229. Meier, supra note 226, at Al.
230. Meier, supra note 226, at Al.
231. See Warren E. Leary, Business and Scholarship: A New Ethical Quandary, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1989, at Al ("Scientists, administrators, and lawmakers are increasingly worried that
the lure of money threatens to compromise the quality and conduct of scientific and medical
research."); see also Barry I. Castleman & Grace E. Ziem, Toxic Pollutants, Science, and Corporate
Influence, 44 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 68, 68 (1989) (claiming that chemical manufacturers
had significant influence over determination of threshold limit values that were used to de-
velop ambient air quality standards for their chemicals); Barbara J. Culliton, Biomedical Re-
search Enters the Marketplace, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1195, 1196-97 (1981) (discussing factors
contributing to growth of ties between academia and industry); David F. Noble & Nancy E.
Pfund, Business Goes Back to College, 231 NATION 233, 251-52 (1980) (claiming that universities
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about the relationship between industry and research centers. Hu-
ber is either completely oblivious to these connections or is com-
pletely indifferent to their import. Huber's lack of concern about
the money lure that threatens to compromise the integrity of medi-
cal and scientific research is odd, given his obsession with arguing
that plaintiffs' lawyers corrupt the experts they hire.23 2 Huber's fail-
ure to note, let alone discuss, any of the above examples must be
seen for what it surely is: bias. Such bias in the subjects Huber has
chosen not to write about, combined with his distorted rendering of
those events he has chosen to write about, as well as his unwilling-
ness to provide any quantitative assessment of the junk science epi-
demic, means that Huber fails each of the three tests of good science
and good scholarship that he sets out as appropriate for others.
III. HUBER'S DUBIOUS LEGAL ANALYSIS IN GALILEO'S REVENGE
In the concluding chapter of Galileo's Revenge, Peter Huber offers
his solution to the problems he outlined in the earlier chapters. Un-
fortunately, Huber's prescription is no better than his diagnosis.
His proposal for curing what he regards as the raging and ravaging
are influenced by industry and rejecting notion that industry funding is no different than gov-
ernment funding); Jeff Bailey, Dueling Studies: How Two Industries Created a Fresh Spin on the
Dioxin Debate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 1 (attributing recent doubts as to danger of diox-
ins to public relations campaigns by paper and chlorine industries and recognizing lack of
attention paid to research that considers dioxins to be extremely dangerous).
Blurring of the line between business and scholarship is hardly the only problem. See Law-
rence K. Altman, Study Says Drug Ads in Medical Journals Frequently Mislead, N.Y. TiMES, June 1,
1992, at Al [hereinafter Altman, Drug Ads Frequently Mislead] (asserting that pharmaceutical
companies often provide misleading advertisements regarding safety and effectiveness of
drugs); Pushing Drugs to Doctors, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1992, at 87, 87-89 (reporting that drug
companies employ sophisticated marketing techniques to sell their drugs to doctors); G. Pas-
cal Zachary, Many Journalists See a Growing Reluctance To Criticize Advertisers: Thy Say Some News-
papers, Suffering Tough Times, Are Softening Coverage, WALL ST.J., Feb. 6, 1992, at Al (noting that
newspapers and magazines display increased aversion to screening out advertisements for
deceptive claims or to publishing news that might offend advertisers).
232. For example, Huber posits: "Junk scienc is impelled through our courts by a mix of
opportunity and incentive. 'Let-it-all-in' legal theory creates the opportunity. The incentive
is money: the prospect that the Midas-like touch of a credulous jury will now and again trans-
form scientific dust into gold." HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 3. According to
Huber, no one is immune from the trial lawyers' blandished lure: " 'You get a professor who
earns $60,000 a year and give him the opportunity to make a couple of hundred thousand
dollars in his spare time and he will jump at the chance'...." Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
Similarly, good scientists are hooked into becoming junk scientists:
A witness may not work directly for a contingent fee, but the expert is a contingent
player anyway, and he knows it. His continued employment today, and reemploy-
ment tomorrow, depends critically on the strength of the support he can supply....
He can earn hundreds of dollars an hour, hundreds of thousands a year. For 111
practical purposes, he is working on a contingency fee, though the contingent nature
of his employment and compensation will always be angrily denied. Where have we
seen this character before? In his employer's office. He is the spit and image of a
trial lawyer.
Id. at 18, 20.
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epidemic of junk science is as superficial as his analysis of what is
wrong with the existing state of affairs: good science will only tri-
umph, can only triumph, with the helping hand of "wise judges"
who must make sure, through the reinvigoration of the Frye rule and
other means, that "scientific bamboozlers" are not allowed to bam-
boozle the common folk who sit on juries.233 Huber's nostrums
cannot be taken seriously. Specifically, Huber completely distorts
the historical significance of the "Frye rule" and its supposed past
importance in combating "junk science" in civil lawsuits, and he to-
tally ignores the traditional role of the jury in resolving factual
issues.
A. The Fictitious History of the "Frye Rule"
Huber's oft-mentioned prescription for solving the junk science
problem is quite simple: supplant the now-fashionable "let-it-all-
in" philosophy supposedly embodied in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence with the once-fashionable "let-only-the-good-stuff-in" philos-
ophy supposedly incarnated in the common-law Frye rule.23 4 This
course would fence off the courtrooms from the ivory-tower theo-
rists who designed the existing rules of evidence that incorporate
the "let-it-all-in" world view; the unsuspecting members of Con-
gress who enacted statutory rules that embody that outlook; and the
spineless judges who, heedless of their duties and of the overall
needs of society, permit junk science into the courtroom.
Huber's description of the Frye rule, of how its elimination
prompted the rise ofjunk science, and thus of how its rebirth would
help destroy junk science, bears close examination. As will hereaf-
ter be noted, there is little truth in any of the very precise claims that
Huber makes about Frye.
The prominence of the Frye rule in Huber's analysis of the legal
roots of the current junk science problem is evident in chapter one
of Galileo's Revenge. Huber asserts that in the "good old days" of
evidence law, courts limited the roles of experts hired by the
parties:235
[T]he rules of evidence embodied the same cautious respect for
233. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 193, 223-25 (concluding that judicial
search for most authoritative scientific evidence prevents fraudulent "snake-oil peddlers"
from demeaning judicial process).
234. See HUBER, GALmEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 14-17, 201 (asserting that Frye rule
represents best way to determine if expertise is based on objective experience).
235. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 13-17 (decrying desultory path down
slippery slope toward junk science by recounting that where judges once applied stricter stan-
dards regarding expert witnesses, 18th-century America witnessed beginning of erosion of
those standards, culminating in loose, junk science standards).
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tradition as did the liability rules themselves. Experts were not
given a free hand to speculate; their function was to convey the
consensus views of their profession .... If expert witnesses were
unconstrained by professional tradition and consensus, malprac-
tice was as likely to be promoted on the witness stand as deterred
at the defense table. Once again, a balance had to be struck be-
tween the need to police incompetence outside the courtroom
and the risk of rewarding incompetence within. 2 36
Huber writes that it was in this context that the Frye rule emerged to
do battle with junk science:
In 1923 a federal appellate court issued a landmark ruling in
Frye v. United States aimed at accommodating these competing con-
cerns. Thereafter, federal courts, widely copied by the states,
were bound by the Frye rule, which allowed experts into court only
if their testimony was founded on theories, methods, and proce-
dures "generally accepted" as valid among other scientists in the
same field. In deferring to the scientific community, the rule con-
ceded the courts' own limits. Fye marked a reasonable compro-
mise between a populist rejection of all expertise and what was to
follow, the equally populist view that experts are everywhere and
there's no choosing among them.23 7
True, Huber notes that "[iike all verbal standards the Frye rule
could be bent, and it sometimes was," for example, by "[ciharlatans
of many stripes" who even in the time of Frye would "go through the
motions of serious science," attempting to qualify their testimony by
setting up their own societies committed to subjects such as whether
"trace ambient pollutants cause narcolepsy. '2 38  "But Frye did at
least serve a hortative purpose, stiffening the judge's spine and
steeling his nerves when a brash scientific iconoclast presented him-
self at the courthouse. Frye held out the hope that, with the help of
determined judges, the legal consensus would in time converge with
the scientific one."'2 39 This thinking led Huber to the following
conclusions:
From 1923 until the mid-1970s, the Frye rule made some at-
tempt to hold expert witnesses to [accepted standards and con-
sensus norms]. Certainly not to anything better than mainstream
scientific norms, but the rule did at least refer to competent sci-
ence as defined by the consensus views of a profession. Under
Frye, the expert witness could report only learning that was "gen-
erally accepted" in his scientific discipline. Negligence, incompe-
236. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 14.
237. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 14.
238. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 14.
239. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 14.
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tence, irresponsibility, reckless disregard for professional
standards, and every other variation on professional malpractice
were as unacceptable on the witness stand as they were anywhere
else.24 0
In Huber's view, the downfall of the Frye rule led directly to the
rise of junk science: "Frye held sway until the 1970s, when it col-
lided with the high ambition of the Calabresians" and their pessi-
mism about technology and its dangers. 241 "Frye seemed to give
mainstream science the final word" on the apparent dangers of such
technology, but "[i]t seemed utterly perverse to many in the legal
community that the consensus views of the very professions causing
all the problems might stand in the way of legal solutions. Viewed
from any angle, Frye clearly threatened to cut short the great
Calabresian search for cheap, wide-ranging control" of risks. 24 2 Frye
was therefore targeted for elimination. 243
Lawyers couldn't change what mainstream science maintained,
but they could decide whether mainstream science mattered.
That is exactly what they did. Some courts candidly stopped
screening experts altogether. Others simply created majorities by
gerrymander, defining "scientific communities" narrowly and un-
critically. One way or another, judges gave up on the possibility
of drawing firm lines between serious science andjunk. When the
Federal Rules of Evidence were first codified in 1975, they made
no mention of Frye whatsoever. Expert testimony would be al-
lowed, thenceforth, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact." Mainstream scientific consensus didn't
matter any more. Social engineering in the courtroom would find
its support wherever convenient; any iconoclast whose views
might prove "helpful" to the jury would be welcome in court.
The academics (as academics are prone to do) have continued
to debate Frye's demise long after the debate has ceased to be of
any practical importance. Some insist that Frye still lives; others
that it is dead and buried; others that, dead or alive, Frye no longer
makes any practical difference. But with Frye certifiably absent
from the rules of evidence, the academics might as well be debat-
240. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 176-77.
241. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 15 (asserting that Calabresian law-
yers changed standard on whether mainstream science had legal significance).
242. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 15.
243. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 15 (implying that objections to Frye
rule arose from its threat to Calabresian control of expert witness standards and insinuating
that Frye came under attack and was ignored in codification of Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975).
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ing the survival of Elvis Presley in the indubitably silent halls of
Graceland. Whether or not Frye still lives, the conviction is gone,
the music has died. Most courts have slouched toward what fed-
eraljudge Patrick Higginbotham dubs the let-it-all-in approach to
expert testimony. By the 1980s, countless courts had opened
their doors wide to claims based on methods or theories not gen-
erally accepted as reliable by any scientific discipline.244
As would be expected, Huber identifies the resurrection of the
Frye rule as a necessary part of any serious attempt to overcome the
evils of junk science in the courtroom. 245 In chapter eleven of
Galileo's Revenge, entitled "Stopping Points: Confronting Malprac-
tice on the Witness Stand," Huber explains that the renewed use of
the Fye test is integral to respecting "Science as Consensus, '246 and
to "Holding Witnesses to a Common Standard. ' 247 "[S]cience has
changed profoundly since the days of Galileo," Huber explains, for
"Galileo had limited opportunities to belong to a larger community
of scientists. ' 248 Since the founding in 1660 of what eventually be-
came London's Royal Society, "all science in the West has been
built up through collegiality and consensus-and a concomitant de-
cline in the role of the hermit scientist. ' 249 Modem science "is no
longer linked to any single theory or result; it is a process of replica-
tion and verification, a search for consensus"; it "is not a solitary
undertaking."2 50
Huber argues that "[tihe methods of science are so fundamentally
different from those of litigation that scientific anarchy in court is
inevitable if rules of evidence are not strictly maintained. ' 2 51
Therefore, he urges:
[J]udges must rediscover rules of evidence consonant with the es-
sential collegiality of modem science. Such rules are not self-evi-
dent, nor can they be implemented mechanically, nor will they
work their intended effect in the hands ofjurists who hold science
itself in no real respect. But rules can be formulated, and even
modest rules, if enforced with evenhanded conviction and some
measure of faith in the scientific method, will make a positive
difference. 252
244. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 15-17.
245. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 204-06 (urging judges to take control
of expert testimony in trials by preventing admission of testimony from "privileged interlop-
ers" in favor of testimony from established experts).
246. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 194.
247. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 198.
248. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 194, 196.
249. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 196.
250. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 196-97.
251. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 197.
252. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 198.
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As Huber explains, the view that science is defined by the commu-
nity was the fundamental insight of the old Frye rule:
F7ye directed the focus away from the individual, whatever his cre-
dentials might be, and toward the scientific consensus. Define the
relevant community whose consensus views should prevail. Then
require expert witnesses to report not their own, personal views,
but the consensus views of that community.
Applying the test is not always simple; there will always be room
for quibbling. Any definition of "the relevant scientific commu-
nity" will be somewhat arbitrary. But despite what some lawyers
maintain, it isn't terribly difficult to decide which community of
scientists to consult on Bendectin, cerebral palsy, or sudden
acceleration. 253
Thus, under Huber's conception, the Frye rule was a tool that al-
lowed judges to select the community of scientists who "know" the
answer to a particular scientific question, and then to demand that
each scientist testifying simply report the "consensus" of scientists
on the issue at hand.254 This is obviously an incredibly powerful
tool for reining in the use ofjunk science. Under this standard, the
only facts that can be "proved" are those that are accepted by a
consensus of the scientific community favored by the judge.255
A telltale sign of the weakness of Huber's analysis is that through-
out his extensive discussion of Frye, Huber provides no citations to
support his version of the birth, growth, death, and possible new
rise of the Frye rule. Close examination reveals that, in fact, virtually
nothing that Huber says about Frye is true. From 1923 through the
1970s, Frye was never used to enforce scientific consensus on issues
of scientific facts. Frye was never a tool for fighting junk science,
especially in civil tort litigation. And as of 1991, when Galileo's Re-
venge was published, Frye was alive and well within its original limited
253. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 199. Huber continues:
The expert whose testimony is not firmly anchored in some broader body of objec-
tive learning is just another lawyer, masquerading as a pundit.
The challenge, then, is to determine when the anchor is secure. The only possible
test is to confirm that other boats have favored similar moorings. The only way to
tell that expertise is based on objective experience is to see whether others with simi-
lar experience favor similar methods, adopt similar procedures, embrace similar the-
ories, and reach similar conclusions. That is pretty much the standard articulated
decades ago by Frye.
Id. at 204.
254. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 199-200, 201 (referring to reality that
judges choose pools of experts, such as physicians from Mayo Clinic, based on subjective
standards, but that these standards are commonsense reflection of which scientists constitute
consensus community and that stating applicable consensus for use in court is simple matter).
255. See HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 199, 201 (noting that FYe rule di-
rected focus toward scientific consensus and that judges often apply Frye according to their
own standards).
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context; the "music" had not died at all. 256
In reality, Frye was simply a federal criminal case in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in the exercise of its specific
common-law authority to prescribe rules of evidence for federal
criminal trials "in the light of general authority and sound rea-
son," 25 7 addressed the admissibility of expert testimony setting
forth the results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test," a ru-
dimentary precursor to the modem polygraph.258 The D.C. Circuit,
in a remarkably casual analysis, announced a conservative approach
to the evaluation of novel scientific techniques:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.259
In the half-century that followed, many federal courts applied the
common-law Frye rule in other criminal trials, not to throw out the
particular factual conclusions of an expert as falling outside the con-
sensus in his or her field, but to bar any expert from resorting to
certain kinds of new scientific techniques, such as "voiceprints, neu-
tron activation analysis, gunshot residue tests, bitemark compari-
sons, sodium pentothal, scanning electronic microscopic analysis,
and numerous other forensic techniques," before they had gained
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community. 260 During
256. See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text (referring to courts' continued use of
Frye rule).
257. See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1918) (following Benson v. United
States, 146 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1892), which observed that sound reason, not common practice,
should guide courts in determining reasons for allowing or denying expert testimony). The
Supreme Court set forth the proposition that competency of witnesses in criminal trials is
governed by common-law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts "in the
light of reason and experience." Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934). Congress
confirmed this power by incorporating Wolffe into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 advisory committee's note; see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,
76-77 (1958) (recounting that Congress confirmed Supreme Court's authority to determine
admissibility of evidence in rule 26).
Under rule 26, as it existed before the 1975 passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
federal courts were free to fashion common-law evidence rules for criminal cases as long as
they were consistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (acknowledging that Court's supervisory power to devise
evidentiary rules is governed by considerations of rule 26).
258. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
259. Id. at 1014.
260. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Sdentiflc Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1205-06 (1980).
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that same period, and well before the rise of the Calabresians in the
1970s, commentators rejected the Frye rule as overly vague and un-
duly restrictive in denying juries useful evidence. 261
Consistent with its origins, Frye has served almost exclusively as a
rule limited to the criminal law context. Frye has been predicated on
a concern for the impact that novel forms of scientific investigation
might have in criminal litigation, given the stakes involved in such
cases. 262 Thus, sixty-four of the sixty-seven reported federal appel-
late decisions analyzing the admissibility of scientific evidence under
261. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE 13-14
(1986) (noting that "the [Frye] general acceptance test has been rejected by an increasing
number of courts and attacked by commentators, who have labelled the test 'infamous,' 'a
sport,' 'archaic,' and 'antiquated on the day of its pronouncement' "). Dean McCormick cata-
lyzed the attack on the Frye rule in the first edition of his hornbook. See CHARLES T. McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 170, at 363 (1954) (" 'General scientific
acceptance' is a proper condition upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence."). He further stated that "[a]ny
relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received
unless there are other reasons for exclusion." Id.
Other commentators have continued to attack the Frye rule. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger,
United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibil-
ity Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 559, 559 (1989) ("Wigmore, McCormick, and other
eminent commentators ... complained for decades about common-law restrictions on opin-
ion evidence that deprived triers of fact of valuable information needed for sounder adjudica-
tions."); George C. Pratt, A Judicial Perspective on Opinion Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 314 (1982) (stating that opinion rules reflect "enlightened, aca-
demic view of opinion testimony" that developed over 50-year period, but recognizing that
there have been numerous objections to opinion testimony rules since their adoption);Jack B.
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RicH. L. REV. 473, 476-77 (1986) (stating that "as
technology advanced and expert testimony became more important in the resolution of in-
creasingly complex litigation, unnecessary impediments became unacceptable," and noting
that "it became clear that the Frye rule might block the introduction of important and useful
testimony").
262. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (urging that Frye
standard has essential function of assuring that value of novel forensic techniques, such as
voiceprints, can be intelligently contested by both sides in criminal trial). The court asserted
that "the Frye test protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve
of experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a par-
ticular case." Id. Frye also helps prevent possible unfairness to defendants by placing addi-
tional burdens on the prosecution when novel scientific evidence is offered. See United States
v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that Frye presents protection of defend-
ant's interest in fair trial that is not protected when prosecution need not meet such high
evidentiary standards). The Sixth Circuit went on to proclaim:
A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a criminal pros-
ecution should not hang on his [or her] ability to successfully rebut scientific evi-
dence which bears an 'aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' although, in
reality the witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated
experiment which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field.
Id.; see also United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (9th Cir.) (finding defendant's
reliance on Frye rule as arising out of "concern[] with the possible prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial of admitting testimony of purported experts based upon insufficiently sub-
stantiated scientific theories, techniques or tests" inapposite to case at bar), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1044 (1982); Giannelli, supra note 260, at 1244 ("The underlying problem is that the
'burden of rebuttal is generally borne in these criminal cases by defendants without the eco-
nomic means to marshal scientific witnesses for a battle of the experts.' ") (quoting concurring
opinion in State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978)).
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Frye were criminal cases. 263 The theory that the Frye rule served for
263. The following federal appellate criminal cases cite Fiye as a general test for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence: United States v. Todd, 964 F.2d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793-97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992);
United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 486
(1992); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 57-61 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Boise,
916 F.2d 497, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2057 (1991); United States v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350-55 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475,480-81
(9th Cir. 1988); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1421 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1034 (1989); United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1297-1300 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194-95, 1198-1219 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and re-
manded in part, 487 U.S. 931 (1988); Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1427-32 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 217 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023 (1987); United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1381-
82 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104 (1987); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45,
49 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203-04, 1205 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988-90 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 892, 898 (10th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1345-47 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985);
United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1232-38 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 48, 49 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200-02 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329,
1336-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982); United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Fran-
zen, 680 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 755-57
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. McFillin, 713 F.2d 57, 60-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1056 (1981); McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 967
(1982); United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 960-62 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827
(1981); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); Hughes v. Mathews,
576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Israel v. Hughes, 439 U.S. 801 (1978);
United States.v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. McDaniel, 538
F.2d 408, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 685 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v.
Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,
1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436-41 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 929 (1959); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956); Medley v.
United States, 155 F.2d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946).
The following federal appellate criminal cases cite Frye for its specific holding on the admis-
sibility of polygraph tests: United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1531-37 (11 th Cir.
1989); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1391, 1394-97 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Black,
684 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v. Clark, 622
F.2d 917,917 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); United States v. Bad Cob, 560
F.2d 877, 882 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975); United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 849 (1973);
United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 955 n.85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Murdock v.
United States, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972); United States v. De Betham, 470 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973); United States v. Parman, 461 F.2d 1203, 1205 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144, 146 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966); Mc-
Croskey v. United States, 339 F.2d 895, 897 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. McDevitt, 328
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decades as a bulwark against junk science in a wide range of civil tort
litigation simply holds no water. If that were true, for example, it
would be difficult to understand how Huber's panorama of "cancer-
by-pothole" cases, along with a number of other junk science cases
ridiculed in Galileo's Revenge and decided in the heyday of Frye before
the flowering of the "let-it-all-in" philosophy, could ever have
emerged. In reality, despite Huber's credit of Frye as a tool against
junk science and his claim that the Calabresians destroyed Frye as
part of the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence, there is not a single case
decided by the federal appellate courts prior to 1975 that applied
the Frye rule in a civil case of any kind. As of April 7, 1993, only
three such decisions had been reported, two of which were decided
in 1991.2 64
Moreover, there is nothing to Huber's claim that, as of the 1991
publication date of Galileo's Revenge, the Frye rule was dead. In fact, a
total of nine circuits recognize Frye as a valid rule for excluding evi-
dence, at least in criminal cases. 26 5 Only two circuits reject the use
of the Frye rule.266 Similarly, at the state level, at least twenty states
F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1964); Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
This summary of the federal appellate history of the Frye rule was laid out in an amicus brief
filed in the U.S. Supreme Court by several states in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Brief of the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae at 2 n.1, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (U.S. Dec. 2, 1992) (No. 92-102). Neither party and none of the numer-
ous amid in Daubert questioned the accuracy of the summary.
264. See Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th
Cir. 1984) (employing Frye to overturn district court's admission of type of "voice stress analy-
sis" in civil diversity case involving insurance claim, but failing to consider propriety of impos-
ing Frye in civil case); see also Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16
(5th Cir.) (employing Frye to determine that district court was within its discreion to exclude
medical expert's testimony in civil case where that testimony was not generally accepted
within relevant scientific community), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1991); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (using Frye to exclude
epidemiological re-analysis studies in civil suit), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
265. See United States v. Hudley, 918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that Frye test is
appropriate test for determining admissibility of novel scientific technique), cert. dismissed, 113
S. Ct. 486 (1992); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying
both Frye test and rule 702 as compatible tests for admissibility of evidence); United States v.
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that Seventh Circuit has continued to affirm
and apply Frye standard); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that
Frye test is standard for admissibility of new methods of scientific measurement), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 817 (1987); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating
that Sixth Circuit predicates admission of scientific evidence upon application of Frye test),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 892, 898 (10th Cir. 1985)
(applying Frye test); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984) (adopting Frye test
as proper standard for determining relevance of scientific testimony); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting in civil case
that Fifth Circuit has continued to apply Frye criteria as standard of admissibility); United
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (recognizing that Frye is valid test).
266. See United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992) (reaffirming rejection of Frye test); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985) (rejecting Fye test as independent controlling standard of admissibility).
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continue to embrace the Frye rule in the context of criminal
litigation.267
B. The Ignorance of the Established Role
of the Juy in Resolving Factual Issues
Huber's vocabulary in Galileo's Revenge is broad, yet almost no-
where to be found is what Huber apparently regards as "the 'J'
Word"-jury. The concept of the jury, or of the Seventh Amend-
ment right to civil jury trial, is listed nowhere in the thirteen-page
index to Galileo's Revenge. Indeed, despite rather clear holdings by
the Supreme Court that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge," 268 much of Huber's
267. ALABAMA: Adams v. State, 484 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Prewitt v.
State, 460 So. 2d 296, 301-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
ALASKA: Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134-36 (Alaska 1986); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d
474, 478-79 (Alaska 1970).
CALIFORNIA: People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d
1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
CONNECTICUT: State v. Miller, 522 A.2d 249, 260 (Conn. 1987); State v. Atwood, 479 A.2d
258, 263-64 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 39 (D.C. 1988).
ILLINOIS: People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268, 285 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 215 (1990);
People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1356-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
INDIANA: Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1301-03 (Ind. 1991); Cornett v. State, 450
N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ind. 1983). But cf Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1305-06 (Ind. 1991)
(concurring opinion) (suggesting that Frye has not been conclusively adopted in Indiana).
KANSAS: State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992); Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144,
157-59 (Kan. 1991); State v. Washington, 622 P.2d 986, 991-92 (Kan. 1981).
KENTUCKY: Perry v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Ky. 1983).
MARYLAND: Cobey v. State, 533 A.2d 944, 946 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), cert. denied, 538
A.2d 778 (1988); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368-72 (Md. 1978).
MAssAcHUsErs: Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 443 (Mass. 1991); Common-
wealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 37 (Mass. 1989).
MINNESOTA: State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1989); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 767-68 (Minn. 1980).
MississiPPI: Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146 (Miss. 1990) (applying general ac-
ceptance test, but not citing Frye by name).
NEBRASKA: State v. Reynolds, 457 N.W.2d 405, 417 (Neb. 1990).
NEW HAMPSHIRE: State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 488-91 (N.H. 1992); State v. Stew-
art, 364 A.2d 621, 623 (N.H. 1976); State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547, 560-61 (N.H. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1970).
NEW MEXICO: State v. Blea, 681 P.2d 1100, 1103 (N.M. 1984).
OKLAHOMA: Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153, 161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (adopting gen-
eral acceptance standard but not citing Frye explicitly); Driskell v. State, 659 P.2d 343, 356
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Smith v. State, 656 P.2d 277, 281 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
PENNSYLVANIA: Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1234-35 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Topa, 369
A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977).
SOUTH DAKOTA: State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 620 (S.D. 1988); State v. Helmer, 278
N.W.2d 808, 812 (S.D. 1979).
WASHINGTON: State v. Ortiz, 831 P.2d 1060, 1069 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); State v. Martin,
684 P.2d 651, 654 (Wash. 1984).
268. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
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book proceeds as if the jury did not exist, and as if only judges are
entrusted with the task of deciding the facts of a case. For example,
Huber lauds the "wise judges" who "affirm[] the solid science and
reject[] the paranoid speculation. ' 269
In applying the reinvigorated Frye rule, Huber explains that the
wise judge should decide which community of scientists to con-
sult.2 70 He or she should then "determin[e] just where the main-
stream scientific consensus lies," based on "[c]areful reviews of
current learning... published in top-notch scientific journals." '271
These journals "have long track records of accuracy and insight,"
and what the wise judge "trusts is the institution, the process, the
collegiality, the experience, and the track record." 272 Huber writes
that "[t]he consensus scientific community supplies stopping points
in abundance," such as the FDA's opinion of the safety of Bendec-
tin, the National Institute of Health's opinion on the value of elec-
tronic fetal monitors, or the Centers for Disease Control's opinion
on the causes of pelvic infection. 273 Although such authoritative
opinions are not infallible, Huber finds that they are "less fallible-
much less fallible-than a thousand juries scattered across the coun-
try grappling with the complexities of immune system impairment
after being educated by the likes of Bertram Carnow or Arthur
Zahalsky," 274 whom Huber regards as high priests of the junk sci-
ence movement.
In short, Huber objects to any legal system that, in the face of a
"definitive pronouncement[]" from an authoritative scientific organ-
ization, would dare ask a jury its view of a factual issue.275 Reliance
on juries leads to "despotism sold by the drink," at the hands of
"activist legal bartenders. ' 276 Huber believes that inviting random
panels ofjurors to decide scientific truth by majority vote repudiates
the existence of objective fact. "The 'rule of law' is a completely
empty promise if key facts are infinitely plastic, if there is no exter-
nal and no immutable reality. ' 277 "It is simply unacceptable for any
judge to insist that there is no such thing. With or without the mod-
em philosopher's blessing, . . . lines can and must be drawn" be-
269. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 193.
270. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 199.
271. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 200.
272. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 200-01.
273. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 201.
274. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 201.
275. See HUBER, GALEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 202 (criticizing fact that judicial sys-
tem permits juries, rather than FDA, CDC, or other well-respected sources of scientific litera-
ture, to decide if drug is carcinogenic).
276. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 218.
277. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 219.
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tween science and pseudoscience, between "fact and fantasy. ' 27 8 In
Huber's legal universe, the judge commands factfinding and is to
direct factual resolutions toward the mainstream consensus. 270
The judge who meticulously steers the search for the most author-
itative, reliable assessment of Bendectin, or the origins of cerebral
palsy, or the causes of sudden acceleration, is not surrendering
her independence, she is vindicating it. In other circles, countless
extraneous considerations might corrupt the inquiry into the
facts. The judge's unique privilege and responsibility is to do her
utmost to get the facts right.
In the long run, a judge's independence is increased, not re-
duced, by careful respect for external law, whether written by
other judges, legislators, constitutional framers, or the still higher
authority, beyond any appeal, that enacted the laws of nature. 280
If the remainder of the book left any doubt, this passage from
Galileo's Revenge, coming five pages from the close, makes clear that
Huber is a legal theorist operating on the radical fringe whose pre-
scriptions cannot be taken seriously in our contemporary constitu-
tional order, at least in the federal court system. 281 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has often remarked, "[tihe right to trial by jury is a
'basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurispru-
dence,' "282 and that right is also protected in all states and in the
278. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 223.
279. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 224 (asserting that 'judge's unique
privilege and responsibility is to do her utmost to get the facts right" and that to do this judge
must make disciplined pursuit of true science, commonly reflected as scientific consensus).
280. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 224.
281. Apart from the radical legal nature of Huber's theory that complex issues of scientific
fact should be entrusted to "wise judges" rather than juries, the course on which he would
have these judges embark has little support in scientific reality. It is well beyond the scope of
this Article to respond to Huber's undocumented lay opinion that as to each factual issue an
authoritative "scientific consensus" can be found, and that select scientific journals serve as
the repository of this consensus. The interested reader, however, will find ample rebuttal of
Huber's views in various briefs filed in the Daubert case recently considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (U.S. Dec. 2,
1992) (No. 92-102) (containing extensive rebuttal of many of Huber's views of science; au-
thors include scientists and historians of science Stephen Jay Gould, Gerald Holton, Everett
Mendelsohn, and Dorothy Nelkin); Brief for Petitioners at 47-49, Daubert (No. 92-102) (re-
jecting view that prior publication in peer review journal can be predicate for admissibility of
expert testimony); Brief of American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics et al. as Amici
Curiae, Daubert (No. 92-102) (documenting frequent use by scientists and government regula-
tors of nonpeer-reviewed scientific analysis); Brief of Daryl E. Chubin et al. as Amici Curiae,
Daubert (No. 92-102) (rebutting many of Huber's conceptions about supposed value of institu-
tion of peer review for promoting scientific "truth").
282. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (quotingJacob v. New York City,
315 U.S. 752, 752 (1942)); see also Lyon v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc., 305 U.S.
484, 492 (1939) ("It is essential that the right to trial by jury be scrupulously safeguarded.");
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (stating that "any seeming curtailment of the
right to ajury trail should be scrutinized with the utmost care"); Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82
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District of Columbia in criminal trials by the Sixth Amendment 28 3
and in civil cases by state constitution or statute.28 4
Despite the "careful respect for ... constitutional framers" that
Huber suggests judges should hold, he ignores the fact that the
Constitution commands judges to defer to juries in resolving mat-
ters of credibility and factfinding. Such a command may not be
modified ad hoc in the pursuit of fealty to scientific consensus or
consistency and efficiency in adjudication. 285 As ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist stated some time ago, such policy goals "cannot obscure or
dilute [the] obligation to enforce the Seventh Amendment," for the
founders of our nation considered the civil jury trial "an important
bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to
be left to the whim of the sovereign or, it might be added, to that of
the judiciary." 286 As has been thoroughly recounted by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and numerous scholars, the Seventh Amendment was
the product of the colonials' perception of repression at the hands
of biased judges appointed by the Crown; whether or not that con-
cern was well-founded, the Federalists' guarantee that a civil jury
trial would be included in the Bill of Rights was essential to the pas-
sage of the Constitution itself.287 Both in its pedigree and in its
U.S. (15 Wall.) 373, 375 (1872) (stating that right to trial by jury is "great constitutional
right").
283. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968) (incorporating Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial in criminal cases through Fourteenth Amendment to apply to states).
284. All 50 states and the District of Columbia preserve or provide a constitutional, statu-
tory, or case law right to ajury trial in civil cases, subject in some instances to a subject matter
or an amount in controversy requirement. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CoNsr. art. I,
§ 16; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; COLO. R.
Civ. P. 38; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-715 (1961),
Paton v. Rose, 191 A.2d 455, 456 (D.C. 1963) (explicating D.C. jury guarantee); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, XI; HAW. CONsT. art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONsT. art. I, § 7; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONsT. art. I, § 20; IOWA CONsT. art. I, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights,
§ 5; Ky. CONST. § 7; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art. 1731 (West 1987); LA. CODE CIv. PROc. art.
1732(1) (West 1987); ME. CONsT. art. I, § 20; MD. CONST. Dec. of Rights art. 23; MASS. CONST.
ANN. pt. 1, art. 15; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 44, MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.1352 (1991); MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 4; MIss. CONST. art. VI, § 147; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONsT. art.
III, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15, § 20; NJ.
CONST. art. I, 9; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 25;
N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 13; OHIo CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-37-60 (Law. Co-op.
1991); S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 6; TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 10; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 10; VT. CONSr. art. XII; VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21;
W.V. CONsT. art. III, § 13; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 5; Wyo. CONsT. art. I, § 9, Wyo. R. Civ. P. 38.
285. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 536 (1974) (noting that where constitu-
tional right to jury trial applies, fact-finding must be carried out by jury, not judge).
286. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 340-44 (recounting history of Seventh Amendment and popular call for civil
jury trials in Constitution ratification debates); see also Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 832-35 (1980) (recog-
nizing high regard for jury trial among American colonists in context of colonial debates over
jury trials for equity cases); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend-
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functioning, the Seventh Amendment is thus a vital check on the
autocratic tendencies that might, absent the jury trial guarantee, de-
velop within the life-tenured federal judiciary. 288
Apart from the constitutional absurdity of Huber's position, there
is little empirical support for the view that a jury is less able to re-
solve scientific issues involving expert testimony than is a single,
nonexpertjudge. Thus, there is no ground for Huber's view that it
is somehow desirable for judges to muscle juries out of the way in
the fight against junk science. To the contrary, as has been noted in
an essay by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, a judge Huber depicts as
one of the fiercest critics ofjunk science, 28 9 the use of a jury to re-
solve difficult scientific questions confers significant benefits to the
civil justice system. 290 The presence of a jury makes "an enor-
mously valuable contribution" to the clarity of argumentation by
"forcing counsel to organize a complex mass of information into a
form understandable by the uninitiated."' 29' "Apart from the occa-
sional situation in which a judge possesses unique training, . . . the
assumption that a jury collectively has less ability to comprehend
complex material than does a single judge is an unjustified
conclusion." 292
A lively debate raged in both the lower federal courts and the aca-
demic community a decade ago over the question of whether some
cases are simply too complex for a lay jury to resolve.293 The con-
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-730 (1974) (discussing debate between Federalists and Anti-
federalists over adoption of Seventh Amendment).
288. See Granfinanceria, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 83 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)
("The function of the civil jury is to diffuse the otherwise autocratic power and authority of
thejudge."); Parklane, 439 U.S. at 344-50 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (arguing that right to jury
trial protects against incursions by government or judiciary); see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 580 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (recounting that Seventh Amendment originated from "en-
croachment on civil jury trial by colonial administrators"). As Judge Patrick Higginbotham
has explained, the Seventh Amendment flowed largely from the need for a check on the
otherwise unaccountable power of appellate courts. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing
the Dialogue: CivilJuries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 48-50 (1977)
(equating debate over jury trials as debate over who will be trier of fact). American courts
have a "peculiar need for the democratizing influence of the jury" because an independent
judiciary carries with it an "attendant risk of autocratic behavior." Id. at 52.
289. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 205 (stating that Judge Higginbot-
ham has urged judiciary to "take hold of expert testimony in federal trials").
290. See Higginbotham, supra note 288, at 52 (asserting that use ofjury in civil trials pro-
tects against risk of autocratic, independent judiciary).
291. Higginbotham, supra note 288, at 54.
292. Higginbotham, supra note 288, at 53.
293. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 287, at 848 (concluding that there is no precedent for
denial of plaintiff's right to jury trial on account of complexity of litigation); Patrick Devlin,
Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLuM. L. REv.
43, 106-07 (1980) (concluding that English history favors courts' denial of jury trial when
practical abilities ofjury to find fact is impaired); Constance S. Huttner, Note, Unfit for Jury
Determination: Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial b'iJuly, 20 B.C. L.
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troversy's fire was stoked by a Third Circuit holding that, in light of
due process concerns, the Seventh Amendment does not necessarily
mandate ajury trial in complex cases, 294 and a Ninth Circuit holding
that there is no "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amend-
ment. 295 The consensus today is that juries are fully able to resolve
complex issues, including the conflicting assertions contained in
complex expert testimony. A special symposium on the civil jury
system organized by the Brookings Institution and the American
Bar Association in 1992 and composed of judges, academics, and
plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers reaffirmed "a strong commitment
to a civil jury of lay persons," which is "a valuable process for deci-
sionmaking and an effective means for arriving at a fair resolution of
disputed facts."' 296 The symposium also concluded that "the jury
provides important protections against the abuse of power by legis-
latures, judges, the government, business, or other powerful enti-
ties."' 297 Rejecting efforts to supplant lay juries with more "expert"
tribunals,298 the symposium exhibited a "strong sentiment" to "re-
sist efforts to reduce the jury's role" and "strongly rejected propos-
als for blue ribbon or expert juries for resolving complex cases. '299
REV. 511, 533-38 (1979) (suggesting that improved judicial management of complex litigation
is preferable to curtailment of right to jury trial); Montgomery Kersten, Note, Preserving the
Right toJury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 99, 115 (1979) (arguing that courts'
restriction of right to trial by jury is unnecessary).
294. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980)
(observing that complexity of case may exceed jury's ability to decide rationally and that de-
nial of jury trial in these cases does not abrogate due process).
295. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to read
complexity exception into Seventh Amendment), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
296. BROOKINGS INST., CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM: REPORT FROM AN
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM 8 (1992) [HEREINAFTER CHARTING A
FUTURE].
297. Id. at 9 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339-40 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting)).
298. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially QualifedJuries and Expert
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887, 942-50, 995-1004 (1981) (recommending use of carefully selected "special juries"
or expert nonjury tribunals for complex litigation).
299. CHARTING A FUTURE, supra note 296, at 2-4. This approach was rejected, among
other reasons, on the view that "the jury provides an important check on the bureaucratiza-
tion and professionalization of the legal system," preventing
adjudication from becoming technical and routinized, perhaps even distant and in-
sensitive, as cases with similar fact patterns recur over and over before the same
decisionmaker (the judge). The jury brings common sense and fairness to its deci-
sions, cutting through the arcane and often overly detailed presentations of informa-
tion by lawyers and judges. Lawyers can over-try cases, jury instructions can
obfuscate basic legal principles, and judges can be mysterious and distant partici-
pants in the process.
Id. at 10. The report concluded:
It is our collective experience, supported by the available evidence, that no case is
inherently too complex for juries to decide. In our view, ifjuries find issues and facts
too complex, it is because the lawyers have failed to present their cases clearly or
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Instead of circumscribing the jury's role, the symposium endorsed
a wide range of proposals to further improve the capacities of the
civil jury, to "move the jury from being a 'passive' fact-finder to tak-
ing a more 'active' part in the trial process," through the use of such
devices as pretrial instructions, notetaking, exhibit notebooks, on-
line access to transcripts of testimony, minisummary statements dur-
ing trial, increased use of visual exhibits during trial, "plain lan-
guage" instructions, larger juries to enhance consistency of
outcomes, and enhanced training of both lawyers and judges in the
ability to run effective trials.300
The U.S. Supreme Court has also exhibited considerable confi-
dence in our basic system of jury justice. As the Court noted in
Barefoot v. Estelle:30 "[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the
federal .. .level[] anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence
should be admitted and its weight left to the fact finder, who would
have the benefit of cross examination and contrary evidence by the
opposing party."30 2
In Barefoot, the Court stressed that "the purpose of the jury is to
sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters
from the unimportant matters, and, when called upon to do so, to
give greater credence to one party's expert witnesses than another's.
Such matters occur routinely in the American judicial system, both
civil and criminal. 303 Although Huber enjoys depicting those who
disagree with his junk science concerns as "far-siders straight out of
a Gary Larson cartoon,"3 04 the extreme, almost caricatured views of
judges have failed to structure the proceedings in a way that would simplify matters
for the jury to understand them.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 16-27. A substantial body of commentary has developed along these lines. See,
e.g.,Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of D'fficult Issues: Lessons from CivilJury Trials, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 727, 764-74 (1991) (advocating continued and increased participation ofjuries in
adjudication and suggesting improvements to increase jury comprehension of issues and
facts); Committee on Fed. Courts of the New York State Bar Assoc., Improving Jury Comprehen-
sion in Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549, 570 (1988) (reviewing potential im-
provements in jury comprehension of issues and facts in civil litigation); Judyth W. Pendell,
Enhancing Juror Effectiveness: An Insurer's Perspective, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989,
at 311, 321 (pointing out that increased predictability of trial outcomes is helpful to insurers
and recommending measures to improve jury efficiency); Carrie P. Withey, Court-Sanctioned
Means of ImprovingJury Competence in Complex Civil Litigation, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 715 (1982) (sug-
gesting that already existing court-sanctioned procedures for sorting out difficulties in com-
plex litigation is preferable to use of special juries or administrative tribunals).
301. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
302. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).
303. Id. at 902 (citation omitted). The Court repeated that emphasis in Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), noting with regard to opinion testimony that "the ultimate
safeguard" in the Federal Rules is "the opponent's right to present evidence tending to con-
tradict or diminish the weight of those conclusions." Id. at 168.
304. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 17.
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the American legal system on which Huber depends are amply re-
vealed by his discussion of Barefoot.
Barefoot considered a constitutional challenge to the receipt of
psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in a state criminal
proceeding. 30 5 The mainstream of the psychiatric profession be-
lieved that psychiatrists' efforts to make such predictions were ut-
terly unreliable, a point brought to the Court's attention in an
amicus curiae brief of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA).30 6  Without challenging the accuracy of the APA's
headcount, the Court responded:
If [the four psychiatrists whose testimony was at issue] are so obvi-
ously wrong and should be discredited, there should be no insu-
perable problem in doing so by calling members of the
Association [to testify against them] .... We are unconvinced,
however, at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be
trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence ....
All of these doubts about the usefulness of psychiatric predic-
tions can be called to the attention of the jury .... Petitioner's...
argument... is founded on the premise that the jury will not be
able to separate the wheat from the chaff. We do not share in this
low evaluation of the adversary process °307
Huber writes contemptuously of the Court's vigorous defense of
the capabilities of the lay jury:
[T]he question before the High Court was whether a certain
brand of psychiatric soothsaying ranks as real science. The Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association declared that it doesn't, and all the
Justices conceded that two-thirds of the predictions made by cer-
tain psychiatric prophets are wrong. No matter, a majority con-
cluded in a dismal display of let-it-all-in reasoning: a jury can
always be trusted "to separate the wheat from the chaff." The
chaff in this case was represented by a psychiatrist nicknamed "Dr.
Death," a man who testifies frequently on the "future dangerous-
ness" of capital defendants. The upshot was that Thomas Bare-
foot, his future dangerousness suitably certified by a credentialed
expert, was executed by lethal injection in Huntsville, Texas, just
after midnight on Tuesday, October 24, 1984.308
Apart from revealing Huber's dependence on a wholesale rejection
of mainstream thinking about law, this passage of his book fails to
come to grips with the implications of the Supreme Court's disa-
305. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
306. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
307. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 900-01 & n.7.
308. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 219-20.
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greement with his view of Barefoot. If the Supreme Court is willing
to permit a human being to be put to death on the basis of what,
under Huber's calculus, is clearly junk science, it is difficult to see
why the Court, or other judges, should put much stock in Huber's
plea that the danger of erroneous jury verdicts in civil tort litigation
justifies a wholesale revision of our legal system, and especially of
the role of the jury.30 9
At the least Huber is candid about his agenda, and the radical
nature of his position. He succinctly states near the close of Galileo's
309. In particular, it is hard to put any stock in Huber's complaint that the present system
invites "random panels ofjurors ... to decide scientific truth by majority vote" repudiates
"the existence of objective fact," and that "[i]t is not especially scientific to ... sit back, let
everything in, and invite random groups of twelve stout citizens to vote as they please." Hu-
BER, GAuLEO's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 218, 228. Huber harps on the fallibility of"a thou-
sand juries scattered across the country grappling with the complexities of immune system
impairment" or other health harms. lId at 201. In fact, Huber's worries about the "inconsis-
tency" in results of individually empaneledjuries simply reflect an endemic feature of a case-
by-case system of adjudication coupled with the use of a lay jury as a means of providing a
needed check on the power of the life-tenured judiciary.
As Justice Kennedy observed in the far more visible and troublesome area of inconsistent
punitive damages awards, the evolution of the jury system over the centuries in general dem-
onstrates that "[o]ur legal tradition is one of progress from fiat to rationality," and
"[e]lements of whim and caprice do not predominate" in a properly functioning jury system.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1055 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"Some inconsistency ofjury results can be expected," of course, partly because "the jury is
empaneled to act as a decisionmaker in a single case, not as a more permanent body. As a
necessary consequence of their case-by-case existence, juries may tend to reach disparate out-
comes based on the same instructions." Id Indeed, in the area of criminal law "[i]t has, of
course, long been the rule that consistency in verdicts or judgments of conviction is not re-
quired." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974). In fact, "'it is common experi-
ence that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of
the consequences we accept under our jury system.'" Id. at 101 (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957)).
The preeminent role our civil justice system gives the jury reveals the fundamental consis-
tency underlying what on the surface might appear to be a pattern of inconsistent verdicts in
cases involving different plaintiffs but similar scientific evidence. "[T]he many ways in which
lawyers are accustomed to talking about 'inconsistency' in the law do not really conflict with
the widespread assumption that legal systems are consistent." SeeJohn M. Rogers & Robert
E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MicH. L.
REV. 992, 1000 (1992) (applying mathematical analysis of number theory systems to legal
system and concluding that it is impossible to derive consistent rule for every fact pattern).
One can conclude that these "different results are but consistent applications of the higher
rule (metarule)" that operates here. Id at 1001.
The core function of the jury is to check the discretion of Article III judges by evaluating
the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Seesupra notes 285-88 and accompany-
ing text (discussing function ofjury). Obviously, in every case in which the jury is permitted
to do its job, regardless of whether the outcomes in any range of cases are the same, this core
function is consistently carried out. "[Alt times the law may not require one action or deci-
sion only, but instead permits a particular range of choices"; even where "discretion is exer-
cised in different ways on identical facts ... there is still legal consistency ... [that] results
from the very fact that the law permits a range of choices." Id. at 1001-02. As justice Ken-
nedy emphasized in Haslip, the institution of jury trial naturally assumes and respects the
discretion ofjuries to reach inconsistent outcomes in separate cases as the price of ensuring a
consistent adjudicative process. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1054 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (as-
serting that mark of sound legal system is that its procedures and not necessarily its decisions
have stood test of time).
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Revenge: "The rule of law is indeed a grand thing, but not half so
grand as the rule of fact."3 10 Of course, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist
noted, because of the centuries-old constitutional pact leading to
the Seventh Amendment, "no amount of argument that [a new pro-
cedural] device provides for more efficiency or more accuracy or is
fairer will save it if the degree of invasion of the jury's province is
greater than allowed in 1791."311 Huber's "rule of fact," presuma-
bly administered by autocratic "social controllers" in the line of the
"grand Inquisitors, the Hiders, and Stalins"31 2 rather than by ju-
rors, may be an option in other countries, but not in ours.
IV. THE SELLING OF PETER HUBER: THE NEW
"MANHATrAN PROJECT"
The flagrant shortcomings of Huber's first tort-reform book, Lia-
bility: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences, have been on record
for years now.31 3 Many of the same errors that infected that book,
such as bias, distortion of fact, and tendentious renderings of judi-
cial opinions and legal treatises, also plague Galileo's Revenge. In
both cases, these flaws, which render the books little more than
quasihistorical, quasihysterical accounts of recent developments in
the law, are either manifest or readily discovered.
To be sure, Peter Huber's style of writing is breezy and interest-
ing. But Huber's marriage of his carefree style of writing to a care-
less style of research and analysis render his two major works on tort
liability of little value for the reader. Despite this, as documented in
Part I of this Article, Huber has long been regarded as the intellec-
tual guiding light of the tort-reform movement, not only in the de-
parted Bush-Quayle administration, but on Capitol Hill and in
academia as well.3 14 The mystery remains: Given the slipshod qual-
ity of Huber's writings, why is he so influential? The answer appears
to be money and organization. The money is provided by insurance
companies and other corporations, acting individually and also
through corporate foundations and conservative think tanks, whose
interests are endangered by lawsuits and who are thus willing to in-
vest money today in the hope of reducing their exposure to liability
tomorrow. The organization is provided by individuals and tort re-
310. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 225.
311. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
312. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 5, at 217.
313. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of various flaws
in Liability).
314. See supra 37-42 and accompanying text (detailing Huber's influence and highlighting
his popularity with Bush administration).
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form groups who lead the charge on behalf of these entities. An
examination of the influence this assistance has garnered Huber in
the tort arena provides a fascinating case study of the role of public
relations in the ongoing policy debate over reform of the American
legal system.
A. The Discovery of Peter Huber
In 1986, investment in Peter Huber appeared to be a prudent
choice. Just one year earlier, Huber had published a law review arti-
cle asserting that society in general and courts in particular are
overly, almost obsessively preoccupied with "public risks," i.e.,
those "threats to human health or safety that are centrally or mass-
produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual
risk bearer's direct understanding and control."3 15 Huber sug-
gested that citizens and governments, not to mention corporations,
would be better off if individuals stopped worrying about the lack of
air bags in cars and just started driving more safely; if they stopped
obsessing about polluted air, contaminated water, and environmen-
tal toxins, and focused instead on examples of their own heedless
behavior, such as smoking, drinking, or overeating.31 6 Huber's arti-
cle attracted the attention of Reagan administration ideologues and
their colleagues in Congress, where debate was picking up steam
over tort reform and the alleged insurance crisis.5 1 7
Huber's article proved to be an intellectual godsend to a move-
ment that was long on lobbyists and cash but short on ideas. Just
one year after its publication, Victor E. Schwartz, general counsel of
the Products Liability Alliance and long regarded as the tort reform
movement's chief lobbyist and spokesperson on Capitol Hill,3 18 was
asked what he thought of Huber's article and what made Huber so
helpful to corporate America's campaign to undo a quarter century
of progress in the law of torts. Schwartz replied that Huber's essay
did nothing less than provide "'the intellectual underpinning' of
the tort reform effort."3 19 A reason for its importance, added
Schwartz, was that Huber "was untainted by any relationship with the
315. Peter Huber, Safely and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 277, 277 (1985).
316. Id. at 277-79.
317. Sheila Kaplan, These Perennials Are Lobbyists' Cash Cows, LEGAL TMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at
S3.
318. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing role of Victor Schwartz in tort
reform movement).
319. W. John Moore, Peter Huber; Free-Lance Critic Hits Shackles of Regulation, NAT'LJ., Nov.
15, 1986, at 2797, 2797 (quoting Victor E. Schwartz).
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manufacturers who are leading the fight for tort reform. '3 20
B. The Manhattan Institute's Packaging of Peter Huber
Having discovered this pure, unadulterated tonic, corporate
America proceeded to do with Huber what it usually does with such
treasures: it commenced to bottle and market him, albeit with the
hope of making it appear that he remain "untainted." Thus, in
March 1986, the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, a con-
servative "think tank," 321 asked Huber to join Richard Epstein, pro-
fessor of law at the University of Chicago, and Richard Willard, head
of the Justice Department's Civil Division and Chief of the Reagan
administration's Tort Policy Working Group, in a public forum on
"The Liability Crisis: Who's to Blame?" 3 22 The program was
scheduled to inaugurate the Manhattan Institute's "Project on Civil
Justice Reform."3 23
Of course, the idea of using a forum to focus attention on the
sponsor's view of an issue is not unusual; such forums, combined
with position papers, are the raison d'etre of Washington think tanks.
What made the Project on Civil Justice Reform forum somewhat
unique, and what has made the Manhattan Institute especially influ-
ential over the years are, first, how effectively the Manhattan Insti-
tute publicized the forum and, second, how it carefully capitalized
on the forum in its aftermath. 324 In an internal report, the Manhat-
tan Institute president, William M.H. Hammett, explained:
Follow-up [of the forum] was [deemed] essential and this is what
we did during the rest of 1986:
320. Id. (emphasis added).
321. See generally MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 1
(1990) [hereinafter HISTORY AND BACKGROUND] (on file with The American University Law Re-
view) (describing development of Manhattan Institute).
Formed originally [in 1978] as the [non-profit] International Center for Economic
Policy Studies, the Institute was renamed in 1981 to reflect an expanded policy
agenda. The Manhattan Institute was a moving force behind the book, Wealth and
Poverty, by George Gilder, its then program director, which was widely credited with
laying the basis for what has since become known as supply-side economics. Later,
the Institute provided a catalyst for Thomas Sowell's work on ethnicity (Markets and
Minorities, 198 1) and Charles Murray's penetrating critique of contemporary welfare
policy (Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950 - 1980, 1984).
Id.
322. See MANHATrAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE LIABILITY CRISIS: WHO'S To
BLAME? 2 (1986) [hereinafter LIABILITY CRISIS] (detailing comments of speakers and ques-
tions of attendees at Manhattan forum discussing increased amount of tort litigation in United
States).
323. ld
324. Cf. Memorandum from William M.H. Hammett, President, Manhattan Institute for
Policy Research, to All CivilJustice Contacts 1 (Jan. 7, 1987) [hereinafter Hammett Memoran-
dum] (on file with The American University Law Review) (observing that "[r]eporters from all the
national papers and magazines were there and the event generated numerous news articles").
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1) Published a 24-page Manhattan Report with the proceedings
of the seminar along with additional analysis of the breakdown of
civil law. This report was mailed to 25,000 carefully selected peo-
ple in government, academia, business, media and the law. It was
reprinted in the Empire State Report and in CNA's newsletter and
extracted in the Wall Street Journal and several other papers.
2) We held two workshops, one in Washington, DC in June
and one in New York in August. The first included thirty corpo-
rate government affairs officers while the second, a full-day semi-
nar, brought together fifteen academic scholars from across the
country.
3) With assistance from a number of our friends, we compiled
a mailing list of over 400 journalists who have written about the
liability crisis.
4) Our project director, Walter Olson, published numerous
"op-eds" on the subject, including a major piece in the Wall Street
Journal. An article by him on directors' and officers' liability,
which was published in the July issue of Across the Board, was
mailed by us to over one thousand CEOs as well as to our media
list.3 25
325. Hammett Memorandum, supra note 324, at 1. These mailings to "over one thousand
[corporate] CEOs" were not just for informational purposes. According to Hammett,
Since May, Walter Olson and I have met with over a hundred corporate counsels and
CEOs ... in an effort to get our project funded. In that time, we've learned much
about the legal problems facing corporate America and have compiled the following
list of blue-chip supporters (amounts of 1986 support in parentheses): AETNA
($10,000); Alexander & Alexander ($1,500); American Home Products ($5,000);
American International Group ($5,000); Blue Bird Body ($1,000); Burlington North-
ern ($1,000); Chubb ($8,000); CIGNA ($5,000); Combined International ($5,000);
Cooper Industries ($1,000); Crum and Forster ($2,500); General Electric ($10,000);
General Mills ($1,000); Foxboro ($1,000); Hartford Insurance ($500); Illinois Tool
Works ($750); Jervis B. Webb Company ($500); Kaman ($500); Ko-Rec-Type
($2,000); Merrill Lynch ($5,000); Metropolitan Life ($2,000); Milliken ($5,000); Pru-
dential ($7,500); Reliance Holdings ($5,000); RJR Nabisco ($20,000); SAFECO
($1,000); Santa Fe Southern Pacific ($5,000); Sears, Roebuck ($7,500); SmithKline
Beckman ($5,000); Squibb ($1,000); State Farm ($5,000); Texaco ($5,000); Travel-
ers ($3,000).
Id. All told, these contributions totaled $114,500-nearly half of which, $52,500, was sup-
plied by insurance companies. Idl at 2.
Six years later, the projected budget for the Judicial Studies Program had swollen nearly
nine-fold to $955,000. MIssION STATEMENT, supra note 38, at 8. Of this amount, $500,000
was earmarked for the salaries and benefits of Huber, Walter Olson, and Michael Horowitz,
the newly designated acting director of the program who served as former general counsel of
the Office of Management and Budget under Reagan and was a former member of the Reagan
Justice Department's Tort Policy Working Group. Id. Another $180,000 was allocated for
"Outreach (Conferences, travel, printing, etc.)." Id.
Where this funding comes from is as interesting as where it is allocated, for it is often the
piper who calls the tune. Notwithstanding the Manhattan Institute's stated ambition to voice
populist themes and its expressed desire to represent not just the "financial community" but
"civil libertarians" and "consumer groups" as well, id at 3, it appears that corporate America
has the biggest financial stake in the Judicial Studies Program's "Mission." Major contribu-
tors include: 14 of the nation's largest insurance companies (Aetna, Alexander & Alexander,
CIGNA, CNA, Crum & Forster, Employers Mutual Casualty, GEICO, Alexander Hamilton
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In hindsight, it appears that the most important development in
the Manhattan Institute's initial focus on tort liability issues was yet
to come. In November 1986, Hammett writes, Huber
became [the Manhattan Institute's] first "Civil Justice Fellow"
when he began work on his book [Liability]. He will be taking the
next few months to complete the manuscript of what we expect
will be the most forceful and lucid argument yet made for true tort
reform. In addition to his stipend, we're also supplying him with
paralegal assistance and editorial guidance from Walter Olson.326
C. The Public Relations Juggernaut of the Manhattan Institute
The Manhattan Institute has long prided itself as much on its abil-
ity to promote views as to incubate them. Indeed, it sees the former
as more important than the latter. In the view of the Manhattan
Institute, the popularity of a given idea is more a reflection of the
quality and quantity of the public relations efforts mounted after
publication than any efforts at research, analysis, and writing by the
author before publication.3 27
Life, Kemper, Marsh & McLennan, Nationwide Insurance, SAFECO, Selective Insurance, and
Transamerica); 16 of the nation's biggest chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturers (Abbott
Laboratories, AMOCO, ARGO, Bristol Myers-Squibb, Dow Chemical, Eli Lilly, Exxon, John-
son & Johnson, Merck, Mobil, Monsanto, Pfizer, SmithKline Beecham, Texaco, Union Car-
bide, and Upjohn); and 21 of the nation's wealthiest industrial manufacturers (including
Alcoa, American Home Products, Ameritech, Anheuser-Busch, Boeing, Coca-Cola, Cooper
Industries, Conoco, General Dynamics, General Electric, B.F. Goodrich, W.R. Grace, Honey-
well, IBM, Litton Industries, PepsiCo, Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco, Rockwell International,
TRW, and Westinghouse). Id at 8.
Over the years, the overall budget for the Manhattan Institute has grown apace. Originally
named the International Center for Economic Studies, see supra note 321, it began operations
with a budget of $125,000. See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISH-
MENT: FROM CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY TO POLITICAL POWER 294 (1986) (noting that growth
from initial budget due to private corporate contributions created substantial political power);
JOSEPH G. PESCHEK, POLICY-PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS: ELITE AGENDAS AND AMERICA'S RIGHT-
WARD TURN 63 (1987) (stating amount of growth of several policy planning organizations and
noting conservative influence exerted by large corporate contributions). By 1989, total con-
tributions had grown to $2,113,000,41%o of which came from conservative and/or corporate
foundations such as theJohn M. Olin Foundation, Sarah Scaife Foundation, Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation, J.M. Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, and Starr Foundation.
TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49, at 20-22. Thirty-three percent came from Fortune 500 cor-
porations, chiefly insurance companies and pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturers, in-
cluding $50,000-plus each from Aetna, State Farm Insurance, Citicorp, and Chase Manhattan
Bank; $15,000-plus each from Prudential, Exxon, RJR Nabisco, Philip Morris, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, and UPS; and $5,000-plus each from Abbott Laboratories,
Alcoa, American Home Products, Amoco, Boeing, Chrysler, Chubb, CIGNA, CNA, Continen-
tal Corporation, Dow Chemical, Dupont, FMC, Ford, General Electric, General Reinsurance,
Hill & Knowlton, Household International, Johnson &Johnson, Merck, Milliken & Co., Reli-
ance Group, Royal Insurance, Sears, Roebuck, J & W Seligman, SmithKline Beecham, U.S.
Trust, Union Carbide, and Xerox. Id at 21, 23.
326. Hammett Memorandum, supra note 324, at 1.
327. See MANHATrAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, WINTER REPORT 1991-1992, at 7 (1992)
[hereinafter WINTER REPORT] (acknowledging that "[c]ommissioning a work, supporting it,
and finding a publishing outlet are only part of what the Institute does, however; making sure
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The Manhattan Institute's approach can be gleaned from docu-
ments that it has released over the past several years, some of which
are publicly available and some of which the author obtained from
recipients of periodic fundraising newsletters distributed by the
Manhattan Institute.3 28 The recent "Mission Statement and Over-
view" of the Manhattan Institute's Judicial Studies Program candidly
proclaims how important it is to mold the media to the proper pro-
tort reform views; indeed, this newsletter provides a prescription for
just how to do so:
Journalists need copy, and it's an established fact that over time
they'll "bend" in the direction in which it flows. For that reason it
is imperative that a steady stream of understandable research, analy-
sis and commentary supporting the need for liability reform be
produced. If, sometime during the present decade, a consensus
emerges in favor of serious judicial reform, it will be because mil-
lions of minds have been changed, and only one institution is
powerful enough to bring that about: the combined force of the
nation's print and broadcast media .... 329
Of course, the Manhattan Institute's objective is to change the
minds of the public and mold that consensus by providing this
"steady stream" of ideas to the media. To that end, the long-tested
techniques developed by Madison Avenue, including the market-
testing of ideas,330 are used by the Manhattan Institute to sell ideas,
a book reaches as wide an audience as possible is perhaps the most important service we
provide"). A primary focus on the marketing of ideas is not unique to the operations of the
Manhattan Institute, among conservative organizations. As William Baroody, Jr., president of
the conservative American Enterprise Institute, put it: "'I make no bones about marketing.
... We pay as much attention to the dissemination of product as to the content.... We hire
ghost-writers for scholars to produce op-ed articles that are sent to one hundred and one
cooperating newspapers-three pieces every two weeks.'" BLUMEN"THAL, supra note 325, at 44
(quoting William Baroody,Jr.). Oras EdwinJ. Feulner, Jr., president of the Heritage Founda-
tion, explained: "'Ideas are always ahead of the politicians. Ideas are refined through orga-
nizations like ours.'" Id. at 36 (quoting Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.). According to Feulner, whose
Heritage Foundation's aggressive public relations strategy set the standard for (and helped to
spawn) other think tanks and established its preeminent influence during the Reagan and
Bush administrations, "It doesn't matter how many books and studies you produce. You've
got to market your product, get it off the bookshelf." Carol Matlack, Marketing Ideas, NAT'LJ.,
June 22, 1991, at 1552, 1552-53.
328. See, e.g., MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 38; TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49; LIABIL-
rry CRISIS, supra note 322; WINTER REPORT, supra note 327; Hammett Memorandum, supra
note 324.
329. MissioN STATEMENT, supra note 38, at 2.
330. See TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49, at 4 (reviewing first decade of Manhattan Insti-
tute's existence).
Sustaining a flow of fresh and innovative ideas is crucial for democratic societies,
whose strength is derived from open and honest discussion. Before ideas are ready
for the political arena, however, they must be tested in the crucible of informed
opinion.... Since 1980 the Manhattan Institute has provided a setting for the intro-
duction and discussion of ideas that many consider to be the best intellectual testing
ground in the world-the Manhattan Forum. Designed to take advantage of New
[Vol. 42:1637
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shape public perceptions of a "legal system in crisis," and manufac-
ture a supposedly spontaneous public outcry about the need to re-
form the legal system. In November 1992, the Manhattan Institute
published a five-year summary of the Judicial Studies Program with
a forward-looking "Mission Statement and Overview." 33' This pub-
lication both highlighted the Program's accomplishments and of-
fered a coherent philosophy for continuing those achievements in
the future: the continued promotion of writers such as Peter Huber.
According to the Manhattan Institute, the key to both achieving
its past successes and attaining its future goals lies in its ability to
"set[] the terms of the debate."33 2 "The rhetoric of liability reform
must incorporate transcending concepts, like consumer choice, fair-
ness, and equity, while simultaneously pointing out the opposition's
indifference or opposition to these values. s333 An earlier promo-
tional brochure vaunted the "Manhattan Institute Approach" in
shaping public debate 334-an approach that easily explains how a
book as inadequate as Galiko's Revenge could nonetheless enjoy such
favorable publicity. What is critical, according to the Manhattan In-
stitute, is not the research and analysis undertaken by an author, or
the data discovered and ideas developed by an author; instead,
[An author's real] "Moment of Truth" ... has just begun when his
York's unique mix of opinion molders and leaders from the business, communica-
tions, and non-profit worlds, these gatherings have given wind to countless new
ideas and original research findings.
Id.
331. MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 38, at 1-6.
332. MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 38, at 1.
333. MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 38, at 1-2 (describing how Manhattan Institute de-
fines its marketing strategy). The section on "Setting the Terms of the Debate" further ex-
plained the Manhattan Institute's marketing strategy, including the tactic of piggy-backing
tort reform "rhetoric" onto current populist themes:
Across a wide cultural horizon today powerful new ideas like choice, empowerment,
and voluntarism are capturing the public imagination; they can and should be
brought into the debate about legal reform....
For tort reform to maintain its rightful place as an issue of national interest and
debate, it must broaden its appeal and move beyond its confrontational demeanor
(e.g., lawyer-bashing)....
Advocates of liability reform must link their arguments to a broader agenda for the
nineties, by showing how consumers and taxpayers are, ultimately, in the same boat
with manufacturers, service providers and insurers.... Such a "linkage" strategy
would engage the following elements: The Financial Community... The Political
Community . .. The Medical/Scientific Community ... The Research/Academic
Community... Professional Organizations... Civil Libertarians... [and] The Grass
Roots-Consumer groups ....
Id- at 1-4.
334. See MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE APPROACH 1
(1987) (on file with The American University Law Review) (explaining Manhattan Institute's phi-
losophy and approach to informing the media).
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or her book finally gets published. That is when it enters the criti-
cal process that will determine which, if any, of its ideas will en-
dure. The Manhattan Institute has provided over three dozen
authors of serious books an opportunity to present their ideas to a
diverse, well-informed, and often critical, New York audience.
Because of the caliber of our audiences, and the large number of
writers, producers and reviewers attracted, a Manhattan Forum
can often be the single most important factor in determining a
book's acceptance and impact.33 5
In another fund-raising letter to corporate executives, President
Hammett further explicated the Manhattan Institute Approach:
The strategy of the Judicial Studies Program centers on spon-
soring the writing of first-rate books on civil justice reform. With
book in hand, the Program then works to bring the ideas to a wide
audience of specialists and lay persons through an imaginative
promotion campaign. Briefly stated, [Judicial Studies Program]
efforts are divided into two main areas: (1) The Litigation Explosion
... [and] (2) Science and Law .... As to promotion, both projects
present their ideas to popular and specialist audiences through a
system of seminars, lectures and published articles. The Institute
sponsors speaking engagements, regional workshops and semi-
nars for judges and policy makers throughout the country. "Civil
Justice Memos" are widely disseminated to judges and law profes-
sors as well as to business and government leaders. And, of
course, Mr. Olson's and Mr. Huber's frequent media appearances
encourage the circulation of ideas.33 6
The promotion of Manhattan Institute ideas, and specifically the
promotion of Huber's work, is also fostered through Manhattan In-
stitute mailings, video broadcasts, and the like.3 37 Two techniques
have been particularly effective. The first technique might be called,
335. Id. at 2.
336. Fundraising Letter, supra note 39, at 2-3. From January 1986 through May 1989, the
Judicial Studies Program sponsored 23 conferences, forums, workshops, and judicial seminars
on civil justice reform. TEN YEAR REViEW, supra note 49, at 15. The 10 judicial seminars were
chaired by leading conservative judges such as Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Id.
337. For example, "the Manhattan Institute used $200,000 in corporate and individual
contributions to produce what [Manhattan] Institute President William Hammett calls 'the
documentary' to bring the issue [of tort reform] before the public." Saundra Torry, Walter
Cronkite Video Helps Stir Up Debate over Tort Reform, WASH. PosT, Sept. 14, 1992, at F5. The
video, which stars Peter Huber and is narrated by retired CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite,
brings together an array of influential spokesmen, including former surgeon general
C. Everett Koop and Atlanta Mayor MaynardJackson. [For example, an] Illinois bus-
inessman tells a horror story about a $5 million judgment against his company. The
video doesn't say so, but the company is a subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc.,
whose foundation donated $50,000 to make the video.
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for lack of a more descriptive phrase, "creating a chain reaction"-a
process by which positive testimonials written by favorably inclined
book reviewers are not only provided to potential contributors, but
are also furnished to other potential reviewers, thereby encouraging
them to write equally glowing assessments.3 38 This technique per-
haps explains how a book as demonstrably bad as Galileo's Revenge
has received book reviews that have been nearly unanimously
favorable.
The second technique is similar to the first. Whereas sowing en-
thusiastic book reviews in order to reap additional approving re-
views relies on a network of like-minded tort reformers to write the
initial reviews, attaining a critical mass of media interest and opinion
leader support at conferences, seminars, and lectures depends on
finding friendly audiences. The Manhattan Institute's boast that
Huber and company regularly participate in academic conferences is
accurate-as far as it goes. What the Manhattan Institute neglects
to mention, however, is that Huber only infrequently appears
outside the friendly confines of programs hosted by tort reform or-
ganizations or by conservative think tanks and foundations.3 3 9
Thus, Huber regularly appears on programs sponsored by, or has
his books and videotape sold through the offices of, allied associa-
tions like the American Tort Reform Association,3 40 the Products
Liability Coordinating Committee,3 4 1 the Insurance Information In-
stitute,3 42 the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, and the Federalist Society.3 43
338. For example, for the stated purpose of "informing and broadening public debate,"
the Manhattan Institute sent out, shortly after Galileo's Revenge was published (but before most
reviews were written), a "packet [that] containfed] some of the early [and positive] press clip-
pings generated by the book." MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, MANHATTAN INSTI-
trrTE PRESS PACKEr 1 (Oct. 28, 1991) (on file with The American University Law Review).
339. Huber occasionally does appear in such neutral venues as Face the Nation and the
McNeil/Lehrer NewsHour. See Peter Huber To Address Nat ' Governors' Ass'n, PR Newswire, July 26,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting that Huber has appeared in
neutral venues).
340. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM Assoc., LAwsurr ABUSE 1 (1992) (on file with The Ameri-
can University Law Review) (advertising Peter Huber/Walter Cronkite videotape, Liability: Injus-
tice for All).
341. See Peter Huber To Address Nat'l Governors'Ass'n, supra note 339 (announcing that Huber
would present address on "Product Liability & International Competitiveness" at meeting of
National Governors' Association in Chicago on July 31, 1989 and advising persons interested
in more information to contact Product Liability Coordinating Committee).
342. See Mark A. Hofmann, III To View Industry's Public Image, Bus. INS., Jan. 20, 1992, at
27, 27 (reporting that Insurance Information Institute's (III) outgoing chairman, Gerald A.
Isom, announced "plans this year to join in the communications efforts of the Manhattan
Institute... and the American Tort Reform Association to make the public aware of the
'intolerable costs' of the civil justice system"); Laura Mazzuca, Huber Trashes 'Junk Science, "
Bus. INS., May 18, 1992, at 60, 60 (discussing Huber's speech at National Association of In-
surance Brokers conference).
343. See Hatch, Strossen, Bork, Kennedy Among Headliners at Fifth Annual Federalist Society Con-
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Huber bestrides that conservative sphere of influence like a colos-
sus, but he rarely ventures outside it. Nor need he, as the network is
comprised of more than one hundred tort reform groups, civil jus-
tice reform organizations, multi-issue conservative think tanks, and
conservative public interest law firms, all supported by conservative
foundations, industry and insurance trade associations, as well as in-
dividual corporations; the resources made available in that network
to promote books such as Huber's are staggering.3 44 Huber's suc-
vention, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (announc-
ing that Huber would be luncheon speaker on September 14, 1991).
344. The network of single-issue tort reform organizations includes: the America Tort
Reform Association; Citizen's Coalition for Truth in Science; Citizens for Civil Justice Re-
form; Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Reform; Lawyers for Civil Justice; Product Lia-
bility Advisory Board; Product Liability Advisory Council; Product Liability Alliance; Product
Liability Information Bureau; and Product Liability Coordinating Committee. These single-
issue tort reform groups are aided by such multi-issue think tanks as the Manhattan Institute;
American Enterprise Institute; American Legislative Exchange Council; Brookings Institu-
tion; Cato Institute; Center for Individual Rights; Center for Judicial Studies; Competitive
Enterprise Institute; Federalist Society; Heartland Institute; and the Heritage Foundation.
Multi-issue conservative public interest law firms include the National Legal Center for the
Public Interest; American Legal Foundation; Capital Legal Foundation; Gulf & Great Plains
Legal Foundation; Landmark Legal Foundation; Mid-America Legal Foundation; Mid-Atlantic
Legal Foundation; Mountain States Legal Foundation; New England Legal Foundation; Pa-
cific Legal Foundation; Southeastern Legal Foundation; and the Washington Legal Founda-
tion.
Both the single-issue tort reform groups and the multi-issue conservative think tanks are
supported by contributions and sometimes the separate efforts of industry and insurance
trade associations, including: Alliance of American Insurers; American Council of Life Insur-
ers; American Corporate Counsel Association; American Insurance Association; American
Medical Association; American Mining Congress; Business Roundtable; Committee for Eco-
nomic Development; Conference Board; Chemical Manufacturers Association; Defense Re-
search Institute; Health Insurance Association of America; Insurance Information Institute;
Insurance Research Council; International Association of Defense Council; National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers; National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies; National Associ-
ation of Wholesalers-Distributors; National Tool Builders Association; Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association; Risk & Insurance Management Society; and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce. Corporate foundations include the following: Bradley Foundation; Broyhill
Foundation; Coors Foundation; Deer Creek Foundation; Fund for American Renaissance;
Health Education Foundation;J.M. Foundation; Lilly Endowment; Murdock Foundation;John
M. Olin Foundation; Pew Charitable Trust; Richardson Foundation; Sarah Scaife Foundation;
Starr Foundation; and Walker Foundation. Support also derives from corporations and insur-
ance companies far too numerous to mention. See generally BLUMENTHAL, supra note 325, at 32-
40 (discussing evolution of conservative ideology); JOHN S. SALOMA III, OMINOUS POLITICS:
THE NEw CONSERVATrvE LABYRINTH 7-23 (1984) (tracing buildup of conservative organiza-
tions and effect on political system); JAMES A. SMrIT, THE IDEA BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND
THE NEw POLICY ELITE 202-03, 207, 214-15 (1991) (explaining think tanks' efforts to define
conservative ideology).
For a discussion of the revolving door between the aforementioned groups and the Reagan
and Bush administrations, see W. John Moore, Keeping the Faith, 23 NAT'L J. 734, 735-36
(1991) (reporting that ex-officials from ReaganJustice Department "network" in and through
such groups as Federalist Society, Washington Legal Foundation, Ethics and Public Policy
Center, Cato Institute, Center for Law & Democracy at Free Congress Research and Educa-
tion Foundation, Heritage Foundation, and Landmark Legal Center for Civil Rights). For a
discussion of how Fortune 500 companies such as Exxon and General Motors created, organ-
ized, and financed a nationwide network of conservative, pro-business public interest law
firms, including the Pacific, Mountain States, Mid-America, Gulf Coast and Great Plains, Mid-
Atlantic, Southeastern, New England, and Capital Legal Foundations and the National Legal
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cess thus reflects not only the agenda and resources of his employer,
the Manhattan Institute, but also the place that it holds in the uni-
verse of enormously influential conservative organizations-the last
subject for brief exploration in this Article. Huber's book can be
fully understood only by considering it as a product of an aggressive
revival of corporate activism dating back three decades.
D. The Veiled Origins and Broad Influence of the Manhattan Institute
Although the Manhattan Institute is loathe to admit it now, its
central founder was a protean figure of the American right, William
J. Casey.345 Casey, who was present at the creation of the Office of
Special Services during World War II and who presided over the
rebirth of the CIA as Ronald Reagan's Director of Central Intelli-
gence, established the Manhattan Institute in 1978 under the name
"The International Center for Economic Policy Studies" 346 just
before he became director of Reagan's 1980 election campaign.
Center for the Public Interest, see Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L. J. 1415,
1456-1512 (1984) (noting that these firms promoted "New Right" philosophy in judicial sys-
tem). For a discussion of the influence of such groups as the Federalist Society at the nation's
law schools, see Neil A. Lewis, Conservative 'Outsiders'Now at Hub of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1991, at B16 (reporting that during 1980s, Federalist Society grew from isolated fringe
groups at few law schools to organization with more than 3000 faculty and student members
at 120 law schools and annual "budget of more than $700,000, largely from conservative
groups like the John M. Olin Foundation and the Bradley Foundation"). According to Lewis,
"Many former student members hold important posts in the Bush Administration and several
others . . . are junior law professors." Id. In the words of Harvard Law School Professor
Christopher Edley, Jr., "'They're practically running the country.' " Id.
345. See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 325, at 206 (noting William Casey's "deep roots" in con-
servative movement); SMrIT, supra note 344, at 285 (noting that William Casey founded Inter-
national Center for Economic Policy Studies that was renamed in 1981 and is now called
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research); Marvin Gottlieb, Conservative Policy Unit Takes Aim at
New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1986, at B4 (noting that Casey founded Manhattan Institute);
Think-Tanks: The Carousels of Power, ECONOMIST, May 25-31, 1991, at 23, 24 (noting that Casey
created Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and that think tanks developed prevailing
concepts of domestic welfare policy); see also Keith Henderson, Think Tanks Spread Free-Market
Ideas Worldwide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 3, 1985, at 23 (recognizing that Casey, abetted
by British citizen Sir Antony G.A. Fisher, was progenitor of nearly three dozen conservative
think tanks and foundations around the globe); John A. May, A Quiet Briton Whose Think Tanks
Back a Free Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, Jan. 19, 1984, at 9 (acknowledging Fisher's influ-
ence in founding of Manhattan Institute).
Over the years, Casey and Fisher have been joined by other leading members of the con-
servative "Counter-Establishment," including: Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. (head of the Heritage
Foundation, another conservative think tank); William E. Simon (former Nixon Treasury Sec-
retary, chair of the Institute for Educational Affairs, and president of the John M. Olin Foun-
dation, which is the biggest financial contributor to conservative groups and causes); R.
Randolph Richardson (of the Richardson Foundation); J. Peter Grace (Grace Shipping); cor-
porate raider T. Boone Pickens, Jr. (Mesa Petroleum); Ronald S. Lauder (heir to the Revlon
fortune); financier Shelby Cullom Davis; Lewis E. Lehrman (director of Morgan Stanley &
Co.); Walter Wriston (chair of Citicorp); Nathan Glazer (Harvard professor and neoconserva-
tive guru); and columnist Ernest van den Haag. TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49, at 24.
346. The International Center for Economic Policy Studies changed its name to the Man-
hattan Institute for Policy Research in 1981, after Casey took over at the CIA, in order "to
reflect an expanded policy agenda." HISTORY AND BACKGROUND, supra note 321, at 1.
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The Manhattan Institute's reticence to acknowledge its paternity 47
presumably stems from the current perception of Casey as "the ma-
nipulative puppet master of the Reagan Administration" who took
"so many unresolved mysteries to the grave."'3 48 Perhaps Casey's
reputation for "operat[ing] in a world of manipulated fact and dis-
information, a place where candor is rarely considered a virtue,"3 49
strikes too close to home for the Manhattan Institute, given some of
its chosen methods for influencing public opinion.
In contrast to its veiled origins, the Manhattan Institute makes no
secret of its membership in a massive network of conservative orga-
nizations that was self-consciously created by the legion of frus-
trated and wealthy Goldwater supporters in the aftermath of
Goldwater's failed 1964 bid for the presidency.3 50 Why, these con-
servatives asked, do "bad" (meaning liberal) ideas triumph over
"good" (meaning conservative) ones? The answer, they decided,
was that liberals controlled the dominant think tanks of that day,
such as the Brookings Institution. Therefore, the liberals domi-
nated the nation's media and the nation's thoughts. 35' These
wealthy conservatives set about to build a parallel universe of think
tanks, first to match, and then to overwhelm the liberal intellectual
opposition. 352 The election of Ronald Reagan marked the triumph
347. The most the Manhattan Institute says nowadays about Casey is that he was an emer-
itus trustee. TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49, at 24.
348. Daniel Schorr, Artful Dodger of the CIA; Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1990, (Book Review) at 8; see JOSEPH E. PERSICO, CASEY 561 (1990) (noting Casey's "life-
long reputation for wheeling and dealing").
349. Ed Magnuson, Death of an Expert Witness; William Joseph Casey: 1913-1987, TIME, May
18, 1987, at 37, 37.
350. See RICHARD REEVES, THE REAGAN DETOUR 23-32 (1985) (crediting Ronald Reagan as
leader and spokesman of conservative institutions and movement); SALOMA, supra note 344, at
3-23 (tracing growth in 1980s of conservative think tanks); SMITH, supra note 344, at 167-213
(discussing conservative counterestablishment movement and origin of think tanks); see also
BLUMENTHAL, supra note 325, at 4 (depicting rise of conservative "counterestablishment").
Blumenthal writes:
To counteract th[e] Liberal Establishment, which conservatives believed encom-
passed both political parties, they deliberately created the Counter-Establishment.
By constructing their own establishment, piece by piece, they hoped to supplant the
liberals. Their version of [the] Brookings [Institution]-the American Enterprise In-
stitute-would be bigger and better. The [John M.] Olin Foundation would give
millions, with greater effectiveness than Ford. The editorial pages of the Wall Street
Journal would set the agenda with more prescience than The New York Times. And
although the Washington Times, funded by Reverend Sun Myung Moon, wasn't a
formidable adversary for the Washington Post, a new generation of advocacy jour-
nalists, planted in a host of newspapers, would begin to create an alternative
presence.
BLUMENTHAL, supra note 325, at 4-5.
351. See M. STANTOR EVANS, THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 18 (1965) (noting general con-
servative belief in 1965 that "the [l]iberal [establishment] [was] . . . in control"). Evans as-
serted that the liberal establishment wielded power by controlling "the instruments of public
scrutiny" and directing popular opinion. Id.
352. Richard Reeves noted:
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of their strategy and the ascendancy of conservative views.353 As the
Manhattan Institute itself has boasted, "The Manhattan Institute
was at the forefront of this movement." 354
With the Manhattan Institute at its fore, the conservative move-
ment has been very successful in promoting the views of pro-tort
reform writers such as Huber and in obtaining wide attention for
their ideas, even where those ideas leave much to be desired in
terms of scholarship. In a recent article, Cornell law professors
James A. Henderson, Jr. and Theodore Eisenberg attribute the de-
clining fortunes endured by plaintiffs since 1979, which they de-
scribe as amounting to a "slaughter" since 1985,3 5 partially to the
extraordinary effectiveness of the public relations campaigns waged
by tort reform groups like the Manhattan Institute's Judicial Studies
Project.3 56
In the twenty years from 1964 to 1984, the Capitol of the United States was sur-
rounded, figuratively and literally, by dozens of conservative institutions staffed with
aggressive scholars, researchers and pamphleteers proposing and refining ideas like
tax reform, and deregulation, and aggressive international unilateralism. They pul-
led together and honed a coherent set of ideas, a view of America and the world that
was persuasively articulated by Reagan.
REEVES, supra note 350, at 23-24.
353. See, e.g., George H. Nash, Completing the Revolution: Challenges for Conservatism After Rea-
gan, HERITAGE FOUND. PoL'Y REV., Spring 1986, at 35, 35 (describing rise of conservative
movement).
354. TEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 49, at 1. At the end of its first decade, the Manhattan
Institute observed:
The past ten years have seen many old assumptions about the role of government
turned upside down. The continuing revolution that began in the eighties owes
much to pressures from technologies and a competitive world economy, but even
more to a wave of fresh ideas that swept away the intellectual complacency of previ-
ous decades. Many of those ideas were promoted by a handful of independent re-
search centers whose sole reason for being was to question established opinion.
The Manhattan Institute was at the forefront of this movement ..
Id.; see also Gregg Easterbrook, Ideas Move Nations, AANTIc, Jan. 1986 at 66, 66 (noting think
tanks' contribution to intellectual conservatism); William Safire, Tanksfor the Memories, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1986, at A23 ("In the past generation, political think tanks have done much to
make conservatism a respectable and dynamic intellectual alternative to the liberalism that
permeated academia from the New Deal through the Great Society.").
355. See Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Prod-
ucts Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 770 (1992) (reporting that "[firom 1985 to the time of the
most recently available data, the products battle has been a slaughter. Filings began to plum-
met; success rates continued to fall. Most measures of awards-means, expected returns, and
sums-are down. Medians are equivocal."). For example, "[plaintiff] [s]uccess rates in pub-
lished opinions fell from 56%o in 1979 to 39% in 1989, a drop of 29%. At the federal district
court level ... plaintiff success rates fell from 41% in 1979 to 31% in 1989, a drop of 24%."
Id. at 741.
These factual assessments are substantiated by a number of other studies, including SEAN F.
MOONEY, CRISIS AND RECOVERY: A REvIEw OF BUSINESS LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE 1980s
(1992). For example, Dr. Mooney reports that whereas "[b]etween 1978 and 1985, paid
claims for general liability insurance increased at an average annual rate of 21.1 percent...
[p]aid claims for general liability increased at an average rate of 7.8 percent from 1986 to
1990 ... considerably below the rate of 21.1 percent for the pre-crisis period from 1978 to
1985." Id. at 1, 5-23.
356. See Eisenburg & Henderson, supra note 355, at 778-79, 789-95 (discussing influence
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Professors Henderson and Eisenberg explain how assiduously
tort reform groups and their allies have influenced the public, in-
cluding the nation's judiciary:
Using every technique of modem media-shaping, tort reform
groups sought to assure that the public believed that products lia-
bility law was the cause of this threat to our way of life. The
message was carried, and is carried, through a variety of media:
massive print media advertising campaigns; television appear-
ances on "The Today Show," "Good Morning, America," and the
"McNeil-Lehrer News Hour," purchased television time; and re-
ports of surveys of business and public opinion.357
Henderson's and Eisenberg's conclusion suggests that the contest
for public opinion, and for the support of the nation's judges, law
of tort reform movement). After careful examination of the possible reasons for this "slaugh-
ter," Eisenberg and Henderson discount both geographical variations and differences in cate-
gories of products as possible causes for the dramatic decline in plaintiffs' fortunes. Id. at
772-74, 778-79. They similarly scrutinize, and likewise reject, the enactment of civil justice
reform statutes as a dispositive factor. Id. at 774-78. Thus, "the pro-defendant opinion trend
is not isolated to states in which reform was enacted during the relevant period." Id. at 776.
Professors Henderson and Eisenberg also explore and determine that "shifts in accident
trends," "changes in plaintiffs' propensity to make claims," and "changes in post-claim, pre-
filing settlement behavior" cannot satisfactorily explain the observed patterns. Id. at 748-60.
Interestingly, the authors also reject the notion that the pro-defendant trend since 1979 has
simply been the consequence of Reagan-Bush appointments to the federal bench.
Accordingly:
[O]ne explanation frequently mentioned is the growing influence of President Rea-
gan's judicial appointees.... [Wle think the explanation falters for two reasons.
First, although our district court non-opinion data are all federal, the published
opinion data are dominated by state court opinions. The trend in state appellate
opinions is very similar to the trend in federal appellate opinions. To the extent
appellate judges shape the law, the growing influence of Reagan's federal appellate
appointees has not led the pro-defendant trend. It seems more likely that the federal
district court judges responded to stated changes in legal doctrine, and that the pro-
defendant thrust of those changes comes from state judges with no direct connection
to Reagan.
Second, the litmus test issues for Reagan judges have been public law issues such
as abortion, civil rights, and affirmative action. Potential appointees' views of state
products liability law have not been mentioned as a prominent feature of any presi-
dent's judicial selection process. Although appointees with conservative views on
public law issues might be expected to be hostile to products liability, the
subordinate role of products liability in the selection process might not produce a
noticeable trend in decisions.
Id. at 790-91 (footnotes omitted).
357. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 355, at 793 (footnotes omitted). Tort reform
groups openly acknowledge the dimensions of their advertising campaign and proudly boast
of its achievements. For example, the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) announced
that its "'LAWSUIT ABUSE! Guess who picks up the tab?' communication campaign has
resulted in orders of more than 55,000 information kits, 300,000 posters, 200,000 brochures
and more than 100,000 bumper stickers." ATRA Press Release, June 5, 1992 (on file with The
American University Law Review). ATRA also claims that these sorts of advertisements have
produced "a dramatic and measurable change in the outcome of civil trials" in at least one
area, the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, where they have been widely distributed. Tort Reformers
Say Advertising Pays, Even in Texas, LIABILITY WK., Feb. 10, 1992, at 1 (quoting ATRA President
Martin Connor).
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professors, and law students, may already have been won by the tort
reformers:
Even if subsequent analyses suggested other possible causes of
the insurance crisis,358 the public's mind had been shaped. The
intricacies of the insurance cycle and insurance company invest-
ment returns could not be grasped as easily, nor were they as
forcefully marketed, as was the idea that products liability was the
cause of the insurance crisis. Many reform statutes were enacted;
many others were defeated after vigorous efforts to secure enact-
ment. However, products liability reformers apparently suc-
ceeded in the larger legislature of public opinion, even though
they failed to secure passage of anywhere near all the legislation
they sought. Among those apparently influenced were the appel-
late and district court judges who, at least since 1985, have in-
creasingly favored defendants. These judges ultimately underlie
the quiet revolution, and they have not been bounded by state
lines, reform status, or product categories. 359
358. Eisenberg and Henderson convey that "[t]his is not the place to decide whether
there was a 1980s insurance crisis or whether the products liability system had a substantial
role in causing it. Although evidence links tort reform and declining insurance rates, one also
has reason to be skeptical." Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 355, at 792.
359. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 355, at 794 (footnote omitted). Stated
differently:
The 1980s pro-defendant movement is not the result of sharp reversals in a few
jurisdictions; rather, it is truly national, with most states showing defendant success
rate increases in the second half of the 1980s. Nor did the national trend result from
shifts in a few important products categories. As best we can tell, the trend spans
nearly all nonasbestos products lines. Legislative reforms do appear to have contrib-
uted; but even in non-reform states, the success rate of products cases has declined.
A widespread, independent shift in judicial attitudes continues to be the likely major
source of the decline.
This general shift in attitude suggests that the tort reform movement of the 1970s
and 1980s may have succeeded in a broader sense even if it failed to achieve many of
its more specific legislative goals.
Id. at 734.
All three strands of the Henderson/Eisenberg thesis-first, that plaintiffs' fortunes have
declined since 1985; second, that the decline is due to changed judicial attitudes; and third,
that the attitudes of judges have been changed by a corporate public relations campaign
targeted at the public in general and at judges in particular-are supported by Dean Teresa
M. Schwartz. Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by theJudiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 303
(1991-1992). First, Dean Schwartz notes that a review of leading cases in various areas of tort
law reveals that courts have embarked on a new, pro-defendant path in recent years. Id. at
318-33. As one example of this pro-defendant retrenchment, she notes that courts, particu-
larly well-respected state supreme courts like those of New Jersey, New York, and California
that had a long tradition of being pro-plaintiff, are today consistently "rejecting [liability-
expanding] claims that would open whole new categories of claims." Id. at 318.
Second, new judicial attitudes are reflected in the rationales for these anti-plaintiff deci-
sions, as well as in the decisions themselves. Id at 323-33. Thus, judges are increasingly
"seeing adverse consequences from the product liability system" and are looking for "a more
limited role for [themselves,]" as exemplified by increasing deference to both legislatures and
regulatory agencies. Id. at 324-33. Third, Dean Schwartz, like Professors Henderson and
Eisenberg, identifies one possible reason for this judicial shift in attitude--extensive corpo-
rate media-shaping:
1720 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1637
According to a recently published research monograph by two
University of Delaware sociologists, Valerie P. Hans and William F.
Lofquist, the same tidal wave of civil justice reform advertising that
has transformed judicial attitudes has also changed juror attitudes
previously regarded as pro-plaintiff and anti-corporateYs 60 Today,
according to Professors Hans and Lofquist:
Rather than revealing jurors willing or eager to impose on busi-
ness the costs of plaintiffs' injuries, our findings show that jurors
were suspicious of the legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims and con-
cerned about the personal and social costs of large jury awards.
Despite insistence on product safety and high expectations of
business, jurors were generally favorable toward business, skepti-
cal more about the profit motives of individual plaintiffs than of
business defendants, and committed to holding down awards. 361
Critics of the product liability system have been highly visible and effective. They
have come from all quarters-business, government, and academia .... The busi-
ness interests pushing for product liability reform are well organized and have com-
mitted substantial resources to promote their aims. They have gathered together
sizeable coalitions of manufacturers and insurers to work for reform. They have
been able to fund studies of the system that support their views and to get the results
of their studies into the news media .... Tort scholarship, once at the forefront of
efforts to expand the product liability law, now largely supports the constriction of
the product liability system.... [T]here has been nearly a "consensus" in academic
writing that the expansion of the product liability system, "whatever its magnitude,
has generated much more harm than good."
Id. at 306-08 (citations omitted). According to Dean Schwartz, the "widespread criticism of
the product liability system ... has begun to have an impact on the judiciary." Id. at 304.
Thus,judges often parrot this propaganda, repeating civil justice reform "horror stories" line
by line:
[Judicial] [o]pinions that reject new liability expanding claims often sound the
themes of the tort system's critics, e.g., that the system is out of control, imposes
burdensome costs on businesses and consumers, deters manufacturers from market-
ing worthwhile products and from research and development, and makes U.S. prod-
ucts less competitive in world markets.
I at 304-05.
360. See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist,Jurors'Judgments of Busines Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & Soc'y REV. 85, 108 (1992) (report-
ing that survey of jurors in tort/business cases revealed skepticism of plaintiffs' claims and
conservative approach to damages awards).
361. Id. at 93. Generally, "tortjurors had strong negative views about the frequency and
legitimacy of civil lawsuits." Id. According to the survey, 83% of the tort jurors sampled
either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "[t]here are far too many frivolous
lawsuits today"; 81% agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that "[p]eople are too
quick to sue"; 39% agreed or strongly agreed with the assertion that "[tihe money awards
that juries are awarding in civil cases are too large"; and 32% agreed or strongly agreed that
"[the number of lawsuits show that our society is breaking down." Id at 95.
On the other hand, "[clontrary to the skepticism shown plaintiffs, corporate defendants
were typically not subjected to such vigorous scrutiny." Id. at 97. Hans and Lofquist "found
little evidence of tough standards and punitiveness [by jurors] toward ... corporation[s]." Id.
at 100. They learned that most jurors evinced only "scattered concern about the profit mo-
tive causing business to cut corners." Id. at 104. Mostjurors polled thought that an "organi-
zation's assets should not be and were not relevant to the liability and award decisions." Id. at
106. The study found that jurors' "comments derogating business were rare compared to the
more frequent negative evaluations of the plaintiffs and their [putatively] mercenary motives."
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Finally, Hans and Lofquist conclude that one force affecting the
attitudes of jurors is "[t]he concerted efforts of business and insur-
ance companies to foster perceptions of a litigation explosion."3 6 2
Hans and Lofquist also surmise that the "litigation explosion rheto-
ric captured the public's (and jurors') attention because [such rheto-
ric] resonated strongly with pre-existing cultural standards of
responsibility." 363
Although any particular organization's importance to such con-
certed efforts is usually difficult to assess,364 one indicator that the
Manhattan Institute is a major player in the tort reform movement-
and a notable outcome of that movement-is the prominence of its
fellow Peter Huber. In 1986, leaders of the tort reform movement,
who were clearly identified as partisan mouthpieces for corporate
America, could herald Huber as something new under the sun, a
thinker" 'untainted by any relationship with the manufacturers who
are leading the fight for tort reform.' ",365 Seven years have passed,
during which Huber has been continuously employed with the Man-
hattan Institute's Judicial Studies Program, helping to carry out its
mandate to promote the civil justice reforms favored by the corpo-
Id. at 104. The numbers bear out their conclusions. Fifty-seven percent of the tort jurors
sampled either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "[tihe threat of lawsuits is so
prevalent today that it interferes with the development of new and useful products"; 51%
agreed or strongly agreed with the view that "[b]ig business in this country is adequately
concerned with the safety of its workers"; and 32% agreed or strongly agreed with the notion
that "[t]he courts have meddled so much in the workplace that many businesses are not able
to remain competitive." Id at 99.
The survey results published by Hans and Lofquist are consistent with those reported ear-
lier this year by The Roper Organization, Inc. See To Sue or Not To Sue: Public Backs Liability
Reform, PUB. PULSE, Aug. 1991, at 6 (charting tort reform poll). According to the Roper poll,
70% of the persons surveyed agreed that "[l]awyers and law firms make much more money
than they deserve"; 63% agreed that "[pleople often start frivolous lawsuits because awards
are so big and they have so little to lose"; only 40% of the people queried said that the major
effect of liability suits is for "[v]ictims [to] get fair compensation for what they have suffered or
lost"; and "two-thirds . . . support caps on compensation for pain and suffering, and half
would limit amounts granted to cover lost income." Id.
362. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 360, at 109.
363. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 360, at 109.
364. This is so because while these conservative organizations collectively advocate con-
servative views, they individually compete with each other for corporate cash, making any
single organization's claim that it is more important than any of the others somewhat suspect.
For example, according to a recent fundraising letter from Manhattan Institute President Wil-
liam M.H. Hammett to corporate executives, contributing money to the Manhattan Institute is
the wisest of investments. MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 38, at i ("Our books have been
extremely influential; no less an authority than The Washington Post [has] hailed them as the
driving force behind the [tort] reform movement (and dubbed their authors-Peter Huber
and Walter Olson-the 'gurus' of tort reform).").
365. W. John Moore, Free-Lance Critic Hits Shackles of Regulation, 18 NAT'L J. 2797, 2797
(1986) (quoting Victor Schwartz as stating that Huber's 1985 tort reform article was "intellec-
tual underpinning" of tort reform effort).
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rate contributors of the Manhattan Institute.3 66 Huber hardly seems
"untainted" now.
Of course, the source of support for Huber's work, and the role
this work plays in fulfilling the agenda of the Manhattan Institute
and its contributors, do not, in and of themselves, render Huber's
scholarship worthless. They do require that the informed reader
keep in mind the potential source of bias and, in that light, carefully
analyze all of Huber's statements and arguments. Likewise, given
the massive promotion of Huber by the Manhattan Institute and its
affiliated conservative organizations, the reader must not assume
that the sheer notoriety of Huber's scholarship necessarily reflects
real merit.
CONCLUSION
"A lie can be halfway round the world before the truth has got its
boots on."3 67 In the case of Galileo's Revenge, the massive promotion
of the book and its author by the Manhattan Institute have fast out-
run the flaws in the book and have long obscured the lack of merit in
its analysis. Unlike the typical nonfiction book on policy issues that
legitimately succeeds with a core synthesis of careful research and
reporting of facts, the prominence of Galileo's Revenge springs chiefly
from the perceived scholarly credentials of its author and the mar-
keting of both the author and the book by the Manhattan Institute.
The analysis in the book itself is mostly smoke and mirrors.
Although best-selling books on policy issues in the legal arena and
elsewhere often draw their share of critics who dispute the premises,
logic, and conclusions of the arguments made, there are few cases in
which readers who take the care to check the details are led to doubt
the fundamental integrity of the book or of the author. Galileo's Re-
venge is one of these unfortunate cases; the long-overdue critical ex-
amination of the book offered in the preceding pages reveals
disturbing problems.
In the subtitle to his book, and as a constant refrain throughout,
Huber complains of "Junk Science in the Courtroom." Yet much of
Huber's response to this supposed scourge can be most aptly de-
scribed as "Junk Scholarship Outside the Courtroom." Huber's
brand of "scholarship" in his legal writing employs distortion of the
facts of cases and of the content of legal doctrines, including an ig-
366. See supra notes 38, 326 and accompanying text (discussing Huber's position with
Manhattan Institute).
367. British Prime Minister James Callaghan, quoted in THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 349:9 (1989).
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norance of controlling constitutional principles. If presented in a
courtroom in the form of a legal brief, such analysis would likely
trigger sanctions under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.3 68 Likewise, such "scholarship" would be unacceptable if
presented in a dissertation or research report. Major faults in
Galileo's Revenge include, particularly: (1) Huber's studied conceal-
ment from readers that fully two-thirds of the supposed "cancer-by-
pothole" cases he discusses involved uncontroversial claims merely
that existing cancer was aggravated by trauma;36 9 (2) Huber's failure
to report that his sources on cerebral palsy severely criticize, or re-
cant, the preliminary report of scientists whose views Huber claims
have consensus status;370 (3) Huber's attempt to portray the $5.1
million spermicide award in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. as run-
away junk science, by falsely claiming that it was a jury "verdict"
based upon a single, tentative study, after which "the several au-
thors of that study" unanimously retracted their earlier findings;3 7'
(4) Huber's rewriting of the legal history of the Frye rule;372 (5) Hu-
ber's pretension that judges are free to enforce their own "rule of
fact" unencumbered by the well-established Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial;3 7 3 and (6) Huber's general failure to cite opposing
authority on central topics and to note obvious counter-examples to
points he makes that are necessary to give a full and fair portrait of
the topics.
Perhaps these and other faults in Huber's book could be defended
by Huber or his supporters as instances not of willful distortion and
368. Rule 11 provides, in relevant part, that an attorney's filing of a legal document "con-
stitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reason-
able inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See
generally 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1331-1339 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993) (discussing rule 11). Sanctions are common "when
the party's position is groundless under existing law, there is a failure to cite controlling law,
or there is a misstatement as to the content of existing law." Id. § 1335. Similarly, rule 11
also "prohibits a party from rewriting the factual record to reflect what it thinks should have
occurred." Teamsters Local No. 579 v. B&M Transit, Inc., 882 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1989);
see alsoJames E. Ward IV, Note, Rule 11 and Factually Frivolous Claims-The Goal of Cost Minimiza-
tion and the Client's Duty To Investigate, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1165 (199 1) (discussing merits of rule).
369. For a discussion of Huber's treatment of the cancer-by- pothole cases, see supra notes
106-25 and accompanying text.
370. For a discussion of Huber's conclusions regarding the relationship between obstetric
malpractice and cerebral palsy, see supra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
371. For a discussion of Huber's treatment of Wells, see supra notes 147-58 and accompa-
nying text.
372. For a discussion of Huber's distortion of the Frye rule's history and current status,
see supra notes 234-68 and accompanying text.
373. For a discussion of the role of the jury in resolving factual issues, see supra notes 268-
312 and accompanying text.
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evasion, but of "merely" shoddy research or negligent analysis-
although this explanation would be groundless in response to a rule
1 1 motion for sanctions, for which "an empty head and a pure
heart" is no excuse.3 74 Even indulging this defense, Huber's many
failures to meet minimal standards of trustworthiness imposed by
the legal and scholarly communities should disqualify Galileo's Re-
venge as worthy of attention. Huber's work is so untrustworthy and
incomplete that a serious reader would be forced to check every
source and do background reading on every topic discussed before
being able to evaluate the worth of Huber's analysis and proposals.
A reader who sets aside Huber's writings as not worth the effort
will encounter no shortage of legitimate scholars on these subjects
who enjoy strong reputations and whose writings are not plagued by
the kinds of flaws that permeate Huber's work. For example, lead-
ing law-and-economics scholars from the University of Chicago,
such as professors Richard A. Epstein and William M. Landes, in
conjunction with their former colleague and now federal court of
appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, have subjected the tort system to
a rigorous and critical analysis, without resorting to factual or ana-
lytical misrepresentation, omission, or distortion.3 75 Yale law pro-
fessor George L. Priest also has authored a large body of tort law
374. See Note, The Intended Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An End to the
"Empty Head, Pure Heart" Defense and a Reinforcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAND. L. REV. 343
(1988).
375. Important writings of Professor Epstein include: Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A
Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL S-UD. 477 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent
Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional
Harms, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presump-
tions, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 556 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market,
14J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
Important writings ofJudge Posner include: RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (3d ed. 1986); Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of
the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73
CAL. L. REV. 747 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Some Uses andAbuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm.
L. REV. 281 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
Important writings of Professor Landes and Judge Posner include: WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535
(1985); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law:
An Economic Approach, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981); William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13J. LEGAL STUD.
417 (1984).
1993] GALILEO'S RETORT 1725
work that has sometimes disparaged current doctrine,376 as have the
co-reporters for the American Law Institute's forthcoming Restate-
ment (Third) of Products Liability, Cornell law professorJames A. Hen-
derson, Jr.377 and Brooklyn law professor Aaron Twerski.3 78 A wide
variety of scholars have published careful evaluations of the current
use of scientific and other expert testimony in our court system.3 79
376. See, e.g., GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (1982); George L.
Priest, Compensation for Personal Injury in the United States, in COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURY IN SWEDEN AND OTHER COUNRIES (Carl Oldertz & Eva Tidefelt eds., 1988); George L.
Priest, The Disappearance of the Consumer from Modern Products Liability Law, in THE FRONTIER OF
RESEARCH IN THE CONSUMER INTEREST 771 (E. Scott Maynes ed. 1986); George L. Priest, A
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297 (1981); George L. Priest, Measuring
Legal Change, 3J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193 (1987); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law andIts Reform,
22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1987); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and the Current Insurance Crisis,
96 YALE LJ. 1521 (1987); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 123 (1982); George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 497 (1987);
George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301 (1989);
George L. Priest, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability Law on the Accident Rate: Reply,
91 YALE LJ. 1386 (1982); George L. Priest, The Insurance and Antitrust Suits and the Public Under-
standing of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV. 999 (1989); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1985); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
377. See, e.g.,James A. Henderson,Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REV. 919 (1981);James A. Henderson, Jr., Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 541 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. LJ. 467 (1976);James A. Henderson, Jr.,Judicial Review of Manufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); James A.
Henderson,Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56
N.C. L. REV. 625 (1978); James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1983); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979); James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Creative Judging Won't
Save the Products Liability System, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 845 (1982).
378. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARO. L. REV. 297 (1977); Aaron D. Twerski, National Product
Liability Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411 (1982);
Aaron D. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restricting Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability
Era, 60 IOwA L. REV. 1 (1974); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and
Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982); Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Aaron D. Twerski,
The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977).
379. See, e.g., PAUL GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1986);
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, ROLE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN PROOF OF
CAUSATION (1987); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857
(1992); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89
(1987); Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); Ron-
ald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986); Neil B.
Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 385 (1985); Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demon-
strating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 429 (1983); E. Donald Elliot, Toward Incentive-
Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989);
David L. Faigman, Struggling To Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877
(1992); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
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Huber has published less work than any of these scholars who
have analyzed the tort system, but paradoxically his fame among the
informed public, fueled by the public relations juggernaut of the
Manhattan Institute, seems to be greater than that of all these au-
thors combined. It is sad to discover that a writer possessing the
intellect, resources, and scholarly background of Peter Huber could
publish a book so contemptuous of the reader and the truth. It is
sadder still to see such work become the focus of attention that
ought to be devoted to books and articles on the same topics written
by legitimate scholars.
Some who have been closely associated with Huber have variously
noted that he is a "polemicist" who, although he "writes a good
jeremiad," also engages in a "slick sleight of hand" and reaches
"large conclusions on the basis of partial or inadequate evi-
dence."380 After full review of Galileo's Revenge and the materials
cited in many portions of it, Galileo would no doubt agree with such
assessments. But the errors in Huber's factual description and legal
analysis are so frequent and profound that Galileo would go further
to repudiate Huber's book-on Huber's own terms-as "a catalog
of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking,
truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud."'38'
Galileo would attribute the prominence of the book and its author
to clever public relations, not merit, and would denigrate it as junk
scholarship in search of "junk science." Such would be Galileo
Galilei's retort to Peter Huber.
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Green, supra note 61, at 643; Edward J.
Imwinkelreid, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577 (1984); EdwardJ. Imwinkelreid,
The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1
(1988); Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Standardfor Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective ofJuror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554 (1982-1983); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange
Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986); Jack B.
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RicH. L. REv. 473 (1986); Michael C. McCarthy,
Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350 (1992).
380. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 94, 98.
381. HUBER, GALILEo's REVENGE, supra note 5, at 3.
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